A DEFENCE OF MILL'S THEORY OF NAMES

J. S. Mill held that the meaning of a name is just referent of the name:  

	...proper names are not connotative: they denote the individuals 
	who are called by them; but they do not indicate or imply any 
	attributes as belonging to those individuals.  (Mill 1961, p. 20)

Michael Devitt and Kim Sterelny, in their text _Language and Reality: An
Introduction to Philosophy of Language_ rehearse four well-known arguments against
Mill's theory.  They conclude that we should follow Frege and postulate senses; the
only other alternative is to follow Meinong and Lewis and inflate ontology.  I
will defend Mill and show how we can respond to each of the four objections without
postulating senses or inflating ontology. 

1. Identity statements:
  
"Everest is Everest" 
 
is not informative, whereas 

"Everest is Gaurisanker" 

is informative. On Mill's account, they have the same meaning.  So  that account is
"clearly false". 

Reply: This objection to Mill's theory turns on epistemic considerations that are
irrelevant to the semantics of names.  Note in particular how we know the first is
true: there is a (contingent?) rule that each occurrence in a single context of a
name has the same referent as every other (not true in decently encrypted
messages!).  But that only tells us apriori that the first is true, not what it
means.  Might be about a dog, a game, a mountain.  Mill could agree that the two
differ in that we can know that the first is true but not know that about the
second, but that doesn't show that we know what either means, nor do these
epistemic considerations show that the meaning of "Everest" is anything more than a
particular mountain. 

Consider the meta-statements:

"Everest" and "Everest" co-refer.
"Everest" and "Gaurisanker" co-refer.

Clearly, _if Mill's theory is correct_, the first is not informative but the second
may be an important discovery.  The discovery is a discovery about the meaning of
"Everest" and "Gaurisanker", namely that they have the same meaning.  Since Mill's
theory has the consequence that the former sentence is trivial but the latter can
be an important discovery, this difference can hardly be cited against Mill's
theory. 

2. Negative existence statements: 

one way of putting this objection (not in D&S) is: if Mill's view were
correct, then if the sentence "James Bond does not exist". were true, which it is,
it would have a subject term which lacked a referent and so, on MIll's theory,
lacked all meaning, but then the sentence would be meaningless and so not true. 

Reply: The sentence should be understood as saying: 
The "James Bond"-stories are fictional.  
That is, as used in the stories, "James Bond" does not refer.  --
semantic ascent.  Similar to the way we treat the "nobody" constructions in the
King's confusions in Alice in Wonderland.  What appears to be in a referential
position does not occupy that position in the paraphrases that capture the truth
conditions. 

3. Empty Names objection:
  
The following sentence is true:  

James Bond is disgustingly successful.  

But on Mill'saccount it couldn't be, because the subject term does
not denote.  So it would be meaningless, and that would make the sentence also
meaningless, not true.  And don't try to tell us it refers to a) a fictional
character, which gives up all sense of reality or pretense to being scientific,  or
b) an idea (an idea isn't the referent in "Reagan is wrinkled", so it shouldn't be 
the referent here).

Reply:  These are peculiar constructions on which to rest a refutation of a theory. 
Anyone who did not know the Fleming stories who heard this sentence asserted, would
suppose there was a real person (or maybe a product) named "James Bond".  So on the
f ace of it, these constructions are misleading.  But we sophisticates do talk this
way sometimes.  Now consider the truth conditions for such talk.  It seems
plausible to hold the truth conditions are close to those given by David Lewis in
"Truth in Fiction": If what Fleming wrote were true, James Bond would be
disgustingly successful.  This seems to nicely capture what we are doing in making
claims like the above (and with "Hamlet was neurotic", etc.).  We enter into a
little make-believe pretense, talking _as-if_ the stories were true.  But so
understood, there is no incompatibility with Mill's theory.  If "James Bond"
denoted a person with the biography set forth by Fleming, that person would be
disgustingly successful.  In the original sentence, we aren't trying to refer by
uttering "James Bond", we are making a claim about the representations made in the
novels. 

4. Opacity

I'll set this one out as an explicit contradiction:

Falwell believes Bob Dylan corrupted America.
Falwell does not believe Robert Zimmerman corrupted America.

These are both true (just ask him).  But on Mill's theory, since Bob Dylan and
Robert Zimmerman are the same person, the two names mean the same thing, so the
sentences mean the same thing (compositionality), except that the second is
negated.  But then the theory has the consequence that two true sentences are
contradictory. 

Reply:  This is well trod turf.  The basic idea of the reply I prefer is that in
the relevant de dicto readings of the displayed sentences, we are not actually
using "Bob Dylan" or "Robert Zimmerman" to refer.  We are mentioning them.  We are
describing a certain mental representation that Falwell has.  He may well have the
Dylan representation without the Zimmerman representation.  But this is consistent
with Mill's view that the two distinct representations have the same meaning.  In
de dicto belief att ribution the attributer is not using the terms in the
attribution.

For example, an atheist does not contradict himself in saying "Falwell believes God
will punish Bob Dylan".  On de dicto readings of belief attribution, there is
mention of terms which may or may not refer, but there is not referring use of the
terms.  Consider a parallel argument to this objection to Mill, which does not turn
on Mill's theory but rather on ordinary synonymy:  Falwell believes telling lies is
immoral.  But Falwell does not believe mendacity is immoral.  (just ask him!).  But
"mendacity" and "telling lies" mean the same thing -- see dictionary.  So the
sentences are contradictory (again by conpositionality), yet both true -- which is
impossible.  Again, all is solved if we don't take the opaque contexts as use, but
as mention, as describing someone's representation of reality.  Two expressions
that mean the same thing might appear in otherwise identical de dicto belief
attributions, yet the one be true and the other false.  So there is nothing
surprising if this happens with names, and is consistent with Mill's theory. 

Of course, there is also no problem with the paradigm case of opacity, direct
quotation: 

Falwell said "Bob Dylan is corrupting America".  
Falwell did not say "Robert Zimmerman is corrupting America".  

These are both true, and this is completely compatible with Mill's theory.  Mill
would say the two names mean they same thing, namely their shared referent, but
saying the one sentence is not saying the other, assenting to the one is not
assenting to the other, and believing the one is not believing the other (de
dicto)... 

Bibliography:

Devitt, Michael and Kim Sterelny 1984 _Language and Reality: an Introduction to the
Philosophy of Language_ MIT Press

Frege, Gottlob 1892 "On Sense and Reference" reprinted in _The Philosophical
Writings of Gottlob Frege_ Peter Geach and Max Black (eds.) 1952 Oxford: Blackwell

Lewis, David "Truth in Fiction" APQ?

Martin, Robert M. 1987 _The Meaning of Language_ MIT Press

Mill, John Stuart 1961 _A System of Logic_ Longmans