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SOCIAL CONFORMITY, DEVIATION, AND OPPORTUNITY-STRUCTURES: A COMMENT ON THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF DUBIN AND CLOWARD

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Six of the articles in this issue of the Review *are concerned with deviant behavior. And three articles—those by Robert Dubin and Richard A. Cloward, upon which Professor Merton comments, and the following paper by Dorothy L. Meier and Wendell Bell—are clearly in the Durkheimian tradition. It is not surprising that these contributions conspicuously exploit Merton's essay, "Social Structure and Anomie," first published in 1938, itself a modern landmark in that tradition. These papers not only illustrate the continuing influence of Durkheim but they specify possibilities, at least, of cumulative theoretical development. Professor Merton's commentary—written at short notice, and at the request of a persistent but grateful editor—attests once more to the viability of the tradition and promises further significant analysis of deviant behavior, to be sure, and of conformity conduct as well.*
—The Editor.

THE papers by Robert Dubin and Richard Cloward, upon which the editor of the *Review* has invited me to comment, are designed to extend a limited theory of the social and cultural sources of socially deviant behavior. Addressed to different parts of that theory, the papers are in turn complementary. Dubin methodically combines additional elements of social behavior to arrive at subtypes of deviant adaptations that were not distinguished in an earlier classification. Cloward introduces strategic new variables for the analysis of the social and cultural contexts that, by hypothesis, give rise to varying rates of deviant behavior. Otherwise put, Dubin proposes a more exacting analysis of distinct forms of deviant adaptation; Cloward proposes a more exacting analysis of kinds of opportunity-structures that help account for differentials in rates and kinds of deviant behavior occurring in various social groups and social strata.

Both papers, in my opinion, move toward a more adequate sociological theory of deviant behavior. In doing so, they exemplify one way in which a theory develops through successive approximations. A set of ideas serves, for a time, as a more or less useful guide for the investigation of an array of problems. As inquiry proceeds along these lines, it uncovers a gap in the theory: the set of ideas is found to be not discriminating enough to deal with aspects of phenomena to which it should in principle apply. In some cases, it is proposed to fill the gap by further differentiation of concepts and propositions that are consistent with the earlier theory, which is regarded as demonstrably incomplete rather than fundamentally mistaken. In other cases, the new conceptions put in question some of the assumptions underlying the earlier theory which is then replaced rather than revised. The papers by Dubin and Cloward are evidently of the first type, providing basic extensions, rather than a replacement, of the sociological ideas under review.[1] Not the least merit of contributions such as theirs is that they keep us from behaving like sociological barnacles, clinging desperately to the theories we have learned in our youth or that we may have helped develop at any age.

The first and larger part of my comment is devoted to Dubin's proposed extension of the typology; the second part, to his and Cloward's theoretical observations on social and cultural sources of deviance.

THE EXTENDED TYPOLOGY OF DEVIANT ADAPTATIONS

In reviewing Dubin's extended classification, I shall try to bring out the bases for the following observations:

First, that Dubin's program for methodi-

[1] Limitations of space do not allow me to examine the relation of these developments to Talcott Parsons' derivation and expansion of the typology set forth in "Social Structure and Anomie." See Parsons, *The Social System,* Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1951, pp. 256–267; 321–325.

cally identifying numerous kinds of deviant adaptation is sound in principle and productive in result. By "sound in principle," I mean that he systematically combines a limited number of attributes in order to identify similarities and differences between types of socially deviant behavior that, on the surface, seem entirely unrelated.[2] The political demagogue and the thief, the overly-zealous patriot and the frightened routineer, are methodically located in some of their sociological dimensions. His program has the merit of consolidating a typology of deviant adaptations with the distinction between attitudes toward social norms and actual behavior.

Second, in extending the typology, Dubin has in fact accomplished more than he expressly set out to do. His implicit program raises more problems and provides more clues to their solution than he indicates; among these is the beginning of a typology of conformity.

Third, temporary patches of ambiguity result from his implicit introduction of more distinctions in his substantive account of specimens of deviant behavior than are expressly recorded in his formal typology.

Fourth, these instructive ambiguities are registered in his system of formal notations, which occasionally uses the same symbol for different referents.

Fifth and finally, I shall try to show that Dubin's explicit program contributes signally to our understanding of sociological relations between diverse types of deviant adaptation and that the discrepancies between his explicit and his implicit program, although they make for temporary ambiguity, have the value of indicating directions for useful inquiry into the relations between conforming and nonconforming behavior.

Attitudinal, Doctrinal, and Behavioral Conformity. One way in which Dubin proposes to refine the typology of deviant behavior is by systematically incorporating a further distinction between institutional norms and actual behavior. As he puts it, the institutional norms "set the limits of legitimate behaviors," prescribing the range of what people subject to the particular institution are normatively expected to believe and to do. "Institutional means" are "the specific behaviors, prescribed or potential, that lie within" these limits; they are "the actual behaviors of people" [p. 149],[3] considered in relation to the institutional norms.

Now, as Dubin says, [p. 149] the distinction between norms and behavior is already found in my typology. Indeed, it is at the very core. Deviant adaptations there refer, of course, to behavior, classified sociologically according to whether or not it is jointly or severally consistent with particular culture goals and institutional norms. An adaptation is described as deviant (and not invidiously so) when behavior departs from what is required by cultural goals, or by institutional norms, or by both.

The fortunate fact is that Dubin has not, as he suggests to be the case, limited himself to introducing this distinction. It is not the generally acknowledged and sociologically important distinction between institutional *norms* (the morally binding expectations of appropriate behavior prevailingly held by those subject to the institution) and actual behavior that he records in his table of types. Instead, he uses two other productive distinctions, as is evident from the notations for "cultural goals," "institutional norms," and "means" in his table and from his discussion of cases in point.

The first of these distinctions is between the *attitudes toward particular norms* held by people and their actual behavior. Here, Dubin is dealing with *attitudinal conformity* (or deviation): attitudes of commitment,

[2] For the logic of this procedure of conceiving observables as resultants of constituent, and sometimes conflicting, elements, see P. F. Lazarsfeld, "Some Remarks on the Typological Procedure in Social Research," *Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung,* 6 (1937), pp. 119–139; Allen H. Barton and P. F. Lazarsfeld, "Some Functions of Qualitative Analysis in Social Research," in Theodor W. Adorno and Walter Dirks, editors, *Sociologica,* Frankfurt am Main: Europäische Verlagsanstalt, 1955, pp. 321–361, especially at pp. 331–343; M. R. Cohen, *A Preface to Logic,* New York: Holt, 1944, pp. 74–75.

[3] In order to enable ready reference to pertinent passages in the papers by Dubin and Cloward and to avoid an excess of footnotes, appropriate page-citations in the text appear in brackets.

when people grant legitimacy to the norm, and attitudes of alienation, when they deny its legitimacy. This is evident from Dubin's own evidence. Obviously, only if he is distinguishing between attitudes and overt behavior can he refer, as he instructively does, to cases in which an institutional norm is "accepted" by people whose behavior nevertheless deviates significantly from it. Once we recognize that the operative distinction is between the individual's attitudinal commitment to the norm or alienation from it and his actual behavior (rather than between the norm—the moral expectations held by others—and actual behavior) we can resolve seemingly contradictory categories that emerge in Dubin's typology. I refer to categories such as the "institutional moralist" and the "means opportunist" that combine acceptance of an institutional norm with rejection of it in actual practice and to categories such as the "organization automaton" and "normative opportunist" that combine rejection of the norm with conformity to it in practice.

By systematically deploying the distinction between attitudinal and behavioral conformity, Dubin converges toward other attempts of like kind. One such attempt, for example, is aimed to distil some sense from the bromide about the discrepancy between creed and conduct in the field of American race relations. For this pupose, we must distinguish between

> the official creed, individuals' beliefs and attitudes concerning the creed, and their actual behavior. . . . Individuals may recognize the creed as part of a cultural tradition, *without having any private conviction of its moral validity or its binding quality.* Thus, so far as the beliefs of individuals are concerned, we can identify two types: those who genuinely believe in the creed and those who do not (although some of these may, on public or ceremonial occasions, profess adherence to its principles). Similarly, with respect to actual practices: conduct may or may not conform to the creed. But, and this is the salient consideration: *conduct may or may not conform with individuals' own beliefs concerning the moral claims of all men to equal opportunity.*
>
> Stated in formal sociological terms, this asserts that attitudes and overt behavior vary independently. Prejudicial attitudes need not coincide with discriminatory behavior. The implications of this statement can be drawn out in terms of a logical syntax whereby the attributes are diversely combined, as can be seen in the following typology.

	Attitude Dimension: Prejudice and Non-Prejudice*	*Behavior Dimension: Discrimination and Non-Discrimination*
Type I: Unprejudiced non-discriminator	+	+
Type II: Unprejudiced discriminator	+	−
Type III: Prejudiced non-discriminator	−	+
Type IV: Prejudiced discriminator	−	−

* Where (+) = conformity to the American Creed and (−) = deviation from it.[4]

This particular instance of generating types of adaptation by systematically combining attitudes toward a norm and actual behavior has been generalized by Gerth and Mills,[5] whose formulation thus converges with what Dubin has worked out in fuller detail. Gerth and Mills methodically combine "attitudes toward the ideal or norm" and "conduct with reference to the norm or ideal" to derive four types of adaptation that closely approximate Dubin's types of the institutional moralist, organization automaton, normative opportunist, and means opportunist. The classifications are similar but not identical, since Gerth and Mills do not distinguish between cultural goals and institutional norms, as does Dubin, so as to identify more detailed subtypes of social adaptation.

Once we see that Dubin in fact distinguishes not between a norm and behavior but between attitudes toward a norm and behavior, we are on the road to locating the conditions under which one or another type of adaptation comes about. Dubin says, for example, that the "organization automaton" (−−+) does everything " 'by the book,' " that he acts in strict accord with the institu-

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[4] R. K. Merton, "Discrimination and the American Creed," in *Discrimination and National Welfare,* R. M. MacIver, editor, New York: Harper, 1948, pp. 99–126, especially at pp. 102–103; for a logical analysis of this and kindred typologies, see Barton and Lazarsfeld, *op. cit.*, pp. 336–337.

[5] Hans Gerth and C. Wright Mills, *Character and Social Structure,* New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1953, pp. 266–271.

tional norms although he "rejects" them. This means, then, that the automaton is alienated from norms that are considered legitimate by others and conforms to them in practice; perhaps because it is expedient —he would otherwise be subject to sanctions—or because of established routines of habit. Again, the "means opportunist" (++−) who accepts the legitimacy of a norm nevertheless deviates from it in practice when behavioral conformity would mean abandoning the cultural goal.

A second important distinction employed by Dubin in his analysis of illustrative cases has no place as yet in his formal typology. This is the distinction between the attitudes toward values and norms that are *publicly expressed in words* and those that remain *private attitudes,* not communicated to others. He deals here with *doctrinal* conformity or deviation, not with attitudinal or behavioral conformity. He deals with the observability of attitudes as a strategic variable. This distinction between publicly expressed and privately held attitudes toward values and norms enables Dubin to locate, in his classification, the important types of adaptation described as the "institutional moralist" (−+−) and the "demagogue" (+−−). What marks off the institutional moralist from, say, a guilt-ridden criminal (who might also be classified as −+−) is not his private commitment to the norms from which he departs in practice, but his public insistence on their legitimacy. In Dubin's words, the institutional moralist is engaged in "persistent reiteration" and in the "ritualistic drumming" of norms; he emphasizes, in effect, that others are " 'to do as I say, not as I do.' " [p. 157 So, too, the hallmark of the demagogue is not his private commitment to cultural values—this is left unsettled in Dubin's scheme—but his repeated public emphasis upon them, at the expense of the established norms linked up with these values.

That this distinction, instructively used in Dubin's discussion of specimen cases, finds no systematic place in his formal typology can also be seen from the system of notation. As with my own notations, the acceptance of goals or norms, signified by (+), sometimes means a private belief in their legitimacy and sometimes, whatever this private belief, their public affirmation. In the case of the instrumental moralist, Dubin implies that public pronouncement coincides with private belief; he is presumably half-brother to the whited sepulchre who talks beautifully of high morality which he does not actually believe. The distinction between private and public attitude, systematically adopted, would enable Dubin to distinguish methodically rather than sporadically between further types of conformity and deviation.

In short, Dubin has begun to bring together basic sociological notions that have not been systematically related before. His description of types of adaptation implicitly employs the basic distinctions between attitudes and overt behavior, and between publicly affirmed and privately held attitudes. But these are not caught up either in the concepts or in the symbolic notations of his formal typology. As a result, the elements that are logically combined to form categories have differing meanings in differing cases, and this makes for temporary ambiguity. Here as elsewhere, the indicated procedure would be to use these further elements to develop other related typologies rather than to try to do too much in too little by compressing them all into a single typology. This would lead to conceptions of attitudinal conformity (or nonconformity), when individuals grant or deny legitimacy to designated institutional values and norms; doctrinal conformity (or nonconformity), when they express their attitudes to others; and behavioral conformity (or nonconformity) when, whatever their attitudinal and doctrinal position, they act in accord with values and norms or at odds with them.

Deviant and Variant Behavior. Although Dubin has undertaken to differentiate types of deviant behavior, it turns out that, by implication, he begins also to differentiate important types of conforming behavior. What is more, the latter distinction has the double merit of being of a piece with one made by other sociologists and of countering the stereotyped connotation, held by many, of social conformity as necessarily confined to routinized, unimaginative, and unthinking assent to institutionalized expectations.

Since the distinction remains implicit, it

can best be seen by again inspecting some of Dubin's specimens of ostensibly deviant behavior. Consider the case of "intellectual invention" which appears in the paradigm as the active rejection of a cultural goal and the substitution of a new one, together with acceptance of institutional norms and behavioral conformity to them (±++). The first intimation that Dubin may be including more here than is provided by the formal typology comes with the unexpected appearance of such men as Pasteur, Einstein, and Boole as "deviants" in the institution of science. [p. 154] Now, it is not that Dubin or I construe "deviant" (or nonconforming) behavior as socially undesirable that makes for surprise in seeing these heroes of science described as deviants. Men honored by posterity often were regarded by their contemporaries as dangerous deviants. It is rather that these scientists were presumably living up to the values of science in high degree and yet they emerge, in Dubin's scheme, as deviating from these values; specifically, as having rejected a cultural goal embodied in the institution of science.

To be sure, these men set forth radically *new ideas*. But these cognitive ideas were not deviant, in the sense of being at odds with the values of science. For, as Dubin himself properly notes [p. 154], a central goal of science is the advancement of knowledge, according to more or less established criteria of what constitutes sound scientific knowledge. Dubin plainly does not contend that Pasteur, Einstein, and Boole have, through their creative work, rejected this goal and substituted another. On the contrary, it would seem that their behavior conformed to both institutional goals and norms (the abbreviated notation should then be +++).

Yet, Dubin senses, and rightly so, that such socially prized and creative conformity to institutional goals and norms should, for many purposes, be distinguished from the kind of conformity represented by repetitive, unthinking routine. He does not want to identify the creative man and the Philistine, Pasteur and the victimized disciples of Mrs. Grundy. But he has no concepts that explicitly distinguish between *new creative* forms of behavior (which are conforming in the sociological sense that they are well within normative limits) and *old repetitive* forms of behavior that are also within these limits. He therefore tries to make a place for the distinction; in the case of "intellectual invention," by shifting the level of generality on which he describes the cultural goal. Rather than considering the goal as the advancement of knowledge, Dubin treats it, by implication, as that of being in accord with preceding ideas. He then concludes that Pasteur and the others have substituted a new "cultural goal" in science, and are consequently engaging in "deviant behavior."

In short, to clarify his typology further, Dubin must distinguish between *new* forms of behavior that are well within the range of the institutionally prescribed or allowed and *new* forms that are outside this range. Following the useful terminology of Florence Kluckhohn, the first of these can be described as "variant" behavior and only the second, as "deviant." [6] Some of the ideas of Pasteur, Einstein, and the rest were the occasion for controversy among scientists when they were first set forth, but this was the kind of controversy that often follows upon variants (which are still within the borders of the institutionally acceptable). These innovating scientists were not accused, by their scientist-critics, of repudiating the goals of science. At most, they were sometimes said not to have met the institutional norms of providing satisfactory evidence for their ideas. Indeed, the institution of science actually calls for variants that will better meet the goal of new knowledge. Each variant must be shown to satisfy the norms of evidence, but however radical, it does not repudiate or replace the institutional goal of advancing knowledge.

Although the important and useful distinction between deviant behavior and the two types of conforming behavior (routinized and variant)[7] turns up in Dubin's discussion

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[6] For a short summary, see the account by Clyde Kluckhohn, "Values and Value-Orientations in the Theory of Action," in Talcott Parsons and E. A. Shils, editors, *Toward a General Theory of Action*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951, p. 415.

[7] It will be recognized that Dubin has thus come back to the distinction, so often emphasized by W. I. Thomas, of two kinds of institutional conformity: one characteristic of the Philistine and the other of the creative man. Thomas's third type, the Bohemian, represents deviant behavior in relation to the conventional community; it may, of

of cases, it is not expressly utilized in the formal typology. Once more, the system of notation helps us see that this is so. For Dubin joins me in using the same symbol (+) to designate the two kinds of conformity, with the "institutional means" creatively employed by a Pasteur or an Einstein being designated in the same way as the routinized institutional means of an "organization automaton." As a rough approximation, this served a purpose for a time. But we can now see, by studying Dubin's paper, that a systematic classification of *types* of conformity is needed and that some of the elements to be used for arriving at this classification are implicit in his description of seeming specimens of deviant behavior.

I have examined this one example at length because of its general implications for the current status of Dubin's typology. Although he began by extending a typology of deviant behavior, Dubin has instructively come upon but not yet formally incorporated a wider range of behavior, including the beginnings of a typology of conformity. Such basic distinctions as that between concretely new forms of behavior that are deviant and those that are only variant would need to be utilized in developing that typology. To the extent that this distinction is built into a typology of conformity, it will systematically indicate which kinds of social change are, and which are not, preceded by deviant behavior. The typology would also serve to reinstitute, in a systematic framework, the earlier recognition by Thomas and others that conformity covers a wide range of behavior and is not confined to the merely repetitive or monotonously routinized behaviors that are in accord with institutional goals and norms.

Types of Variants: Transitory and Enduring. Dubin's illustrative cases provide other respects in which the analysis moves toward typologies of both conforming and deviant behavior. Consider the category of "operating inventions," which refers to adaptations that involve acceptance of both cultural goals and institutional norms together with new specific forms of behavior (+ + ±). Fads and fashions, as well as occupational jargon and craft secrets, are proposed as good examples of this category.

Dubin's characterization of fads and fashions as deviant will probably give the reader pause. After all, to follow the fashion—whether in dress, ideas, or child-rearing—would seem to be the acme of conforming behavior. It means being in the swim, of doing something new which many others are doing precisely because it is being done. In many groups, it is the person out of fashion, not the one who follows the fashion, who is evidently the nonconformist, subject to sanctions by his fellows.

Dubin knows this, of course. Although operating inventions of this sort appear in his catalogue of deviancy, when he gets down to cases, he says, in substance, that fads, fashions, and the like really are not instances of deviant behavior. As he notes, "operating inventions are wholly concerned with innovating behaviors that represent the fulfillment of the potential behavior patterns possible within the limits established by the institutional norms." [p. 152] If they are within these limits (and involve adherence to cultural goals as well), they can scarcely be categorized as deviant. These, too, are variant, not deviant, behaviors; they are normatively acceptable innovations.

Yet, Dubin senses that they are variants of a particular kind. As long as types of conforming behavior are not methodically distinguished, then scientific innovation as well as fad and fashion would be described as conforming with the institutional values and norms (+ + +). Both would be similarly categorized as new behaviors that are institutionally allowed or prescribed. This is repugnant to phenomenological experience and a bar to analysis, and so Dubin seeks a way of distinguishing between them.

Although scientific innovation and fashion (or fad) are both variants, they differ, of course, in other respects. Of these, I here consider only one: they are enduring or transitory. When the words "fad" or "fashion" are applied to a currently new form of behavior or to a new idea, they imply that it will be short-lived. The words contain a prediction (or, if the event is past history, a

course, be even more exactingly conformist in relation to the Bohemian subculture. Dubin's contribution rests in beginning to locate these types in a systematic framework. W. I. Thomas and F. Znaniecki, *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America,* New York: Knopf, 1927, II, pp. 1853–1859.

description): the variant will not last; it too shall soon pass away. They also contain an evaluation: it is right and fitting that the variant be transitory for it is of little permanent worth as measured by the values of the group.

There are, consequently, special institutional settings within which the words "fad" or "fashion" are used as epithets for behavior that is truly deviant in the sense of departing from norms. This is provided by institutions devoted to what are felt to be enduring values—science and religion, for example—as distinct from institutions devoted to the ephemeral, such as dress or entertainment (not art). In the first, mere vogue is suspect; in the second, mere vogue reigns. Thus, when scientific work is described as (merely) a fad or fashion—as was sometimes said, for example, of the more than a thousand papers published on X-rays following their discovery by Röntgen, or of the widespread use of the F-scale or of Rorschachs—it is being claimed that the work is transitory or, at least, is being given more attention than it is worth. As the history of science shows, such predictive evaluations are not always borne out by the event. Yet when applied accurately to scientific work, the epithets "fad" and "fashion" do indeed refer to deviant behavior, judged by the standards of science itself. But this is so only because science is institutionally concerned with enduring knowledge which, however much amended and amplified, remains sound knowledge. But if fads and fashions constitute deviant behavior in this institutional domain, they do not in the other domains in which they register expected conformity with what is currently in vogue.

By implication, then, Dubin gives us a further distinction between types of conformity: variants that come to endure as a part of normative expectations and of culture, this being a process of social and cultural change (without antecedent *deviant* behavior), and temporary variants that leave no residue in society and culture, this being a process of social and cultural fluctuation.[8] These types, as exemplified by new scientific discoveries and by new fashions, respectively, are not only phenomenologically different, but they presumably differ also in the conditions giving rise to them and in their functions.[9]

Overconformity as Social Deviation. Overconformity emerges as a distinct kind of deviant behavior at several points in Dubin's account. The demagogue is described as "over-conforming to cultural goals" through his "insistent demand that [these] . . . should override any institutional norms or means—a clearcut case of overconformity." [p. 160] The institutional moralist "centers his overconforming behavior on the norms of the institution in which he acts. This overconformity is expressed in a persistent reiteration of these norms. . . ." [p. 157] And the organization automaton engages in "overconformity to institutional means. . . ." [p. 158].

Although Dubin does not define overconformity, he states two criteria of it. He notes that the ritualist is selectively overconformist "with respect to the facet of the social system to which he overconforms and [that] overconformity is visibly displayed in his words and action. . . . [p. 159] On the first criterion, overconformity is registered as an imbalance in which *conformity* to either goals, norms, or means is not balanced by *conformity to the other two.* In the system of notation, this reads as any combination of two minuses and one plus. This is why, presumably, Dubin refers to overconformity only for the demagogue (+ — —), the institutional moralist (— + —), and the organization automaton (— — +). It is important to note that, as was also true of my typology, Dubin's has no *distinct* notation for overconformity under the three elements of goals, norms, and means.

The first criterion is different from and can be inconsistent with the second, implied by Dubin's descriptive accounts and employed by other sociologists who have been investigating overconformity as a form of

[8] Much pertinent material is provided in the four volumes of P. A. Sorokin, *Social and Cultural Dynamics,* New York: American Book, 1937.

[9] Consider only Edward Sapir's observations in "Fashion," *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences,* New York: Macmillan, 1935, Vol. 6, pp. 139–144, and, in particular, his concluding remark: "Functional irrelevance as contrasted with symbolic significance for the expressiveness of the ego is implicit in all fashion."

deviant behavior. The second criterion is the "excessive degree" to which the overconformist exhibits his adherence to values and norms. He displays too much of what, in a certain measure, is regarded by the group as a good thing. If ambition or patriotism or piety is a group value, then, as the vernacular aptly expresses it, he is "over-ambitious" or a "jingoist" or a "religious fanatic." If an institutional norm calls for high productivity or for punctuality, then he insists on even higher standards of production or on being earlier than promptness requires. If the group expects behavior to approximate the norms, then he is a perfectionist who adheres strictly even to those minutiae of the rules that everyone recognizes are not seriously intended.

On this view, overconformity is the direct counterpart of underconformity. It is a form of social deviation that involves "too much" just as underconformity involves "too little" when judged by group standards.[10] This still leaves open the question of accounting sociologically for certain actions being experienced as "too much" and therefore as social deviation; why, for example, are certain kinds of high performance regarded by the group as a great achievement, and other kinds as being too much of a good thing? A few observations on this may help suggest what is required for Dubin to locate overconformity systematically in the developing typology.

Overconformity and underconformity have the same functional basis for being experienced as deviant behavior by members of a group: they are so regarded when they depart from group expectations to such an extent as to interfere with the relatively smooth operation of the social system. "*Some* measure of leeway in conforming to roles is presupposed in all groups," although the amount of leeway varies among groups and for the same group under differing conditions.[11] It is when great or little conformity is of such magnitude as to move beyond this range of the socially functional that it comes to be felt as "excessive" and is visited with sanctions. In the case of adherence to cultural goals, an excess occurs when the emphasis on one goal is so great as to interfere with socially established attachments to other goals in the institutional system; the single goal tends to become absolute and exclusive. In the case of norms, an excess occurs when the group-member insists upon the established way of doing things even when this gets in the way of moving toward the goal for which the norm was once effectively instrumental or symbolically appropriate. In the case of behavior, an excess occurs when literal compliance with norms is such as to interfere with the adaptations of others in the social system. So it is that the overconforming bureaucrat interferes with operations in his organization,[12] just as "the compulsive achiever places excessive demands on himself and on others." [13]

These attributes of overconformity are clearly found in Dubin's description of typical cases. But, as we have seen, he has no distinct concept or notation in his typology, just as I had none, for this "excess" of response to values, norms, and means. The same notation (+) is used to designate an acceptable degree of conformity and to designate an excess of conformity. To incorporate excessive conformity systematically in the typology, rather than to confine it to the description of cases, would require that it be introduced as a distinct element with its distinctive notation. In other words, and it is a merit of Dubin's work that this now becomes apparent, a fourth mode of response, overconformity (++), must be added to the three now in use: conformity (+) underconformity (−), and substitution of an alternative (±). After all, the principal purpose of the classification is not merely to *identify* forms of socially deviant behavior, for none of these is apt to have

[10] The *fact* that overconformity occurs has of course been noted and discussed from earliest times. For some recent efforts to interpret the fact sociologically, see Parsons, *The Social System,* pp. 323–324; Richard T. LaPiere, *A Theory of Social Control,* New York: McGraw-Hill, 1954, pp. 122 ff.; R. K. Merton, *Social Theory and Social Structure,* Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1957, revised edition, pp. 149 ff.; 182 ff.

[11] Malinowski did much to open up the implications of this familiar fact; see also Merton, *op. cit.,* pp. 343 ff.; LaPiere, *op. cit.,* pp. 124–129.

[12] Peter M. Blau, *The Dynamics of Bureaucracy,* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955, Chapter 17, especially pp. 184–193.

[13] Parsons, *op. cit.,* p. 286.

gone unnoticed through the millennia of recorded history. As with other classifications, the purpose is to derive these forms by combining a limited number of defined elements, and so to discover the relations of each form to all the rest.

Concluding Remarks on the Typology. Within the available space, I can only mention, rather than discuss in deserved detail, other instructive potentialities, of Dubin's mode of analysis.

1. Observability of institutional norms: I have already noted that Dubin implies the strategic variable of diverse observability of peoples' attitudes toward a norm: commitment to a norm or alienation from it can be variously visible; it can remain private or publicly expressed. Related to this concept but nevertheless distinct is the observability of norms: the extent to which the moral expectations held by others are known to individual members of the group. This has been recognized as a fundamental aspect of the structure of social situations at least from the time, a generation ago, that Floyd Allport introduced the concept of pluralistic ignorance: a condition in which individual members of a group assume that they are almost alone in holding the social attitudes and expectations they do, all unknowing that others privately share them.[14] Since then, the degree of knowledge about group norms has been used as a basic variable in sociological experiments on social control.[15]

Dubin considers this variable in an illuminating aside to his discussion of "operating inventions." He calls attention to the special cases in which people believe they are privately engaging in socially deviant behavior although in fact they are not. [p. 152] Owing to "incomplete socialization" and imperfect communication in the group, these self-defined deviants surreptitiously and worriedly engage in these behaviors, without knowing that they are in fact legitimate.

The observability of norms is too important a variable to be left to an aside, devoted only to the one case of operating inventions. In principle, all other kinds of social deviation and conformity are variously affected by the degree to which members of a group have access to knowledge about pertinent values and norms. As an example, the overconformity of the new convert to a group has in part been theoretically derived from his imperfect knowledge of the actual (rather than the official) norms; he finds security by trying to live up to the strict letter of the official norms.[16] Experimental evidence suggests that an excess of conformity is apt to be found among men ignorant of the group norms.[17] The variable of access to knowledge about the norms and practices in the criminal subculture is systematically used by Cloward to help account for rates of criminal behavior [pp. 169–170].

2. Typology of responses to deviant behavior: At times, Dubin uses his typology to locate, not types of deviant behavior, but types of response by "the group" or "the community" to deviant behavior. He examines, for example, the historically trivial but analytically significant case of a "normative invention" designed to cope with the deviant practices of teen-age hotrodders who went in for drag races. This case, as categorized, deals with the accommodative responses of the "civil authorities," rather than the deviant behavior of the teenagers [p. 151]. The normative invention consists in the teenagers' claims to legitimacy of conduct, at first denied by the community, becoming socially validated.

The point is not that Dubin has shifted ground in deciding *whose* behavior is to be methodically located in the typology. Rather, he has by implication moved toward the important problem of developing a systematic *classification* of the responses of conventional or conforming members of a group to deviant behavior. For a long time, sociologists have used a gross and implicit *list* of group responses to nonconformity: we refer to negative sanctions, formal and informal; or to specific social procedures, such as ostracism, ridicule, accommodation, and

[14] Floyd H. Allport, *Social Psychology,* Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1924; for further discussion of pluralistic ignorance and its bearing on patterns of conformity and deviance, see Merton, *Social Theory and Social Structure,* pp. 336 ff., 377 ff.

[15] For one among many treatments of this matter, see Josephine Klein, *The Study of Groups,* London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1956, pp. 80 ff.

[16] Merton, *Social Theory and Social Structure,* pp. 296, 352–353.

[17] Klein, *op. cit.,* p. 85.

the like. But a list is plainly no substitute for a methodical classification. This same point, implicit in Dubin's paper, has recently been singled out by A. K. Cohen,[18] who suggests that the paradigm of "Social Structure and Anomie" can perhaps be adapted to classify types of response to social deviation. In any event, we can now see the need for a typology of community response *to* deviant behavior comparable to the typology *of* deviant behavior.

Many other aspects of Dubin's typology cannot be considered in this paper: the bases for his condensing twenty-seven types of deviant and conforming behavior into the fourteen he has elected to examine; [19] the problem of handling the "appropriateness" of one or another institutional norm for a particular action (see the case of the Federal Commissioners, p. 156); the adequacy of his paradigm to locate types of deviant behavior both at one point in time and at several (*cf.* the description of the "normative opportunist" as "*temporarily*" rejecting institutional norms); and the differing bases for non-performance of roles (motivated *versus* unmotivated deviance; *cf.* his opening sentence about the "means opportunist"). But these important problems must here remain matters for allusion rather than for discussion.

I have followed Dubin's own emphasis in devoting most of my comment to the typology, trying to indicate how it moves toward a series of related classifications, designed to systematize some of the complexities of deviant and conforming adaptations and of selected patterns of social change. I turn now, much more briefly, to some theoretical issues raised by Dubin and to Cloward's contributions in meeting these issues.

SOCIOLOGICAL SOURCES OF DEVIANT BEHAVIOR

Dubin's largely achieved purpose is to identify and methodically locate subtypes of socially deviant adaptations. His purpose therefore differs from Cloward's and my own. We try to identify social and cultural conditions that combine to make for differing rates of various types of deviant behavior among people occupying differing positions in a social structure, with the typology being only instrumental to that purpose.

Dubin's focus on the typology, useful as it has proved to be, leads him to put to one side the principal ideas making up the "theory of deviant behavior" that he discusses, and then to conclude that the purposes served by the ideas he neglects were left wholly unrealized. It is a little as though a scenarist were to cut out all scenes in which Hamlet appears and then to conclude that, from the very outset, the play lacked a central figure. The respects in which Dubin's justifiable focus on the typology has led to this neglect can be seen by comparing what he and Cloward have to say on the same matters. This will serve both to clarify some basic theoretical problems and to indicate the specific ways in which Cloward advances earlier formulations.

Position in the Social Structure. The first omission in Dubin's account is symptomatic and crucial. In summarizing the limited and undoubtedly incomplete theory under review, he never refers to the social positions or attributes of the individuals or groups engaging in deviant adaptations.[20] By omitting all such sociological attributes, he must of course neglect the first principal component of the theory which holds that people located in different positions in the social structure thereby find it variously difficult to live up to cultural goals and norms (especially when these are much the same for all). In contrast to Dubin, with his focus on types of deviant behavior, Cloward, with his focus on the sources of that behavior, deals throughout with the status and group-affiliations of deviants (*e.g.*, Cloward, pp. 166–167).

Comparative Rates of Deviant Behavior. The first omission necessarily leads to the

[18] A. K. Cohen, "The Study of Social Disorganization and Deviant Behavior," in R. K. Merton, L. Broom and L. S. Cottrell, editors, *Sociology Today*, New York: Basic Books, 1959, p. 465.

[19] For the logical operations involved, see Allen H. Barton, "The Concept of Property-Space in Social Research," in P. F. Lazarsfeld and M. Rosenberg, editors, *The Language of Social Research*, Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1955, pp. 40–53.

[20] On three occasions in his summary, Dubin refers to "structural imperatives." These may be allusions to the social positions of individuals and groups but, if so, they are not enough to deal with this component of the ideas under review.

second. At no point does Dubin consider comparative rates of the deviant adaptations he has identified. He refers only to types of deviance adopted by sociologically unspecified individuals or groups, not to the greater or less frequency of such deviance among individuals occupying designated kinds of statuses or among groups holding different positions in the society. Yet, as Cloward [p. 173 ff.] and I try to make clear,[21] the comparison of rates of deviance is of course at the core of any theory of anomie and deviant behavior.

Dubin says that he and I both confine our efforts to devising a "descriptive typology" of deviant behavior. Were it so, this would indeed make "it impossible to state any single proposition predicting a state of relationship between persons, cultural goals, and institutional means" [p. 163]. But as Cloward's account makes plain, it is not so. By including other specified conditions, we are able to set out hypotheses about comparative rates of social deviation in different kinds of social structure and among groups and strata within a particular kind of structure, as the following remarks are intended to bring out.

Comparative Rates of Deviant Behavior in Differing Types of Society. As Cloward points out [p. 166], the ideas under review hold that the differences between rates of deviant behavior in social classes will systematically differ in various kinds of social structure. For example, it is suggested that in a society where similar success-goals are held out to a considerable part of the population, low social and economic status will be more highly correlated with crime than in societies "where rigidified class structure" is more often coupled with differential class symbols of success.

My own papers were limited to hypotheses, on the basis of a small set of assumptions, about comparative rates of deviance among strata in one type of society; one in which an extreme emphasis on certain cultural goals is much greater than the emphasis on institutionalized means to those goals.[22] The fact that the illustrative materials are confined to this one type of society need not make the theory culture-bound. In principle, the same type of analysis can be adopted for other types of social structure, for example, the traditionalist type in which the emphasis on institutional norms is more marked than that on cultural goals.[23] But in centering on the one kind of social structure, we focus on comparative rates of deviance among those variously located in that structure, and it is in connection with this problem that Cloward has made a distinct contribution.

Social Distribution of Pressures for Deviant Behavior. Cloward picks up, clarifies, and substantially extends the concept of the social distribution of structurally induced pressures for deviant behavior. Social pressure for deviance is conceived as varying with the extent of dissociation between, on the one hand, the cultural goals and institutional norms men accept as binding, and on the other, the social position or situation in which they find themselves, making it relatively difficult or easy for them to live in accord with these goals and norms. The greater the dissociation between cultural values and the facilities provided by a social position, the greater the pressure for deviation.[24] As Cloward brings out, social position,

[21] Of the many formulations to this effect, see only these: "Our perspective is sociological. We look at variations in the *rates* of deviant behavior," not at the particular individuals that happen to exhibit this behavior. This "sets out a typology of adaptive responses . . . and the structural pressures making for greater or less frequency of each of these responses among the several strata of the class structure." Merton, *Social Theory and Social Structure,* pp. 132, 163.

[22] For a pointed analysis of data bearing on this point, see Morris Rosenberg, *Occupations and Values,* Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1957, Chapter 8. He finds that college students most oriented toward "monetary success" and toward "getting ahead in the world" are inclined more than others to believe that they "can't afford to be squeamish about the means" they use to achieve these objectives. As noted below, further concepts are required to formulate the problem of the conditions under which such sentiments are apt to be translated into deviant behavior: concepts of structurally induced pressures for deviance and of the structural bases for vulnerability to these pressures.

[23] For apposite materials comparing different types of local communities and their characteristic rates and kinds of social deviation, see Mandel Sherman and Thomas R. Henry, *Hollow Folk,* New York: Crowell, 1933.

[24] William Martin is engaged in a study of "the patterned situations in medical school which facilitate or hinder the efforts of students to conform

on this view, is defined as position in an opportunity-structure, providing greater or less access to *legitimate* means of working toward a cultural goal.

But as Cloward now shows, this assumes by default that access to *deviant* or *illegitimate* means for reaching a valued goal is uniformly available, irrespective of position in the social structure. He corrects this unwitting and, it appears, untrue assumption by dealing with socially patterned differences of access to *learning how* to perform particular kinds of deviant roles and of access to *opportunity for* carrying them out.[25] He thus generalizes the notion of social-structural differences in ease or difficulty of role-performance, to hold for both socially legitimate and illegitimate roles. Pressures for deviant behavior are construed as a function of access to both legitimate and illegitimate opportunity-structures.

Social Distribution of Vulnerability to Pressures for Deviant Behavior. Pressures for deviant behavior are one thing; actual rates of deviant behavior, quite another. I had made a slight and insufficient effort to distinguish the two and to bridge the gap by distinguishing socially generated pressures for deviance from vulnerability to these pressures.[26] Socially patterned differences in the content and processes of socialization were said to affect vulnerability to pressure for one or another *type* of deviant behavior. On this basis, for example, I suggested that "the socialization patterns of the [American] lower-middle class" dispose toward the ritualistic kind of deviance.

But, as Cloward shows, [pp. 174–175] this is at best no more than a bare beginning. It is necessary to identify other sociological variables that intervene between structurally induced pressure for deviant behavior and actual rates of such behavior. For example, his concept of differential access to the illegitimate opportunity-structure should help explain differences in vulnerability to pressures for particular kinds of criminal behavior.

Patterned Sequences of Deviant Adaptations. Toward the close of his paper, Cloward begins to develop an idea that is practically unnoticed in my own work, is implicit in Dubin's paper, and is greatly advanced in forthcoming articles by Cloward and Lloyd E. Ohlin. This is the concept of patterned sequences of deviant roles, and of the conditions of social structure making for one or another sequence.

In "Social Structure and Anomie," [27] it was emphasized that the typology refers to "role behavior in specific types of situations, not to personality" and it was said that people "move from one type of adaptation to another." I instanced the "occasional passage from ritualistic adaptation [after a prolonged period of over-compliance] to dramatic kinds of illicit adaptation," such as defiant outbreaks. Nevertheless, I did not see the problem that Cloward brings into focus: that it should be possible to work out conditions making for patterned sequences of different kinds of deviant behavior. Dubin also implies, but does not develop, the notion of a sequence when he describes the normative opportunist as "temporarily" rejecting institutional norms and, "after the crisis," returning to conformity. [p. 160].

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to the professionally defined norms of behavior and attitudes toward patients." See Martin's summary of the problem in R. K. Merton, G. G. Reader, and P. L. Kendall, editors, *The Student-Physician,* Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957, pp. 297–298.

[25] Cloward suggests reasons for this general idea, "obvious" once it is brought out, not being recognized by Shaw and McKay. (Cloward, p. 170) I can add another example of this kind of blind-spot, in which the systematic implications of a general idea are not seen even though it is used in a particular instance. Some years ago, I collaborated on a critique of Hooton's work on "the biological inferiority of criminals." We raised the question whether we were to "assume biological determinants of the fact that there are proportionately five times as many Texas criminals [in Hooton's example] convicted of forgery and fraud as there are in the Massachusetts sample? . . . Possibly the 'glib and oily art' of stock-swindling is less a matter of bodily type than of petroliferous regions and an established pattern of promoting chimerical gushers." R. K. Merton and Ashley Montagu, "Crime and the Anthropologist," *American Anthropologist,* 42 (July–September, 1940), p. 407. But this offhand allusion did not lead us to see the general concepts of learning- and opportunity-structures implied in it, concepts which, as Cloward shows, can be methodically used to help interpret variations of rates of different kinds of deviant behavior.

[26] *Social Theory and Social Structure,* pp. 157, 179n., 180.

[27] *Ibid.,* pp. 140, 152.

Drawing on the concept of access to both legitimate and illegitimate opportunity-structures, Cloward moves beyond such occasional remarks, poses the problems of sequences of deviant adaptations, and suggests processes making for one or another sequence. His observations on "double failure"—in both legitimate and illegitimate endeavors—as a prelude to retreatism afford one example. [p. 175] Others are developed at length in his forthcoming papers.

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Much else in these papers will repay attention. But this review is perhaps enough to indicate the reasons for my belief that although we are far from having a satisfactory theory of socially deviant behavior, the papers by Dubin and Cloward contribute appreciably to it.

ANOMIA AND DIFFERENTIAL ACCESS TO THE ACHIEVEMENT OF LIFE GOALS *

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A post factum *analysis leads to a single generalization, namely,* that anomia results when individuals lack access to means for the achievement of life goals. *Lack of opportunity to achieve life goals follows mainly as a result of the individual's position in the social structure as determined by numerous factors: occupation, education, income, age, class identification, participation in formal organizations and in informal groups, social mobility, marital status, and religious preference. Each of these factors is related to anomia. A multi-dimensional Index of Access to Means for the Achievement of Life Goals was constructed by using the above variables. Of those individuals receiving an index score of 7 (high access) only 10 per cent have high anomia scores; whereas, of those persons receiving an index score of 0 (low access) 100 per cent have high anomia scores.*

IN an earlier paper Bell reported that anomia, as defined by the Srole scale, was related inversely to each of the following variables: the economic status of the neighborhood within which a respondent lived; individual economic status as measured by occupation, income, and education; and amount of informal and formal group participation. He also reported that older respondents were more likely to be anomic, in this psychological sense, than were younger respondents.[1]

The present paper is a continuation of the analysis of the cause or causes of anomia, also based upon data from the San Francisco Study of Social Participation, but in this case more independent variables have been introduced into the analysis. We introduce the variables *simultaneously* and thereby approach the logic of the controlled experiment to a greater extent than in the earlier paper. Admittedly, the measures utilized are crude, the techniques—mostly dichotomies and percentages—are rudimentary, and therefore the results are only approximate.

However, the interpretation of our data has led us to a single, but of course tentative, generalization which constitutes the thesis of

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[1] Wendell Bell, "Anomie, Social Isolation, and the Class Structure," *Sociometry,* 20 (June, 1957), pp. 105–116. Following Srole's suggestion, we use the term "anomia" to refer to the phenomenon measured by his scale so as to distinguish the psychological concept from the sociological concept of anomie; the former refers to the state of an individual and the latter to the condition of a group or a society. See Leo Srole, "Social Integration and Certain Corollaries: An Exploratory Study," *American Sociological Review,* 21 (December, 1956), pp. 709–716.