WALTER J. ONG’S THOUGHT AND A BIBLIOGRAPHY OF SELECTED RELATED WORKS

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AN INTRODUCTION TO ONG’S THOUGHT

When we consider what might contribute to helping people to live morally upright lives, does it make any difference whether people think that the sun revolves around the earth, or that the earth revolves around the sun? No, it probably does not. But does it make any difference if people believe in an atheistic version of evolutionary theory, or believe that God somehow created the cosmos? Once again, it probably does not. Ah, but what about social policy? Yes, there are social-policy implications in the sense of the social policies about what we teach in schools regarding these two respective issues. However, unless we subscribe to so-called social Darwinism, we are not likely to contend that either issue has serious implications for social justice.

But Walter J. Ong, S.J. (1912-2003) was an American cultural historian and philosopher. He formulated a philosophy of cultural history that does have serious implications for social justice, most notably for promoting literacy education and functional literacy not only in the
United States but also around the world, where an estimated one billion people do not know how to read and write any language. Those one billion people will not be using computers and the Internet. In the United States, people who are not functionally literate with respect to their reading ability are usually socially disadvantaged, unless they happen to be extraordinary athletes or entertainers. For all practical purposes, people in the United States who are not functionally literate live in a residual form of oral culture. Thus functional literacy with respect to reading ability should be a social-policy goal in the United States.

Who Was Walter J. Ong?

With a Ph.D. in English from Harvard University and three other graduate degrees to his credit, Ong first rose to prominence in the 1950s when white Anglo-Saxon Protestant (WASP) culture still dominated the United States. Despite the fact that he was not a Protestant, but a Roman Catholic priest, he could claim that he came from a somewhat Protestant background because his father Walter Jackson Ong, Sr., was a Protestant when Walter Jr. was growing up. But his mother was a Roman Catholic, so young Walter and his younger brother were raised as Roman Catholics.

The middle name “Jackson” in the name of both Walter Sr. and Walter Jr. commemorates that President Andrew Jackson was a family relative. The family name “Ong” is English; for centuries it was spelled “Onge”; it is probably related to the English name “Yonge.”

But the strident anti-Catholic spirit of American WASP culture was beginning to give way to a more expansive and inclusive spirit in the United States, as the Harvard-educated white Irish-American Catholic John F. Kennedy was elected president of the United States in 1960. But
of course President Kennedy was assassinated on November 22, 1963 -- for reasons that are debated to this day. For its part, the Roman Catholic Church tempered its strident anti-Protestant spirit a bit at the Second Vatican Council (1962-1965). Thus on the one hand, we in the United States underwent the tempering of the strident anti-Catholic spirit of American WASP culture, about the time when the American Catholic subculture in the United States, which Ong in the 1950s characterized as extremely conservative culturally (compared to French Catholics at the time, for example), was undergoing the tempering of the strident anti-Protestant spirit that had characterized it for centuries. These two temperings could be likened to the shifting of tectonic plates that produce earthquakes and tsunamis. We in the United States are still undergoing the aftereffects of these two cultural temperings, as more Roman Catholics have risen out of the American Catholic subculture that Ong in the 1950s characterized as extremely conservative culturally to play more prominent roles in the larger American culture of our time – as I write, six of the nine Supreme Court justices are Roman Catholics, a proportion that would never have happened under the pre-1960 WASP culture.

**What Did Ong Discover?**

As significant as these two cultural temperings have been in the United States to this time, they are best understood as byproducts of the far larger cultural shift in Western culture that Ong came to identify as the rise of communication media that accentuate sound (e.g., television, radio, telephone, sound amplifications systems, sound recordings, including movies with soundtracks). Ong sees Western cultural history as unfolding in four historically successive waves:
(1) primary oral culture (i.e., pre-literate culture), which has never come to an end;
(2) manuscript or chirographic culture involving writing with the phonetic alphabetic writing;
(3) print culture with the emergence of the Gutenberg printing press in the 1450s; and
(4) secondary oral culture with the rise of communication media that accentuate sound.

More recently, photocopiers and printers attached to computers have vastly expanded the influence of Gutenberg print culture. But we should remember that an estimated one billion people in the world today do not know how to read or write any language, which means that they live in a residual form of oral culture and will not be using computers or the Internet.

Regarding these four successive waves of Western cultural development, Ong worked up what he styled a relationist thesis. According to Ong’s relationist way of thinking about cultural changes, probably all major cultural changes in Gutenberg print culture, for example, were connected to changes associated with the Gutenberg printing press, which served to advance and carry forward cultural developments that had originated in ancient and medieval Western culture such as visuality, the quantification of thought in medieval logic, and the inward turn of consciousness. According to Ong’s relationist way of thinking, modern capitalism and the culture of capitalism, modern science and the culture of modern science, and modern democracy in America and the culture of modern democracy in America, the Industrial Revolution and the culture of the Industrial Revolution, and the Romantic Movement and the culture of the Romantic Movement emerged historically in Gutenberg print culture. Thus in the final analysis, Ong’s impressive body of work from the 1950s onward can be understood as being about Western culture in general and American culture in particular.
But it remains to be seen still how many Americans are ready to undergo the cultural
navel-gazing and deconstruction that Ong’s thought invites us to undertake. We Americans today
are the products of Western cultural history as Ong has detailed Western cultural history. In
short, Ong’s work from the 1950s onward is about us Americans and our cultural conditioning.

**Ong’s Relationist Way of Thinking**

But apart from the works listed in the present bibliography that can be related in one way
or another to Ong’s thought, is his thought important enough for ordinary Americans to be
interested in it?

Because Ong’s relationist way of thinking about major cultural developments is not yet a
familiar way of thinking for most Americans, I should explain that Ong’s relationist way of
thinking does not involve straightforward cause-and-effect claims. Relationist claims are usually
claims about significant factors and the interaction of those factors with one another. So let me
illustrate how this kind of relationist thought works.

(1) No print culture, no modern capitalism as we know it in Western culture.

(2) No print culture, no modern science as we know it in Western culture.

(3) No print culture, no modern democracy as we know it in the United States or elsewhere in
Western culture.
(4) No print culture, no Industrial Revolution as we know it in Western culture.

(5) No print culture, no Romantic Movement as we know it in Western culture.

But so what?

So what happens in non-Western countries in the world today when the United States engages in democracy promotion?

Ong’s relationist way of thinking suggests that modern democracy is actually a juggernaut of cultural factors that emerged historically in Western culture. A clash of cultures is inevitable, but violence may not be inevitable.

Next, what happens when the globalization of the economy today leads to some form of modern capitalism making inroads in non-Western countries?

Once again, Ong’s relationist way of thinking suggests that modern capitalism is actually a juggernaut of cultural factors that emerged historically in Western culture. A clash of cultures is inevitable, but violence may not be inevitable.

Ong used to like to say that the English title of Freud’s *Civilization and Its Discontents* should have been *Civilization and Its Discomforts*. Instead of civilization, I will refer to refer to culture.

As democracy promotion makes inroads in non-Western countries today where democracy has not already been established, we should expect that there will be certain cultural and personal discomforts associated with the inception of democracy.
Similarly, as capitalism, or something like capitalism, makes inroads in non-Western countries today where it has not previously been native to the culture, there will be certain cultural and personal discomforts associated with the development of capitalist economic arrangements.

**Major Themes in Ong’s Thought**

Without ever claiming to have rendered a complete and exhaustive account of the factors in Western culture that contributed historically to the emergence of print culture and of modernity within print culture, Ong identified and discussed certain key factors that contributed to the emergence of print culture and thus to modernity:

(A) orality

(B) literacy

(C) linear thought, as distinct from cyclic thought

(D) agonistic structures

(E) visuality

(F) the inward turn of consciousness

(G) the quantification of thought in medieval logic

(H) commonplaces and composing practices

(I) the art of memory and Ramist method.
As the mention of medieval logic suggests, all of these different factors had earlier historical developments before the development of the Gutenberg printing press in the 1450s.

Arguably one of the most significant transformations that occurred in emerging modernity involved what Ong styles agonistic structures. In Manliness (Yale UP, 2006: 230), Harvey C. Mansfield in effect writes about agonistic structures. The title of his book involves the meaning of the Greek term andreia, which means both courage and manliness. In any event, Mansfield makes a telling observation about modernity: “The entire enterprise of modernity . . . could be understood as a project to keep manliness unemployed.” Yes, it could. In the history of modern literature, the rise of the mock epic should be understood as showing the waning of the old oral manliness and the code of the hero, as should the later rise of the antihero in literature. In general, the old oral orientation toward the heroic gives way to the inward turn of consciousness toward inner-directedness. Nevertheless, modernity cannot be understood as keeping agonistic structures entirely unemployed, for modern capitalism and modern science employ agonistic structures, as do old warrior religions such as Christianity and Islam. Moreover, in American popular culture today, we find an extraordinary fascination with the agonistic spirit in televised sports and in comics and action movies.

The Aural-to-Visual Shift in Cognitive Processing

For Ong, the corpuscular sense of life is expressed not only in world-as-view sense of life in ancient Greek and Roman and medieval and modern philosophy and more broadly in modern print culture but also in the oral sense of life as event. But as Plato and Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas and Bernard Lonergan and Ong understand the human mind, the human mind
transcends the corpuscular sense of life. The prolific conservative Roman Catholic writer Michael Novak gives no evidence of having studied Ong’s thought about the corpuscular sense of life in depth, but Novak has studied Lonergan’s thought well enough to grasp how the human mind is different from the corpuscular sense of life that Ong writes about. In the introduction to the recent reprinting of his 1965 book Belief and Unbelief: A Philosophy of Self-Knowledge (X.17: xv), Novak sets forth the following critique of the visualist tendencies in Richard Rorty’s thought:

Rorty thinks that in showing that the mind is not “the mirror of nature” he has disproved the correspondence theory of truth. What he has really shown is that the activities of the human mind cannot be fully expressed by metaphors based upon the operations of the eye [see Ong on visualist tendencies]. We do not know simply through “looking at” reality as though our minds were simply mirrors of reality. One needs to be very careful not to confuse the activities of the mind with the operations of any (or all) bodily senses [see Ong’s critique of the corpuscular sense of life]. In describing how our minds work, one needs to beware of being bewitched by the metaphors that spring from the operations of our senses. Our minds are not like our eyes; or, rather, their activities are far richer, more complex, and more subtle than those of our eyes. It is true that we often say, on getting the point, “Oh, I see!” But putting things together and getting the point normally involve a lot more than “seeing,” and all that we need to do to get to that point can scarcely be met simply by following the imperative, “Look!” [Or the imperative, “Hear!”] Even when the point, once grasped, may seem to have been (as it were) right in front of us all along, the reasons why it did not dawn upon us immediately may be many, including the
fact that our imaginations were ill-arranged, so that we were expecting and “looking for” the wrong thing. To get to the point at which the evidence finally hits us, we may have to undergo quite a lot of dialectical argument and self-correction.

For a straightforward and useful account of Lonergan’s thought, the interested reader should see Hugo A. Meynell’s *An Introduction to the Philosophy of Bernard Lonergan*, 2nd ed. (U of Toronto P, 1991).

In *Ramus, Method, and the Decay of Dialogue* (III.74), Ong has in effect also set forth a critique of “confusing the activities of the mind with any (or all) the bodily senses.” Ong refers to this kind of confusion in various terms: the corpuscular view of reality, the corpuscular epistemology, and the corpuscular psychology – in short, the corpuscular sense of life (65-66, 72, 146, 171, 203, 210). But in the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition of philosophic thought that Lonergan and Ong and Novak draw on, the human mind is not corpuscular. This is the import of the body/soul distinction with which Ong and others in the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition of philosophic thought work.

Like everybody else in the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition of philosophy, Ong works with what is known in philosophy as the body/soul distinction, where the distinctively human soul is understood to be the source of the human mind and rationality. For an excellent and accessible discussion of how and why the intellect is not material, the interested reader should see Mortimer J. Adler’s *Intelect: Mind Over Matter* (IX.2). In short, Ong works within the nonmaterialist philosophic tradition of thought in Western culture.

In the final analysis, there really are only two basic philosophic positions: (1) the materialist philosophic position (aka naturalism) and (2) the nonmaterialist philosophic position.
People who claim to be agnostics do not affirm the nonmaterialist philosophic position, so they can be aligned with the materialist philosophic position.

In any event, when Ong refers to the corpuscular sense of life, he is accentuating the sensory-based quality involved. The centuries-old philosophic tag-line is relevant here: “Nothing is in the intellect that was not first in the senses.” But the intellect as such is not material (i.e., not corpuscular in Ong’s terminology). So what would a noncorpuscular orientation to life be like? It would presumably involve radical reflectiveness about one’s conceptual constructs and predications.

Late in his life, Ong summed up his view of verbal discourse and communication in “Hermeneutic Forever: Voice, Text, Digitization, and the ‘I’” in Oral Tradition (I.125), which can be accessed at the journal’s website.

In The Cambridge Encyclopedia of the Language Sciences, edited by Patrick Colm Hogan (New York and Cambridge, UK: Cambridge UP, 2011), Christopher Norris, an authority on Derrida’s thought, has set forth an incisive and sharply focused presentation of Derrida’s thought (“Deconstruction,” 244-47). If I understand Norris correctly, Ong’s thought and Lonergan’s thought are not incompatible with Derrida’s thought.

In my annotations to certain works below, some of which are not short, I have at times singled out statements by Harold Bloom of Yale University for comment. Harold Bloom is a national treasure to be cherished. I have always benefited from reading his books, even when I have found particular points to disagree with. In my annotations below, my disagreements with particular points that Bloom makes are highlighted. Despite my explicit disagreements, I am enormously thankful to Professor Bloom for having the courage of his convictions to say the very things with which I happen to disagree. If he had not said these things, then I could not
disagree with him about them. For this reason, I am abundantly grateful to him for stimulating me to think about the very points with which I disagree. He has served as a useful foil against which I have developed my own thinking about certain matters.

For years now, Bloom has been intrigued with the anonymous biblical author known as the Yahwist, the author of the oldest parts of the Hebrew Bible, the parts known for their use of the tetragrammaton YHWH to refer to the monotheistic deity, which is Englished as Yahweh. Famously or infamously depending on your point of view, Bloom claims that the Yahwist was probably a woman. For among other things, the Yahwist undercuts the pretensions of men. Of course it is impossible to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the Yahwist was a woman, just as it is impossible to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the Yahwist was not a woman.

In any event, Bloom is intrigued with the voice of the Yahwist. This anonymous author captivates him, just as Shakespeare’s character Hamlet also captivates him. Now, Ong never tired of urging us to attend to voice, as Bloom regularly does. In this respect, Bloom is one example of the kind of literary critic that Ong wanted literary critics to be. As a matter of fact, Ong wanted to initiate undergraduate English majors at Saint Louis University into the practice of attending to matters of voice in poetry (in his course Practical Criticism: Poetry) and prose (in Practical Criticism: Prose). In Practical Criticism: Prose, Ong assigned us to read Marshall McLuhan’s The Mechanical Bride: Folklore of Industrial Man (New York: Vanguard P, 1951), which consists of short essays by a literary critic commenting on different voices in popular culture and experimenting in those very essays with different voices in responses to the voices being discussed. Because Ong would like to see American adults learn how to respond critically to the artifacts of popular culture, we might say that he wanted to see American adults be
initiated into the art of the literary critic and learn how to respond to the appeals that different voices make on our attention.

Ong presents his basic argument for paying attention to voice in “Voice as Summons for Belief: Literature, Faith, and the Divided Self” (I.131). We should note that faith in this title does not necessarily refer to religious faith, even though religious faith may work in ways analogous to the ways in which faith works in literature. Faith works in literature by evoking our sense that the author of the work in question is making a genuine effort to speak from the depths of his or her consciousness in constructing the work of literature, as distinct from speaking from more superficial levels of consciousness, as the artifacts of popular culture examined by McLuhan and all forms of kitsch art do.

Bloom is intrigued with the voice of the Yahwist. The Yahwist constructed the character known in English as Yahweh, just as Shakespeare constructed the character known as Hamlet. The character Yahweh has a voice, just as the character Hamlet has a voice. At one time, Bloom put his trust in Yahweh. But Bloom reports that he no longer puts his trust in Yahweh or in the covenant. Fair enough. He is being honest and candid in telling us where he now stands. However, as we listen to Bloom’s voice as a literary and cultural critic, we should notice how his personal cynicism is expressed in certain points in his cultural criticism. In short, Bloom is far more reliable as a literary critic than as a cultural critic. As I explain in my annotations below, I find Ong preferable to Bloom as a cultural critic. Bloom is unsurpassed as a literary critic. But Ong is unsurpassed as a cultural critic.

Unlike Bloom, I did not grow up as a Jew. I grew up as a Roman Catholic. As a result, I did not received the Jewish instruction to place my trust in the covenant. Nevertheless, in teaching an introductory-level survey course on the Bible annually at the University of
Minnesota Duluth before I retired, I devoted most of the course to selections from the Hebrew Bible. As a result of teaching selections from the ancient Hebrew prophets, I came to the conclusion that the covenant is one of the greatest ideas in the Western tradition of thought. Despite the supercessionism of orthodox Christianity (i.e., the New Testament supercedes the Old Testament), self-described Christians are Jews spiritually. Tragically, early polemics between the yeasty followers of Jesus and their unpersuaded fellow Jews produced striking invectives against their unpersuaded fellow Jews, the consequences of which have reverberated tragically down the centuries. As a result of Christian persecution of Jews over the centuries down to and including the Holocaust, we should conclude that those Christian persecutors of Jews demonstrated by their persecution of Jews that they were not part of the covenant (i.e., not part of God’s people), but were acting contrary to the inner meaning of the covenant which calls for God’s people to recognize their mutual responsibilities toward other people. In other words, Christians are Jews spiritually. Self-described Christians want to claim that they are among God’s people. But God’s people are part of the covenant, so let self-described Christians show that they understand the inner meaning of the covenant through the ways in which they act.

Because I myself am no longer a practicing Catholic, I can join with Bloom in hoping to see self-described Christians abandon the various claims of orthodox Christianity. However, I do not expect to see Christians do this. Moreover, I do not join Bloom in advocating the emergence of secular culture to supercede the highly variegated Christian culture that dominates the United States today. Instead, my hope is that secularists such as Bloom and religious people in the monotheistic religious traditions will live in morally upright and responsible ways. Granted, there is room for debate about how to live in morally upright and responsible ways.
In the following categorized bibliography, I use the following twelve classifications of works about factors that in one way or another contributed historically to the emergence of modernity in Western culture:

I. SELECTED WORKS ABOUT ORALITY (see *Orality and Literacy*: 1-76)

II. SELECTED WORKS ABOUT CYCLIC THOUGHT AND LINEAR THOUGHT (see *Orality and Literacy*: 138-44)

III. SELECTED WORKS ABOUT AGONISTIC STRUCTURES (see *Orality and Literacy*: 42-45, 69-70)

IV. SELECTED WORKS ABOUT WRITING SYSTEMS (see *Orality and Literacy*: 77-114)

V. SELECTED WORKS ABOUT WRITTEN AUTHORSHIP

VI. SELECTED WORKS ABOUT THE ART OF MEMORY (see *Orality and Literacy*: 33-36, 136-52)

VII. SELECTED WORKS ABOUT COMMONPLACES AND COMPOSING (see *Orality and Literacy*: 107-10)

VIII. SELECTED WORKS ABOUT READING
IX. SELECTED WORKS ABOUT VISUALITY (see Orality and Literacy: 115-21)

X. SELECTED WORKS ABOUT THE INWARD TURN OF CONSCIOUSNESS (see Orality and Literacy: 174-76)

XI. SELECTED WORKS ABOUT THE QUANTIFICATION OF THOUGHT (see Orality and Literacy: 127)

XII. SELECTED WORKS ABOUT PRINT CULTURE (see Orality and Literacy: 115-35)

As I hope this schematic overview illustrates, Ong’s thought is multivariate and ecological in spirit. Certain works are listed in more than one category, especially works by Ong.
A CLASSIFIED BIBLIOGRAPHY KEYED TO ONG’S ORALITY AND LITERACY

I. SELECTED WORKS ABOUT ORALITY

NOTE: See Orality and Literacy: 1-76.


(I.7) Anderson, R. Dean, Jr. *Ancient Rhetorical Theory and Paul*. Rev. ed. Leuven, Belgium: Peeters, 1999. Concerning ancient rhetoric, also see Anderson (I.8); Aristotle (I.1); Aune (I.12); Enos (I.52, I.53); Ericksson, Olbricht, and Ubelacker (I.54); Garver (I.67); Grimaldi (I.71); Hart (I.73); Kennedy (I.87); Kinneavy (I.88); B. L. Mack (I.96); B. L. Mack and Robbins (I.97); May (I.102, I.103); Mitchell (I.106); Porter (I.139); Schiappa (I.145, I.146); Sloane (I.149); Walker (I.170); Welch (I.174); Wilder (I.176); Winter (I.179).


(I.9) Anonymous. The First Book of Kings. Trans. Jay A. Wilcoxen. *The Oxford Study Bible: Revised English Bible with the Apocrypha*. Ed. M. Jack Suggs, Katherine Doob Sakenfield, and James R. Mueller. New York: Oxford UP, 1992. 340-73. The First Book of Kings is part of the lengthier work that critical biblical scholars refer to as the Deuteronomistic History. As the name suggests, the extended history known as the Deuteronomistic History begins with part of the Book of Deuteronomy and extends over six other books of the Hebrew Bible (aka the Old Testament). The Deuteronomistic History has been skillfully composed from several written sources, some of which are explicitly named. Had the books of the
Hebrew bible not been written down, we obviously would not have them. But they are written transcripts for oral thought and Expression. In short, they do not give evidence of the distinctively literate forms of thought and Expression that emerged in ancient Greece and are known as philosophic thought. In addition to providing us with transcripts of oral thought and Expression as these came to be written down and preserved and transmitted, the portrait of Solomon’s wisdom in the First Book of Kings (4:29-34) also provides us with a sense of the educated man in an oral culture. Among other things, we are told that Solomon “propounded three thousand proverbs, and his songs numbered a thousand and five” (4:32). Later on, we are also told that Solomon “had seven hundred wives, all princesses, and three hundred concubines” (11:3). So we might want to take the numbers with a grain of salt. But proverbs are ways in which insights are stored and transmitted in an oral culture. Concerning the Christian Bible, which includes the Hebrew Bible as the so-called Old Testament, see Anderson (I.7); Aune (I.12); Bloom (I.20); Boman (IX.1); Borg (I.21); Borg and Crossan (I.22); Brueggemann (I.24); Bullinger (VII.4); Bultmann (IX.13); Byrskog (I.28); D. M. Carr (I.29); Cross (I.35, I.36); Crossan (I.38, I.39, III.23); Crossan and Reed (IX.17); Crowe (I.40); Draper (I.45); Dundes (I.48); Engberg-Pedersen (I.50, I.51); Eriksson, Olbricht, and Ubelacker (I.53); Fowler (I.61); Fredriksen (III.30); R. E. Friedman (I.63, II.9); Gospel of John (III.1); Gospel of Mark (III.2); Graham (I.70); Harris (I.72); Hart (I.73); Harvey (I.74); Horsley and Draper (I.78); Horsley, Draper, and Foley (I.79); Isser (III.44); Jaffee (I.82); Jeffrey (VII.11); Kelber and Byrskog (I.86); Kennedy (I.87); Kinneavy (I.88);
MacDonald (I.95); B. L. Mack (I.96); B. L. Mack and Robbins (I.97); Mitchell (I.106); Mobley (III.61); Neusner (I.112); Niditch (I.116); Peters (I.136); Shaheen (VII.31); Stahmenr (I.155); Voegelin (I.168); Wilder (I.176); Winter (I.179); Wolterstorff (I.180).


(I.16) ---. *The Reenchantment of the World.* Ithaca and London: Cornell UP, 1981. Concerning enchantment, see Bettelheim (I.18); Collingwood (I.32); concerning disenchantment (aka secularism), see Gauchet (XI.39); Taylor (XI.134); concerning reenchantment, see Brown (I.23); Ong (II.14, esp. 104-25; II.17).

(I.17) ---. *Wandering God: A Study in Nomadic Spirituality.* Albany: State U of New York P, 2000. For other works concerning spirituality, see Berman (I.16); Bloom (I.20, XI.10); Brakke (XI.4); Brown (I.23); Burrow (XI.5, XI.6); Connor (X.8); Cushman (X.9); Engberg-Pedersen (I.50); Loyola (X.13); Menn (X.16); Ong (II.14, esp. 104-25; II.17; X.19; X.20); Schmidt (XI.125); Tade (X.10); Teilhard de Chardin (X.28); Voegelin (I.168); Wilshire (I.177).


Bloom, Harold. *Jesus and Yahweh: The Names Divine*. New York: Riverhead Books/Penguin Group, 2005. Harold Bloom says, “My culture is Jewish, but I am not part of normative Judaism; I decidedly do not trust in the covenant” (2). Fair enough. We know where he is coming from and where he now stands. However, one thread in the present work centers on “presence,” including Ong’s *The Presence of the Word* (I.129); Balthasar (I.13); Belting (IX.6); Cushman (X.9); Loyola (X.13); Menn (X.16); and Sokolowski (I.154). Because Professor Bloom teaches at Yale University, I should point out that Ong’s 1964 Terry Lectures at Yale University were published in expanded form by Yale University Press as *The Presence of the Word: Some Prolegomena for Cultural and Religious History*. In other annotations, I have suggested that the experience of presence bespeaks the world-as-event sense of life, as distinct from the world-as-view sense of life. For this reason, Bloom’s discussion of presence is worth detailing in the present work. He discusses the Hebrew wording *Ehyeh asher ehyeh*, wording that names the deity whose name is Englished as Yahweh. Bloom says, “The traditional rendering is ‘I Am That I Am,’ which I explicate as ‘I will be present whenever and wherever I will be present’” (27). Later, Bloom says, “The name of Yahweh must after all primarily mean being present” (144). Later, Bloom refers to Yahweh in passing as “the Master of Presence” (149; his capitalization). Later, Bloom says, “After all, his very name intimates that his presence depends upon his will” (173). Later, Bloom says, “The mystery of Yahweh is in his self-naming as a presence who can choose to be absent” (200). But enough about presence! I do not know Hebrew, so I will leave it to experts in Hebrew to judge
Bloom’s understanding of the words *Ehyeh asher ehyeh*. But here’s Bloom’s key argument: “Whoever you are, you identify necessarily the origins of your self more with Augustine, Descartes, and John Locke, or indeed with Montaigne and Shakespeare, than you do with Yahweh and Jesus. That is only another way of saying that Socrates and Plato, rather than Jesus, have formed you, however ignorant you may be of Plato. The Hebrew Bible dominated seventeenth-century Protestantism, but four centuries later our technological and mercantile society is far more the child of Aristotle than of Moses” (146). The historical Jesus was far more a child of Moses than of Aristotle. The historical Jesus probably never even heard of Aristotle or of Greek philosophy. So it is ironic that many self-described Christians today appear to Bloom to be far more the children of Aristotle than of Moses. However, in Ong’s terminology, the experience of presence bespeaks the world-as-event sense of life. But we Americans today are indeed the products of modernity and the world-as-view sense of life that was exemplified in ancient Greek philosophy by Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle and then carried forward in ancient and medieval culture through the inward turn of consciousness and then powered into stronger depths after the development of the Gutenberg printing press in the 1450s. Nevertheless, through the influence of residual orality in the Roman Catholic tradition of thought and spirituality, the experience of God’s presence remained a cultural and personal ideal. However that may be, as mentioned, Bloom’s understanding of the Hebrew words *Ehyeh asher ehyeh* may not be supported by experts in Hebrew.


Crowe, Frederick E. “Neither Jew nor Greek, but One Human Nature and Operation in All.” *Communication and Lonergan: Common Ground for Forging the New Age*. Ed. Thomas J. Farrell and Paul A. Soukup. Kansas City: Sheed & Ward, 1993. 89-107. Crowe works with the four levels of consciousness and their respective cognitive operations that Lonergan discusses in *Insight: A Study of Human Understanding* (IX.45). Let me spell out the implications of Crowe’s essay for understanding Ong’s work. People in primary oral cultures has what Ong describes as a world-as-event sense of life, with which they employed the four levels of consciousness described by Lonergan and Crowe. Later, after the development of distinctively literate thought in Greek philosophy as exemplified by Plato and Aristotle, people worked with what Ong characterizes as the world-as-view sense of life, with which they worked with the four levels of consciousness discussed by Lonergan and Crowe. Next, let me spell out the implications of Crowe’s essay for understanding my own work regarding Arthur R. Jensen’s work on Level I and Level II cognitive development (see Farrell [IX.22]). Level II is an actuation of cognitive potential, a development of cognitive potential. I align Level I with the world-as-event sense of life; Level II, with the world-as-view sense of life. Now, let me spell out here that people at Level I employ all four levels of consciousness discussed by Lonergan and Crowe, just as people at Level II do also. Nevertheless, we should consider carefully an observation that Harold Bloom makes in *Ruin the Sacred Truths: Poetry and Belief from the Bible to the Present* (IX.9). Even though Bloom does not use Ong’s terminology regarding the world-as-event sense of life and the
world-as-view sense of life, Bloom uses his own way of speaking to construct a roughly equivalent contrast. Then he observes that “the two modes seem irreconcilable” (27). I prefer to work with Ong’s conceptual constructs, rather than Bloom’s. To be sure, people who have a strong world-as-event sense of life appear to be unacculturated in the world-as-event sense of life, just as people who have not actuated Level II appear to be unacculturated in Level II. But what about the reverse ways of proceeding? Bloom’s seems to suggest that the reverse is not possible – that people today whose “only way of thinking comes to us from the ancient Greeks” (27) cannot through cognitive empathy as it were enter into and understand the world-as-event sense of life as exemplified in the Hebrew Bible. Granted, there are particulars in the Hebrew Bible that may be difficult for scholars today to understand. For this reason, I want to skip over the Hebrew Bible for the moment. It seems to me that Plato and Aristotle and many other ancient Greek philosophers were capable of drawing on the world-as-view sense of life but also tuning into the world-as-event sense of life. In Aristotle’s Rhetoric: An Art of Character (I.67), Eugene Garver has illustrated and explained how Aristotle’s thought works in this way. If I were to borrow Bloom’s wording about “two modes,” I would say that Garver illustrates that Aristotle ably drew on the two modes that Ong describes as the world-as-event sense of life and the world-as-view sense of life. For Aristotle, Ong’s two modes were not seemingly irreconcilable. But I now want to turn to some tricky observations. The so-called Arian heresy was one of the most persistent heresies in medieval Christianity (see Farrell [I.56]). But Arius and his followers represent the world-as-event sense of
life. By contrast, the Nicene Creed represents the world-as-view sense of life as exemplified in ancient Greek philosophy. Centuries later, Unitarians basically sided with Arius and his followers in rejecting the Nicene doctrine of the divine trinity. Nevertheless, the orthodox Catholic tradition of thought to this day refers to presence, as Ong himself does in *The Presence of the Word* (I.129); also see Balthasar (I.13); Belting (IX.6); Bloom (I.20); Cushman (X.9); Loyola (X.13); Menn (X.16); Sokolowski (I.154). I would suggest that the experience of presence is a manifestation of the world-as-event sense of life, or at least a residual form of the world-as-event sense of life. If people who are strongly acculturated in the world-as-view sense of life were to experience presence, they would probably categorize their experience as an experience of nature mysticism or at least mysticism. However, in *On Communitarian Divinity: An African Interpretation of the Trinity*, A. Okechukwu Ogbonnaya (I.120) works with African conceptual constructs to suggest new ways in which the orthodox Christian view of the divine trinity can be understood, ways that I would align with the world-as-event sense of life. Moreover, people who are strongly acculturated in the strong visualist tendencies of print culture will probably as a result become followers of Kant and rule out of consideration metaphysics and metaphysical thought. But Plato and Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas famously had no problem with metaphysics and metaphysical thought, because they were not as strongly acculturated in the visualist tendencies of print culture as Kant was. In the final analysis Bloom is of course correct when he says that “our only way of thinking comes to us from the ancient Greeks, and not from the Hebrews” (27). However,
apart from the Roman Catholic tradition of thought down to this day, Bloom’s reference to “our only way of thinking” should probably be understood to mean the only way of thinking for academics today who accept Kant’s strictures against metaphysics and metaphysical thought.


(I.49) Edwards, Mark W. *Sound, Sense, and Rhythm: Listening to Greek and Latin Poetry*. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton UP, 2002. For other works regarding Latin and/or classical education, see Baldwin (VII.3); Binnis (XII.6); Curtius (VII.6); Hotson (XII.53, XII.56); Hurst (XII.57); IJsewijn (XII.58); P. Mack (XII.68); Mantello and Rigg (I.100); Moss (VII.20); O’Malley (III.67); O’Malley, Bailey, Harris, and Kennedy (XII.85, XII.86); O’Malley, Bailey, and Sale (XII.87); Ong (I.122, esp. 88-130, 177-205, 206-19; I.126, esp. 17-49, 147-88, 213-29; III.72; III.74; XII.92); Pavur (XII.113); Richard (XII.121); Shalev (XII.126); Winterer (XII.144, XII.145).


Drawing on Ong’s thought, I work with the terms residually oral culture and secondary oral culture. He suggests that open admissions black inner-city students come from a residually oral culture because they have not achieved what reading teachers refer to as functional literacy. By comparison, white students from a secondary oral culture may not have yet mastered the so-called basics of writing, but they have usually achieved functional literacy. Reprinted in Theresa Enos, ed.,


(I.75) Havelock, Eric A. *Preface to Plato.* Cambridge, MA: Belknap P/Harvard UP, 1963. Very accessible classic study of the Homeric oral mentality. Ong never tired of referring to this book. No doubt vowelized phonetic alphabetic literacy was one salient factor in the historical emergence of the knower from the known that led to the emergence of ancient Greek philosophic thought as exemplified by Plato and Aristotle, as Havelock notes. However, the salient factor was the human mind, as manifested in the questions raised and discussed over the centuries that led to Plato and Aristotle. For a study of the earlier Greek oral mentality out of which the separation of the knower from the known emerge, see Detienne (I.42).


(I.90) Kozol, Jonathan. *Illiterate America*. Garden City, NY: Anchor P/Doubleday, 1985. People who have not attained what reading teachers refer to as functional literacy live in a form of a residually oral culture. In and of itself, there is nothing inherently wrong with not being functionally literate. However, in the United States today, functional literacy is important for many types of jobs. As a result, people who are not functionally literate are handicapped.


MacDonald, Dennis R. *The Homeric Epics and the Gospel of Mark*. New Haven and London: Yale UP, 2000. In the *Iliad*, Agamemnon and Achilles take turns being unreasonable. By contrast, Hector and his wife Andromache are portrayed very sympathetically. However, in the end Achilles kills Hector. Then Achilles dishonors Hector’s corpse by dragging it around behind his chariot. In the Gospel of Mark, Jesus is put to death by crucifixion under the authority of Pontius Pilate. So just as Hector was killed by Achilles, so to Jesus is killed by Pontius Pilate on the trumped up charge of being King of the Jews, a charge that implies a violent revolutionary, not a non-violent resistance leader. In respect to ending up dead, Jesus undeniably resembles Hector. However, I would draw attention to certain other aspects of the Gospel of Mark. Not once, not twice, but three times that anonymous author of the Gospel of Mark portrays Jesus as predicting in advance his upcoming suffering and death, to the disbelief of his closest followers. After the local authorities of the Roman empire executed John the Baptist, the historical Jesus probably recognized that he also might be executed by the local authorities of the Roman empire. At that juncture, the historical Jesus could have stopped his own public ministry and quietly returned home so as to avoid endangering himself. But he did not stop. He heroically continued his public non-violent ministry. In this respect, the historical Jesus was undoubtedly heroic. However,
the anonymous author of the Gospel of Mark was driven by his personal and cultural agonistic spirit to portray a non-violent hero on the order of Achilles. Achilles’ goddess-mother Thetis had told him that two possible fates awaited him: (1) he could return home from the Trojan war and live a long life, or (2) he could return to fight in the Trojan war and eventually die in the war instead of ever returning home. After Hector kills Patroclus, Achilles decides to return to fight in the war, thus guaranteeing his own death in the war. So Achilles knew in advance that he would die in the war, and he decided to re-enter the war. The anonymous author of the Gospel of Mark portrays Jesus as predicting his upcoming suffering and death three times so as to establish that Jesus is a hero on the order with Achilles, because like Achilles, Jesus knows in advance that he will die and he keeps on walking toward Jerusalem, where his death awaits him.


(I.107) Moore Robert and Douglas Gillette. *The King Within: Accessing the King [Archetype] in the Male Psyche*. New York: William Morrow, 1992; revised and expanded ed., Chicago: Exploration P, 2007. There is a Queen archetype in the female psyche. In all cultures, people who have the titles “king” and “queen” within a certain group receive projections of the King and the Queen archetypes respectively from members of the group, and so the designated “king” and “queen” carry those archetypal projections from the members of the group. Just how well the “king” and the “queen” carry those projections usually determines the fates of the carriers. But in all cultures, the mother figure and the father figure for the children growing up also carry the projections of these archetypes from the children. But the mother figure and the father figure are not necessarily the only carriers of these projections from the children – relatives and friends and schoolteachers and
clergy also frequently carry the projections of these archetypes from children. As a result, we usually have a number of mother figures and father figures in our lives if we are lucky. However, if we are not so lucky, we can continue to go through our adult lives in search of worthy mother figures and worthy father figures. By virtue of their professional training, spiritual directors and psychotherapists are supposed to be such worthy persons because in Carl Rogers’ famous formulation they are supposed to be able to extend unconditional positive regard to persons in the proper ritual setting of spiritual direction or psychotherapy. However, apart from the contexts of spiritual direction or psychotherapy, people who manifest the quality that Aristotle in the *Nicomachean Ethics* refers to a greatness of soul (aka magnanimity) are accessing the King or Queen archetypes in the archetypal level of the psyche. (Remember that “soul” is used in English to render the Greek term that would be transliterated as “psyche”; I admit that it would sound odd to render Aristotle’s expression as “greatness of psyche”; but perhaps we could settle for “greatness of spirit.”)

(I.108) --- *The Lover Within: Accessing the Lover [Archetype] in the Male Psyche.* New York: William Morrow, 1993. There is a feminine form of the Lover archetype in the female psyche. The part of the psyche that is referred to in Plato’s *Republic* and the *Phaedrus* as the desiring part accesses the Lover archetype in the archetypal level of the psyche.
The Magician Within: Accessing the Shaman [Archetype] in the Male Psyche. New York: William Morrow, 1993. There is a feminine Magician archetype in the female psyche. Trickster figures such as Odysseus are manifestations in folklore and oral tradition and in written imaginative literature of the Magician archetype. The part of the psyche that is referred to by Plato and Aristotle as logos (reason) accesses the Magician archetype at the archetypal level of the human psyche.

The Warrior Within: Accessing the Knight [Archetype] in the Male Psyche. New York: William Morrow, 1992. There is a feminine Warrior archetype in the female psyche. Heroic figures such as Hector and Achilles are manifestations in folklore and oral tradition and written imaginative literature of the Warrior archetype. The part of the psyche that Plato and Aristotle refer to as thumos (or thymos) accesses the Warrior archetype in the archetypal level of the human psyche. Thumos is the psychological home of our fight/flight/freeze responses. Also see Koziak (III.52).


(I.121) Oliver, Robert T. *Communication and Culture in Ancient India and China*. Syracuse, New York: Syracuse UP, 1971. A classic. Also see Lloyd and Sivin (I.94); Nisbett (I.118).


Also see Simpkins (IX.71).


(I.154) Sokolowski, Robert. *Eucharistic Presence: A Study in the Theology of Disclosure*. Washington, DC: Catholic U of America P, 1994. Also see Ong’s *The Presence of the Word* (I.129); Balthasar (I.13); Belting (IX.6); Bloom (I.20); Cushman (X.9); Loyola (X.13); Menn (X.16).


Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2003. Also see Gerard (IX.27).


(I.178) Wimsatt, James I. *Hopkins’s Poetics of Speech Sound: Sprung Rhythm, Lettering, Inscape*. Toronto; Buffalo; London: U of Toronto P, 2006. Decisively corrects Ong’s influential 1941 Master’s thesis that was originally published, slightly revised, in 1949 and is reprinted in *An Ong Reader: Challenges for Further Inquiry* (I.127: 111-74). Also see Nixon (II.11); Ong (II.14; II.15, esp. 61-82; VIII.12; XII.90); Phillips (IX.59).


II. SELECTED WORKS ABOUT CYCLIC THOUGHT AND LINEAR THOUGHT

NOTE: See Orality and Literacy: 138-44. Ong connects cyclic thought with primary orality; linear thought, with writing and visuality; evolutionary thought, with print culture and what Ong refers to as hypervisualism; ecological thought, with what Ong refers to as secondary orality.


(II.9) Friedman, Richard Elliott. *The Hidden Book in the Bible*. San Francisco: HarperSanFrancisco, 1998. Centuries before somebody put the two accounts of creation at the beginning of the Hebrew Bible, the Yahwist source (aka J) constructed a roughly chronological and linear sequence of historical events. In Plato’s *Republic*, Socrates tells the story of Er, in which we learn about the periodic recycling of souls, which is an example of cyclic thought. In Virgil’s *Aeneid*, we find a similar example of recycling of souls when Aeneas visits the underworld. Because the ancient Hebrews eventually came to think in terms of creation (i.e., the beginning) and end-time (the eschaton), our Western sense of linear time derives from them.


(II.15) ---. *Hopkins, the Self, and God*. Toronto; Buffalo; London: U of Toronto P, 1986. Ong’s 1981 Alexander Lectures at the University of Toronto. Also see Nixon (II.11); Ong (II.16, esp. 61-82; VIII.12; XII.90); Phillips (IX.59); Wimsatt (I.178).
(II.16) ---. *In the Human Grain: Further Explorations of Contemporary Culture*. New York: Macmillan, 1967. See the index for cyclicism, Charles Darwin, evolution, history, Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, time. Concerning Hopkins, see 61-82; also see Ong (II.15; VII.12; XII.90); Phillips (IX.90); Wimsatt (I.178).

(II.17) ---. “The Mechanical Bride: Christen the Folklore of Industrial Man.” *Social Order* (Saint Louis University) 2 (1952): 79-85. The first article in which Ong discusses the thought of the French paleontologist and religious thinker Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, S.J.


III. SELECTED WORKS ABOUT AGONISTIC STRUCTURES

Note: See *Orality and Literacy*: 42-45, 69-70.

(III.1) Anonymous. The Gospel According to John. Trans. David M. Stanley. *The Oxford Study Bible: Revised English Bible with the Apocrypha*. Ed. M. Jack Suggs, Katharine Doob Sakenfeld, and James R. Mueller. New York: Oxford UP, 1992. 1365-93. Probably written in the decades of the 90s CE. The anonymous author of the Gospel of John was motivated by the agonistic spirit of pro-and-con debate to stand up for his convictions about the significance of Jesus and to denigrate the Jews of his time who did not share his convictions about Jesus by making the Jews of Jesus’ time in the story the villains. As the author portrays the Jews in the story that he constructed, they are roughly comparable to the suitors in the Homeric epic the *Odyssey*. Also see John Dominic Crossan’s *Who Killed Jesus? Exposing the Roots of Anti-Semitism in the Gospel Story of the Death of Jesus* (III.23) and James Carroll’s *Constantine’s Sword: The Church and the Jews: A History* (III.15).

constructed a hero story to rival the Homeric epic the *Iliad*. In the *Iliad* Achilles is told by his goddess-mother that two fates await him: (1) he can leave Troy and the war and go home, in which case he will live a long life; or (2) he can return to fight again in the war, in which case he will die in the war and not return home. After certain events unfold, Achilles chooses to return to the war and fight again, knowing full well that he will die in the war and not return home. With the well-known example of Achilles in mind, the Greek-educated anonymous author wrote the Gospel of Mark in Greek in such a way that he portrayed the character named Jesus as predicting not once, not twice, but three times his own upcoming suffering and death in Jerusalem, and then walking heroically straight into Jerusalem to meet his predicted suffering and death. In this way, the anonymous author has constructed the greatest hero story ever told – he topped Homer! That’s the agonistic spirit at work – go up against the best Greek storyteller and surpass the best storyteller with your own carefully constructed story. Also see MacDonald (I.95).


York: McGraw-Hill, 1964-1981. Even though the agonistic spirit of pro-and-con debate is exemplified in the literary genre known as a dialogue, Thomas Aquinas’ *Summa theologiae* is arguably the most famous exemplification of the agonistic spirit in the Western tradition, because of the way in which Aquinas systematically lists real or imagined adversarial objections and then proceeds to reply to each objection one by one.

(III.5) Bakan, David. *The Duality of Human Existence: An Essay on Psychology and Religion.* Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966. David Bakan defines and explains two central tendencies in human nature, which he refers to as agency and communion. What he means by agency is the psychodynamism of the agonistic spirit discussed by Ong. In *The Psychology of Gender*, 3rd ed. (III.35), Vicki S. Helgeson works with Bakan’s terms of agency and communion. In my article “The Female and Male Modes of Rhetoric” in *College English* (III.27), I have defined two modes of rhetoric that decidedly resemble what Bakan means by agency and communion. I make the following brief characterizations: “The thinking represented in the female mode [of rhetoric] seems eidetic, methetic, open-ended, and generative, whereas the thinking in the male mode [of rhetoric] appears framed, contained, more pre-selected, and packaged” (910). Also see Sullivan (III.83).

American jeremiads can be understood as being examples of the kind of civic rhetoric that Aristotle refers to as epideictic rhetoric. However, in *Ramus, Method, and the Decay of Dialogue: From the Art of Discourse to the Art of Reason* (III.74), Ong suggests that Ramism is monologic, which is to say that Ramism fostered the art of reason. Elsewhere, Ong works with the terms polemic and irenic. Because the art of discourse requires the refutation of the real or imagined adversarial position(s), the art of discourse is polemical in structure. By contrast, the art of reason is not polemical, but irenic. American jeremiads are argumentative in the sense of arguing about something that is indeed truly debatable and therefore seemingly polemical. However, because of the influence of Ramism, American jeremiads are not usually structured in such a way as to include a refutation of the real or imagined adversarial position(s). As a result, American jeremiads can be understood as a form of what Aristotle refers to as epideictic rhetoric, not a form of the kind of pro-and-con debate found in deliberative rhetoric or forensic rhetoric.


(III.14) Campbell, Joseph. The Hero with a Thousand Faces. 3rd ed. The Collected Works of Joseph Campbell. Novato, CA: New World Library, 2008. Very accessible. In his classic book Joseph Campbell has discussed what he discerns to be the overall pattern of the life-stories of heroes who commit themselves to live heroic lives of virtue. (For another discernment of the most salient pattern, based on C. G. Jung’s work, see Erich Neumann’s The Origins and History of Consciousness [III.63].) Stories of imaginary heroes who committed themselves to live heroic lives of virtue are too numerous to enumerate here. But out of the ancient Western world
have come stories about three historical persons who committed themselves to striving to live a heroic life of virtue: Socrates, Jesus, and Augustine, Bishop of Hippo. By definition, all saints canonized by the Roman Catholic Church are supposed to have led heroic lives of virtue. That does not mean that they were perfect. But it does mean that their efforts to live virtuous lives were heroic. More Americans should commit themselves to striving to live heroic lives of virtue, instead of living like anti-heroes such as Shakespeare’s character Falstaff. To Falstaff, the word “honor” is nothing but an empty sound signifying nothing but sound and fury. That’s the anti-hero for you. But the hero knows better. The hero values self-love and self-respect and self-regard. As a result, the hero is committed to striving to live a heroic life of virtue.


Very Accessible. Also see Fredriksen (III.31).


against men: to gain control or retribution and to promote or defend self-image.”
Also see Nisbett and Cohen (III.64).


(III.30) Forsyth, Neil. *The Old Enemy: Satan and the Combat Myth*. Princeton: Princeton UP, 1987. Also see Brakke (X.4); Loyola (III.54); Pagels (III.77); Russell (III.81, III.82, III.83, III.84).


the rise of modern capitalism in print culture also transformed the agonistic spirit to a new level.


(III.39) Homer. *The Iliad of Homer*. Trans. and introduction Richmond Lattimore. Chicago and London: U of Chicago P, 1951. It is extremely important to note that *Iliad* is not structured as a struggle of good guys versus bad guys. For example, Hector and Andromache are admirable compared to the Agamemnon and Achilles in the opening scene, in which the goddess Athena needs to physically restrain the powerful Achilles from dispatching Agamemnon and instruct him (Achilles) to give Agamemnon a good tongue lashing instead, which Achilles proceeds to do.
In any event, the story about the seemingly endless war in Troy conveys the message that life, figuratively speaking, is like an endless war or struggle (Greek, *polemos*). In Christianity, the sense of life as a moral struggle or war is thematized by teaching Christians that they should be prepared to die for their religious faith. In Islam, the sense of life as a struggle or war is thematized in the term “jihad.”

(III.40) --- *The Odyssey of Homer*. Trans. and an introduction Richmond Lattimore. New York: Harper & Row, 1965. The story of Odysseus can be understood as conveying the message that life, figuratively speaking, is like a never-ending contest or struggle (Greek, *agon*).


Loyola, Ignatius. *The Spiritual Exercises of Saint Ignatius: A Translation and Commentary*. Trans. George E. Ganss. St. Louis: Institute of Jesuit Sources, 1992. Robert Moore of the Chicago Theological Seminary has characterized Jesuit training as warrior training, albeit non-violent warriors who strive to follow the example of the non-violent Jesus. This is indeed a truly apt way to characterize Jesuit training. As part of their Jesuit training, novices in the Jesuit order make a thirty-day retreat following the *Spiritual Exercises* of Ignatius Loyola. By doing this, Jesuit novices learn how to restructure their agonistic tendencies in their personal effort to become non-violent warriors capable of following the example of the non-violent Jesus. But making a thirty-day retreat following the *Spiritual Exercises* also involves an enormous inward turn of consciousness. Concerning Satan and demons, see Brakke (X.4); Forsyth (III.30); Pagels (III.77); Russell (III.81, III.82, III.83, III.84).


(III.56) MacLean, Paul D. *The Triune Brain in Evolution: Role in Paleocerebral Functions.* New York and London: Plenum P, 1990. Paul D. MacLean contends that the human brain is made up of three separate brains, which function together interactively in the way that he characterizes as constituting the triune human brain. What MacLean refers to as the reptilian brain is the biological base for all agonistic tendencies in all animals, including the human animal.


(III.58) Mansfield, Harvey C. *Manliness.* New Haven and London: Yale UP, 2006. In this controversial book Harvey C. Mansfield of Harvard University make one important observation that I do not consider to be controversial: “The entire enterprise of modernity . . . could be understood as a project to keep manliness unemployed” (230). His point is well taken. For example, Shakespeare’s character Othello will no longer be a heroic cultural role model in modernity as he was in a residually oral late medieval culture. In a similar way, Achilles and Hector and Odysseus and Aeneas and Beowulf and Sir Gawain and King Arthur will no
longer be heroic cultural role models in modernity as they were in their respective oral cultural contexts. However, Jesus as portrayed in the Gospel of Mark will endure as a non-violent heroic cultural role model in modernity. As a result, I might modify Mansfield’s claim a bit to say that modernity will not keep non-violent manliness unemployed. Ong has suggested that modernity is powered by a strong tendency toward irenicism and away from polemicism, as exemplified in Peter Ramus (1515-1572) and Ramism. The strength of the modern tendency toward irenicism and away from polemicism will lead gradually over the centuries to the demise of the old oral heroic cultural ideal of manliness exemplified in the warrior such as Achilles and Hector and Odysseus and Aeneas and Beowulf and Sir Gawain and King Arthur and Othello. The gradual demise is exemplified in the “mock heroic” poetry of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Now, Robert Moore of the Chicago Theological Seminary has pointed out that Jesuit training is warrior training. His point is well taken. But Jesuit training is training for non-violent warriors. With this understanding in mind, I would generalize from the example of Jesuit training and say that all people in modern culture should cultivate being non-violent warriors. In short, all people in modern culture should strive to be heroic in their own eyes and in their own self-regard and their own self-respect. To be blunt, the alternative to being heroic is being depressed. We all need warrior training to help us be effective non-violent warriors and thereby avoid being depressed, inasmuch as it is possible to avoid being depressed.


sums up Neumann’s Jungian account of the eight stages of consciousness in one paragraph-length sentence: “The stages of psychic development as treated by Neumann are successively (1) the infantile undifferentiated self-contained whole symbolized by the uroboros (tail-eater), the serpent with its tail in its mouth, as well as by other circular or global mythological figures, (2) the Great Mother (the impersonal womb from which each human infant, male or female, comes, the impersonal femininity which may swallow him [or her] up again, (3) the separation of the world parents (the principle of opposites, differentiation, possibility of change), (4) the birth of the hero (rise of masculinity and of the personalized ego) with its sequels in (5) the slaying of the mother (fight with the dragon: victory over primal creative but consuming femininity, chthonic forces), and (6) the slaying of the father (symbol of thwarting obstruction of individual achievement, to what is new), (7) the freeing of the captive (liberation of the ego from endogamous kinship libido and emergence of the higher femininity, with woman now as person, anima-sister, related positively to ego consciousness), and finally (8) the transformation (new unity in self-conscious individualization, higher masculinity, expressed primordially in the Osiris myth but today entering new phases with heightened individualism – or more properly, personalism – of modern man [and woman]” (10-11). Freudians refer to the integration of stage eight as ego-integrity, and Robert Moore refers to it as the optimal self system.

The Gutenberg movable printing P of the 1450s helped launch an unprecedented upsurge in basic literacy and formal education in Western culture. Peter Ramus (1515-1572) and his Protestant followers were part of this upsurge – remember that all those Ramists in seventeenth-century New England that Perry Miller writes about founded Harvard College in 1636. The newly founded religious order in the Roman Catholic Church known as the Society of Jesus (aka the Jesuit order) played an enormous role in the upsurge of formal education, as John W. O’Malley ably details (200-42). Robert L. Moore of the Chicago Theological Seminary has aptly characterized Jesuit training as warrior training. Jesuit education can also aptly be characterized as warrior training, at least prior to the delayed impact of the Second Vatican Council in the Roman Catholic Church (1962-1965). See Philip Gleason’s Contending with Modernity: Catholic Higher Education in the Twentieth Century (New York and Oxford: Oxford UP, 1995). In Ong’s terminology, the Roman Catholic tradition represents a residually oral cultural sensibility that is in many ways pre-modern. For example, the Aristotelian-Thomistic philosophy that the Jesuits, the Dominicans, and other Catholic educators taught represents a residually oral sensibility because both Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas lived in highly oral cultures. However, as a result,
popes and other Roman Catholics have had difficulty adapting to modernity. Instead of adapting to modernity certain popes and other Roman Catholics dedicated themselves to contending with modernity in order to preserve and transmit Aristotelian-Thomistic philosophy. But Ong attempted to channel the agonistic spirit of his co-religionists by challenging them to “Christen” modernity by using their own values to relate positively to modernity. Mutatis mutandi, any group could undertake to use its own cherished values to relate positively to modernity. See Ong’s “The Mechanical Bride: Christen the Folklore of Industrial Man” (II.16).


(III.77) Pagels, Elaine. *The Origin of Satan*. New York: Random House, 1995. Also see Brakke (X.4); Forsyth (III.30); Loyola (III.54); Russell (III.81, III.82, III.83, III.84).


(III.80) Remer, Gary. *Humanism and the Rhetoric of Toleration*. University Park: Pennsylvania State UP, 1996. Not surprisingly, Gary Remer does not happen to advert to Ong’s *Ramus, Method, and the Decay of Dialogue: From the Art of Discourse to the Art of Reason* (Harvard UP, 1958). In this book Ong characterizes Ramism as monologic. Ramism encourages authors and speakers to develop their own line of thought, but without explicit refutation of real or imagined adversarial positions. In contrast, the art of discourse does engage in explicit refutation of real or imagined adversarial positions. In this way, the art of discourse is dialogic in
spirit, not monologic in spirit. Elsewhere, Ong uses the terms polemic and irenic. Because of the refutation, the art of discourse is polemical. Because Ramism eschews the refutation, Ramism is irenic. Ong also elsewhere sees Ramus and the Ramist educational movement as part of the larger movement that is known to us as Renaissance humanism. For this reason, the extensive Ramist educational movement undoubtedly contributed to what Remer describes as the emerging rhetoric of toleration.

(III.81) Russell, Jeffrey Burton. *The Devil: Perception of Evil from Antiquity to Primitive Christianity*. Ithaca and London: Cornell UP, 1977. Also see Brakke (X.4); Forsyth (III.30); Loyola (III.54); Pagels (III.77).


Sloane, Thomas O. *On the Contrary: The Protocol of Traditional Rhetoric*. Washington, DC: Catholic U of America P, 1997. Thomas O. Sloane focuses on the pro-and-con debate protocol in traditional rhetoric in Western culture. But not only the verbal art known as rhetoric, but also the verbal art known as dialectic inculcated the spirit of pro-and-con debate. In *Ramus, Method, and the Decay of Dialogue: From the Art of Discourse to the Art of Reason* (1958), Ong shows how Peter Ramus (1515-1572) and Ramism in effect moved away from the protocol of pro-and-con debate in favor of setting forth one’s own line of argument without the refutation of real or imaginary adversarial positions or possible objections.

“Reinventing Inventio.” *College English* 51 (1989): 461-73. Cicero thought that the standard step known in Latin as *inventio* (known in English as invention), the step of trying to discover possible arguments one could use in debate, would be advanced by conducting pro-and-con debate with oneself about one’s own thesis statement. One would first negate one’s own thesis statement by adding the word “not” to the predicate, thus forming the antithesis of one’s own position. Next, one would formulate arguments that could be advanced in support of the antithesis statement. Next, one would set about formulating counter-arguments to those arguments, because one could use the counter-arguments in one’s own presentation in the debate to advance one’s own thesis statement. For examples of how the spirit of pro-and-con debate can be incorporated into lesson plans for use in the classroom, see David W. Johnson and Roger T. Johnson’s *Creative Controversy: Intellectual Challenge in the Classroom*, 3rd ed. (1995).


Very accessible – like an introductory textbook -- explanation of object-relations theory and related psychoanalytic theory.


IV. SELECTED WORKS ABOUT WRITING SYSTEMS

NOTE: See Orality and Literacy: 77-114. I should note here that writing systems accentuate visuality, so works about writing systems could be classified in the category about visuality, as could works about print culture.


V. SELECTED WORKS ABOUT WRITTEN AUTHORSHIP


NOTE: See Orality and Literacy: 33-36, 136-52. I should note here that external memory-aides are visual, so external memory-aides help accentuate visuality. But the external memory-aides usually involve the use of images, so in this respect they can be aligned with the imagistic thinking that Eric A. Havelock identifies as oral thinking, as distinct from the more abstract forms of thought that he sees as distinctively literate thought – in short, the kind of thought frequently found in Plato’s writings, except for the myths in Plato’s writings. (The images in comics and photographs and movies and television can also be aligned with imagistic thinking.)


NOTE: See *Orality and Literacy*: 107-10. Biblical scholars today maintain that the Book of Proverbs in the Hebrew Bible is a composite of several collections of proverbs from different time periods. In the early modern period, Erasmus (1466?-1536) was one of the more distinguished compilers of proverb-like sayings, as his *Adages* shows. In television news today, the sound bite carries forward the spirit of the drive to get things summed up crisply and briefly. In addition to finding it handy to recycle familiar proverbs and other well-known figures of speech, orators and writers over the centuries also found it convenient to follow established formulas for organizing extended orations and written essays (e.g., introduction, thesis statement, background material, definition of terms and/or problems, supporting arguments, refutation of real or imagined adversarial positions and possible objections, and conclusion).


(VII.2) Adler, Mortimer J., ed. *The Syntopicon*. 2nd ed. 2 vols. *Great Books of the Western World*. 2nd ed. Vol. 1 and 2. Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, 1990. Mortimer J. Adler’s *Syntopicon* is the result of a prodigious amount of work by Adler and his assistants. The 102 “great ideas” that Adler culled from the works collected together in both editions of the *Great Books of the Western World* show that there was and is a discourse community in Western culture. The great ideas are
common conceptual constructs in the Western tradition of thought, which can be subdivided into numerous topics and related terms, as Adler and his assistants have subdivided them in the Syntopicon. The great ideas and the topic are the conceptual constructs out of which intertextuality is constructed.


(VII.4) Bullinger, E. W. Figures of Speech Used in the Bible: Explained and Illustrated. Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Books, 1968 (original London, 1898). In this 1,100-page compilation, E. W. Bullinger (1837-1913) uses the familiar terminology of the commonplace tradition in Western culture to classify and describe numerous passages from the Christian Bible.


(VII.10) ---. *Homer’s Traditional Art.* University Park: Pennsylvania State UP, 1999. Also see West, 2011.


(VII.17) ---. “*Making a Way Out of No Way*”: Martin Luther’s King’s Sermonic Proverbial *Rhetoric*. New York: Peter Lang, 2010.


VIII. SELECTED WORKS ABOUT READING


Ong Reader: Challenges for Further Inquiry (I.127: 497-504). Concerning Hopkins, also see Nixon (II.11); Ong (II.15; II.16, esp. 61-82); Phillips (IX.59); Wimsatt (I.178).


IX. SELECTED WORKS ABOUT VISUALITY

NOTE: See Orality and Literacy: 115-21. I should note here that writing systems accentuate visuality, as does the printing P, but I have dealt with them in two separate categories in the present classified bibliography.


(IX.4) Aristotle. The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation. 2 vols. Ed. Jonathan Barnes. Princeton: Princeton UP, 1984. Also see Adler (IX.1); Aquinas; Copleston (III.22); Garver (I.67); Koziak (III.52); Lonergan (IX.45); Nightingale (IX.49); Nussbaum (IX.51); Mann (IX.46); Ong (I.132, III.74). Almost everything I have published is based on Aristotle’s insight regarding act and potency – act actuates potential. To be sure, my understanding of Arthur R. Jensen’s account of Level I and Level II cognitive development is based on my aligning Level I with orality and residual forms of oral cultural conditioning in the world-as-event sense
of life; and Level II with the world-as view sense of life. However, in addition, I see Level II as actuating cognitive potential. In short, I do not equate the relative under-development of Level II that concerns Jensen as a decisive absence of cognitive potential, as Jensen seems to see it, but simply as a relative unactuated cognitive potential due to highly oral cultural conditioning.


(IX.9) Bloom, Harold. Ruin the Sacred Truths: Poetry and Belief from the Bible to the Present. Cambridge, MA; and London: Harvard UP, 1989. In a remarkably straightforward way, Harold Bloom makes observations that I would align with Ong’s thought:
“Frequently we forget one reason why the Hebrew Bible is so difficult for us: our only way of thinking comes to us from the ancient Greeks, and not from the Hebrews. No scholar has been able to work through a persuasive comparison of Greek thinking and Hebrew psychologizing, if only because the two modes themselves seem irreconcilable” (27). What Bloom here refers to as “our only way of thinking” does indeed come from the Greeks, as he says, not from the Hebrews. For all practical purposes, Bloom is here referring to what Ong means by distinctively literate thought and expression. For all practical purposes, what Bloom refers to as “Hebrew psychologizing” is an example of the world-as-event sense of life that Ong associates with primary orality and with residual forms of primary oral cultures. By contrast, Greek thinking represents the world-as-view sense of life that Ong discusses.


A classic.


(IX.22) Farrell, Thomas J. “IQ and Standard English.” *College Composition and Communication* 34 (1983): 470-84. Because learning to read proficiently is the key to making the aural-to-visual shift in cognitive processing that Ong writes about in *Ramus, Method, and the Decay of Dialogue* (III.74), I regret that I did not know about Gary Simpkins’ reading research, listed below in the category on visuality (IX.71), at the time when I wrote this article. I have no problem with the idea of using non-standard forms of English in readers to promote reading instruction for African American elementary-school students. In addition, I regret that I did not think to say in my discussion of the *McGuffey Readers* that new readers might be prepared with orally resonant selections that might work as well as the *McGuffey Readers* have worked. The aural-to-visual shift in cognitive processing that Ong writes about is connected with the actuation of cognitive potential – the kind of cognitive ability measured, however imperfectly, by IQ tests, especially the kind of cognitive ability that Arthur R. Jensen refers to as Level II. What he refers to as Level I cognitive abilities are as well developed in children who come from a strongly oral cultural background as in children who come from a more visually oriented cultural background. But Level II cognitive abilities are not usually
actuated in people from a highly oral cultural background unless and until they have individually undergone the aural-to-visual shift. For this reason, Simpkins’ research about reading instruction is best understood as involving the aural-to-visual shift in cognitive processing that is connected with actuating cognitive potential of Level II. Nevertheless, we do need to remember the tendency known as “backsliding” because individual children from a strongly oral cultural background can indeed make short-term gains on IQ measures as the result of intensive educational programs, only to have those gains disappear after the students leave the intensive educational program. Also see Nisbett, 2009.


(IX.29) Havelock, Eric A. *The Greek Concept of Justice: From Its Shadow in Homer to Its Substance in Plato*. Cambridge, MA; and London: Harvard UP, 1978. Havelock devotes an important chapter to detailing the history of the ancient Greek verb “to be” (233-48). Also see Charles H. Kahn’s *The Verb “Be” in Ancient Greek: With a New Introductory Essay* (Indianapolis and Cambridge, UK: Hackett Publishing, 2003). The verb “to be” is best understood as representing the stasis or static sense of vision that Ong associates with the world-as-view sense of life (see Ong’s “World as View and World as Event” [I.132]).


Nie, Giselle de; Karl F. Morrison and Marco Mostert, eds. *Seeing the Invisible in Late Antiquity and the Early Middle Ages*. Turnhout, Belgium: Brepols, 2005.

(IX.50) Nisbett, Richard E. *Intelligence and How to Get It: Why Schools and Cultures Count*. New York: W. W. Norton, 2009. Also see Farrell (IX.22); Simpkins (IX.71).


On page 338, in note 54, Ong credits the French philosopher Louis Lavelle (1883-1951) with “a discerning and profound treatment of the visual-oral opposition on which the present discussion [in Ong’s book] turns,” and Ong refers especially to Lavelle’s *La parole et l’écriture*, 2nd ed. (Paris: L’Artisan du livre, 1942). In his book Ong refers to the corpuscular sense of life with various terms: corpuscular view of reality, corpuscular epistemology, corpuscular psychology (65-66, 72, 146, 171, 203, 210). For all practical purposes the corpuscular sense of life that Ong refers to is involved in what Bernard Lonergan mocks in *Insight: A Study of Human Understanding* (IX.45) as the tendency to equate knowing with “taking a good look.” Ong also refers to the visualist loading of this tendency as visualism and hypervisualism. Also see Andrea Wilson Nightingale’s *Spectacles of Truth in Classical Greek Philosophy: Theoria in Its Cultural Context* (IX.49).


judgments about what conceptual constructs and predications are most reasonable and tenable.


(IX.59) Phillips, Catherine. *Gerard Manley Hopkins and the Victorian Visual World*. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2007. Also see Nixon (II.11); Ong (II.14; II.15, esp. 61-82; VIII.12; XII.90); Wimsatt (I.178).


(IX.61) Plato. *Complete Works*. Ed. John M. Cooper and D. S. Hutchinson (various different translators). Indianapolis and Cambridge, UK: Hackett Publishing, 1997. See Copleston (III.22); Cushman (X.9); Dancy (IX.18); Havelock (I.75, IX.29); Henle (IX.33); Jordan (IX.35); Marenbon (XI.8); Menn (X.16); Nightingale (IX.49); Ong (I.132, III.74); Rhodes (X.23); Stewart, trans. (I.138).


uses readers with the highly oral dialect of urban African-American children. Also see Rickford (IX.68); and Farrell (IX.22).


X. SELECTED WORKS ABOUT THE INWARD TURN OF CONSCIOUSNESS

NOTE: See Orality and Literacy: 174-76.


(X.4) Brakke, David. Demons and the Making of the Monk: Spiritual Combat in Early Christianity. Cambridge, MA; and London: Harvard UP, 2006. Also see Forsyth (III.30); Loyola (III.54); Pagels (III.77); Russell (III.81, III.82, III.83, III.84).


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concerted and self-conscious cultivation of the inward turn of consciousness and self-awareness and self-appropriation. But also see Albert Ellis (X.10).


XI. SELECTED WORKS ABOUT THE QUANTIFICATION OF THOUGHT

NOTE: See Orality and Literacy: 127.


(XI.9) Ong, Walter J. *Ramus, Method, and the Decay of Dialogue: From the Art of Discourse to the Art of Reason*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1958. A classic study of print culture. Regarding the quantification of thought, see especially 53-91. In *The Barbarian Within: And Other Fugitive Essays* (I.122: 72), Ong explains the overall import of the quantification of thought in medieval logic: “In this historical perspective, medieval scholastic logic appears as a kind of premathematics, a subtle and unwitting preparation for the large-scale operations in quantitative modes of thinking which will characterize the modern world. In assessing the meaning of [medieval] scholasticism, one must keep in mind an important and astounding fact: in the whole history of the human mind, mathematics and mathematical physics come into their own, in a way which has changed the face of the earth and promises or threatens to change it even more, at only one place and time, that is, in Western Europe immediately after the [medieval] scholastic experience [in short, in print culture]. Elsewhere, no matter how advanced the culture on other scores, and even along mathematical lines, as in the case of the Babylonian, nothing like a real mathematical transformation of thinking takes place – not among the ancient Egyptians or Assyrians or Greeks or
Romans, not among the peoples of India nor the Chinese nor the Japanese, not among the Aztecs or Mayas, not in Islam despite the promising beginnings there, any more than among the Tartars or the Avars or the Turks. These people can all now share the common scientific knowledge, but the scientific tradition itself which they share is not a merging of various parallel discoveries made by their various civilizations. **It represents a new state of mind.** However great contributions other civilizations may hereafter make to the tradition, our scientific world traces its origins back always to seventeenth and sixteenth century Europe [in short, to Copernicus and Galileo], to the place where for some three centuries and more the [medieval] arts course taught in universities and parauniversity schools had pounded into the heads of youth a study program consisting almost exclusively of a highly quantified logic and a companion physics, both taught on a scale and with an enthusiasm never approximated or even dreamt of in ancient academies” (emphasis added).


XII. SELECTED WORKS ABOUT PRINT CULTURE

NOTE: See Orality and Literacy: 115-35.


(XII.2) Alter, Robert. Pen of Iron: American Prose and the King James Bible. Princeton: Princeton UP, 2010. For other studies of the English Bible, see Bloom (XII.11); Bobrick (XII.12); Bullinger (VII.4); Campbell (XII.14); Crystal (XII.19); Hamlin and Jones (XII.48); Harrison (XII.49, XII.50); Jeffrey (VII.11); McGrath (XII.73); Nicolson (XII.82); Norton (XII.83); Ryken (XII.123).

(XII.3) Anderson, Amanda. The Powers of Distance: Cosmopolitanism and the Cultivation of Detachment. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton UP, 2001. Ong liked to say that we need both closeness (proximity) and distance to understand something. Part of his claim and of Eric A. Havelock’s claim about the impact of ancient Greek phonetic alphabetic literacy on the development of abstract philosophic thought from the pre-Socratics onward to Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle is that the written texts supplied distantiation that enabled the development of the more abstract conceptual constructs with which philosophic thought works. When we come to
Peter Ramus (1515-1572) and his followers in early print culture, we should note that their trademark, as it were, involved the construction of elaborate arrays of unfolding dichotomies (usually; occasionally, we find a triple branching). By constructing these arrays of dichotomous terms, Ramus and his followers were distancing themselves from their visual constructs. Of course printed books themselves are visual constructs, just as handwritten manuscripts are. With respect to storage and retrieval, both manuscripts and printed books provide distance. Distance in turn frees up the human mind to move on to new adventures in learning, because the old is now safely stored up in written manuscripts and printed books. Independently of Ong and of Havelock, Amanda Anderson explores the potential of cultivated distance by examining certain Victorian writers in detail, including George Eliot, John Stuart Mill, Charlotte Bronte, Matthew Arnold, and Oscar Wilde. For a deeply thought-provoking defense of the cultivation of learning about the past as the way to establish the kind of distance that is needed for intelligent and insightful understanding of major cultural developments, see Ong’s “Communications as a Field of Study” in *The 1977 Multimedia International Yearbook*, edited by Stefan Bamberger (Rome: Multimedia International, 1976: 7-25).

Western culture. In *The Spirit of Democratic Capitalism*, 2nd ed. (Lanham, Maryland; and New York: Madison Books, 1991), Michael Novak discusses the certain social dimensions associated with modern capitalism in print culture. In *The Universal Hunger for Liberty: Why the Clash of Civilizations Is Not Inevitable* (New York: Basic Books, 2004: 33-35), Novak discusses cultural systems and moral ecology. Also see B. M. Friedman (XII.37); Habermas (XII.46); Mokyr (XII.80); Ong (XII.110); Poovey (XII.116); Sota (XII.131); Stark (XII.133); Warsh (XII.139).

(XII.5) Berman, Morris. *Social Change and Scientific Organization: The Royal Institution, 1799-1844*. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1978. Modern science is at home in Western culture, especially in the United States. As a result, when I taught the introductory-level course Literacy, Technology, and Society at the University of Minnesota Duluth, I used to tell the students that the course was about them and their cultural conditioning. In the twentieth century, Nobel Prizes were awarded in the following numbers: (1) Medicine or Physiology: the United States 45; the United Kingdom 18; and Germany 14; (2) Physics: the United States 42; the United Kingdom 19; and Germany 17; (3) Chemistry: the United States 37; the United Kingdom 22; and German 14. Concerning the history of science, also see Bird and Sherwin (XII.7); Blackwell (XII.8, XII.9); Ferris (XII.32); Frasca-Spada and N. Jardine (XII.35); Gribbin (XII.45); Harrison (XII.49, XII.50); O’Malley, Bailey, Harris, and Kennedy (XII.85, XII.86); Ong (III.68; XII.89, esp. 72;
XII.107); Saliba (XII.124); Stark (XII.132); Whitehead (XII.141); Wills (III.96); Yeo (XII.146).


(XII.7) Bird, Kai and Martin J. Sherwin. American Prometheus: The Triumph and Tragedy of J. Robert Oppenheimer. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2005. Unfortunately for everybody in the world, but most especially for the people in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, J. Robert Oppenheimer had to learn the hard way the point of Mary Shelley's cautionary tale about the spirit of modern science, Frankenstein, or the Modern Prometheus. Thus far, only one nation in the world has been so barbaric as to use atomic bombs. Also see Wills (III.96).


(XII.11) ---. *The Shadow of a Great Rock: A Literary Appreciation of the King James Bible.* New Haven and London: Yale UP, 2011. Very accessible. This new book will probably not become a best-seller, as Bloom’s *Shakespeare: The Invention of the Human* did. However, Bloom’s new book really should be read in conjunction with his book on Shakespeare. But also see Alter.


(XII.29) ---. “The West Versus the Rest: Getting Our Cultural Bearings from Walter J. Ong.”


(XII.31) Feingold, Mordechai, Joseph S. Freedman and Wolfgang Rother, eds. The Influence of Petrus Ramus: Studies in Sixteenth and Seventeenth Century Philosophy and Sciences. Basel, Switzerland: Schwabe, 2001. Also see Freedman (XII.36); Hotson (XII.53, XII.56); P. Mack (XII.68); Milton (XII.79); Ong (XII.101, XII.107, XII.108); Sharratt (XII.127, XII.128, XII.129).


(XII.44) Grendler, Paul F. *Schooling in Renaissance Italy: Literacy and Learning, 1300-1600*. Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins UP, 1989.


inadequate for understanding the Ramist pedagogical movement and its successors. In the process of criticizing and correcting Ong’s apparent misunderstandings of the Ramist pedagogical movement, Hotson does not diminish Ong’s stature as a cultural theorist regarding the aural-visual shift in cognitive processing.


known as the Society of Jesus (known informally as the Jesuit order). He is also the compiler of the minor classic work in spirituality known as the *Spiritual Exercises*. He was roughly contemporary with the French logician and educational reformer and Protestant martyr Peter Ramus (1515-1572). In his 1967 encyclopedia article titled “Humanism” (XII.97) Ong sees both the Jesuit educational movement and the Ramist educational movement as parts of the larger educational movement associated with Renaissance humanism. Concerning the Jesuit educational movement, see Pavur (XII.113); concerning the Ramist educational movement, see Hotson (XII.53, XII.56).


(XII.75) McLuhan, Marshall. *The Gutenberg Galaxy: The Making of Typographic Man*. Toronto: U of Toronto P, 1962. A classic but flawed study of print culture. For understandable reasons, McLuhan and Ong are often thought of as espousing similar and indeed compatible ideas. But it is important to understand that Ong is not McLuhan. For example, in *The Gutenberg Galaxy*, McLuhan repeatedly refers
to “retribalization” as though this hypothetical possibility were a realistic possibility. However, following a centuries-old pattern of defining something by saying what it is not, Ong famously defines secondary orality as not primary orality. He associates secondary orality (i.e., orality fostered by communication media that accentuate sound) with literate forms of thought, because literate forms of thought were involved in developing the communication media that accentuate sound. If secondary orality were the same as primary orality, then there would presumably be no point in dubbing it “secondary orality.” Moreover, if secondary orality were the same as primary orality, then McLuhan’s hypothetical “retribalization” would seem likely to occur as a matter of course. However, Ong also works with the contrast of cyclic thought versus evolutionary thought. But even the hypothetical possibility of “retribalization” would seem to imply a form of cyclic thought (i.e., return to the original oral cultural conditions that Ong refers to as primary orality).


(XII.77) Miller, Perry. The New England Mind: The Seventeenth Century. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1939. A classic study about print culture. Among other things, Miller reports that he found only one self-described Aristotelian in seventeenth-century New England – everybody else was a self-described Ramist. As Ong shows, before the advent of the French logician and educational reformer and Protestant
martyr Peter Ramus (1515-1572), the arts course of studies in the medieval university was dominated by what was referred to as the Aristotelian tradition of logic, even when new additions were added that were not found in Aristotle’s writings about logic. The influence of the arts course of studies in the medieval university emerged before the development of the Gutenberg printing press in the 1450s. After the development of the Gutenberg printing press in the 1450s, the extensive Ramist educational movement and the extensive Jesuit educational movement and other educational developments associated with Renaissance humanism emerged that were decisively different from the arts course of studies in the medieval university. See Ong (III.74); Hotson (XII.53, XII.56); Pavur (XII.113).


of God to man, as Ong has noted. However, if it is “logical” for Milton to state his purpose in *Paradise Lost*, as Ong has suggested that it is, then we should note that Ignatius Loyola (1491-1556), who did not study the logic of Peter Ramus (1515-1572), states the purpose of the religious believer in this life in the section of the *Spiritual Exercises* titled “Principle and Foundation” (paragraph number 23).


(XII.83) Norton, David. *The King James Bible: A Short History from Tyndale to Today.*


(XII.85) O’Malley, John W., Gauvin Alexander Bailey, Steven J. Harris, and T. Frank Kennedy, eds. *The Jesuits: Cultures, Sciences, and the Arts, 1540-1773.* Toronto; Buffalo;
London: U of Toronto P, 1999. For other works by and/or about Jesuits (including some by Ong), see Copleston (III.22); Crowe (I.40); Henle (IX.33); Lonergan (IX.45); Loyola (X.13, XII.65); P. Mack (XII.68); Nixon (II.11); O’Malley (III.67, XII.64); O’Malley, Bailey, Harris, and Kennedy (XII.86); O’Malley, Bailey, and Sale (XII.87); Ong (II.15; II.16, esp. 61-82; II.17; VIII.12; X.19; XII.90; XII.97); Phillips (IX.59); Tade (X.26); Teilhard de Chardin (II.20, X.28); Wimsatt (I.178).


(XII.108) ---. *Ramus and Talon Inventory*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1958. Bibliographic listing and brief description of more than 750 volumes by the French logician and educational reformer Peter Ramus (1515-1572) and his followers and related works. With the financial assistance of two Guggenheim fellowships, Ong was able to live abroad for about four years, staying in Jesuit residences. He worked in more than 100 libraries in the British Isles and Continental Europe tracking down the more than 750 volumes (mostly in Latin) listed. Concerning the verbal art known as rhetoric, see Lawrence D. Green and James J. Murphy’s *Renaissance Rhetoric Short-Title Catalogue 1460-1700* (XII.43). For studies of Ramus and Ramism, see Feingold, Freedman, and Rother (XII.31); Freedman (XII.36); Hotson (XII.53, XII.56); P. Mack (XII.68); Milton (XII.79); Sharratt (XII.127, XII.128, XII.129).


(XII.113) Pavur, Claude, trans. *The Ratio Studiorum: The Official Plan for Jesuit Education* [Ratio atque Institutio Studiorum Societatis Iesu]. St. Louis: Institute of Jesuit Sources, 2005. In his 1967 encyclopedia entry titled “Humanism” (XII.97), meaning Renaissance humanism, Ong sees the Jesuit educational movement as part of the larger educational movement of Renaissance humanism, just as he sees the Ramist educational movement as part of Renaissance humanism. Over 50 years of collaborative Jesuit effort went into producing this 1599 document, which was preceded by earlier versions in 1586 and 1591. Concerning Jesuit
higher education in the United States, see Kathleen A. Mahoney’s *Catholic Higher Education in Protestant America: The Jesuits and Harvard in the Age of the University* (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins UP, 2003).


(XII.134) Taylor, Charles. *A Secular Age*. Cambridge, MA; and London: Belknap P/Harvard UP, 2007. Also see Gauchet (XII.39); Gillespie (XII.40); Ong (II.14, esp. 104-25; II.17); Roy (XII.122).


Weedon, Alexis, Jane Roberts, Pamela Robinson, Ian Gadd, Eleanor F. Shevlin, and Stephen Colclough, eds. The History of the Book in the West: A Library of Critical Essays. 5 vols. Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2010. Regarding works in Latin, see Ong’s Ramus and Talon Inventory (XII.108) and Lawrence D. Green and James J. Murphy’s Renaissance Rhetoric Short-Title Catalogue 1460-1700, 2nd ed. (XII.43). Studies of book history are emerging with greater frequency and greater coverage than ever before. Ong liked to say that we need both proximity (closeness) and distance to understand something. The recent growth of studies of book history shows our newly emerging distance from print culture, the cultural matrix out of which printed books emerged after the emergence of the Gutenberg printing press in the 1450s. Because the recent growth of studies of book history shows our cultural the distance from the print culture that emerged from the Gutenberg printing press, this cultural distance can also double as evidence that we in Western culture today are being culturally conditioned by a new cultural matrix, which Ong refers to as secondary oral culture. But for Ong, secondary orality (i.e., the orality associated with communication media that accentuate sound such as sound amplification systems, telephones, radio, movies and videos with sound tracks, television, audiotapes) is not primary orality. If Marshall McLuhan’s use of the term “retribalization” in The Gutenberg Galaxy (XII.75) is understood to mean a return to what Ong refers to as primary orality, then Ong’s understanding of secondary orality appears to be decidedly different from McLuhan’s understanding of what he styles electric orality. For McLuhan, electric orality is by definition tribal (a term that McLuhan uses but does not
carefully define and explain). But for Ong, secondary orality by definition is not primary orality, which means that our contemporary cultural conditioning in our secondary oral culture is not likely to lead to anything seriously approximating retribalization. Nevertheless, our contemporary cultural conditioning in our secondary oral culture may lead to greater psychological and cultural distance from the print culture that emerged after the emergence of the Gutenberg printing press in the 1450s. But Ong also hoped that our cultural conditioning in our secondary oral culture would enable us to deepen our understanding of primary oral cultures, so that we in Western culture today might be able to “we” and “us” to people in primary oral cultures and residual forms of primary oral cultures, and to their poetry and the kinds of experiences expressed in their poetry. In this way, Ong was hopeful that our secondary orality in Western culture today would be deeply humanizing for us to experience, or at least potentially deeply humanizing for us to experience. Indeed, Ong saw his own work in cultural history and cultural theory as humanizing.


