The Truth About "Broken Windows" Probation: Moving Towards A Proactive Community Supervision Model

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Introduction and Overview

In the summer of 1999 the Reinventing Probation Council, in conjunction with the Manhattan Institute, released a monograph describing "Broken Windows" probation, which we characterize as an attempt to apply the "lessons learned" from community policing initiatives to the field of probation. They have elaborated on their model in a new release, "Transforming Probation Through Leadership: The Broken Windows Model" and in the process, they have challenged probation executives around the country to get down to the real business of probation: public safety. The Council—consisting of an interesting "mix" of one conservative academic (i.e., John DiIulio), and mostly male, Caucasian executives from federal, state and local probation agencies—met several times over a two year period and developed the following 7-step strategy for "reinventing probation":

- Step 1: Place public safety first;

- Step 2: Supervise Probationers in the neighborhood, not the office;

- Step 3: Rationally allocate resources;

- Step 4: Provide for strong enforcement of probation conditions and a quick response to violations;

- Step 5: Develop partners in the community;

- Step 6: Establish performance-based initiatives; and,

- Step 7: Cultivate strong leadership.

In the following article we examine each of the key elements of the Council's proposals and offer our assessment of the model's strengths and limitations. It is our view that the Council has ignored the single most important finding from the research conducted over the past two

decades on various community-based initiatives: offender treatment is the main public safety measure that works as a recidivism revocation strategy. For this reason, it is our view that unless the Council's broken windows model is revised to integrate and emphasize the role of the dreaded r-word (rehabilitation) at each step in the 7-step change strategy they propose, it will *not* result in improved public safety where implemented. In fact, we suspect that it will only exacerbate the problem by moving probation in the wrong direction (toward increased use of surveillance and control strategies) for the wrong reason (to increase funding).

Members of the Council would be wise to consider the legacy of other highly touted reforms that were "sold" to the public as "get-tough" community sanctions: intensive probation supervision, electronic monitoring, and day reporting centers. In each instance, what was gained in terms of short-term funding for these initiatives was lost further down the road when subsequent evaluation research documented an irrefutable "fact of life" about the supervision of offenders in community settings: *surveillance and control-oriented sanctions don't work* (see e.g., Byrne, Lurigio, and Petersilia, 1992; Taxman, 1998; Petersilia, 1999). What *does* work as a recidivism reduction strategy is the treatment component of these programs (e.g., for drug, alcohol, personal, family and/or employment problems). Recognizing the value of interventions as part of a comprehensive strategy will only repeat the problems of the past.

In the section below, we offer our assessment of each of the 7 proposals included in the Council's "Broken Windows" probation model, focusing on the need to recognize the value of treatment to the success of any probation-based strategy. We conclude by offering our vision of the future of probation, including our assessment of how to "fix" the broken windows probation model.

Strategy 1: Place Public Safety First

The Council begins by examining the often conflicting, multiple purposes of probation (e.g., accountability, recidivism reduction, individual offender rehabilitation) and concluding that "until probation practitioners reach widespread agreement that public safety is their primary mission and act accordingly, the practices of the field will not resonate with core public values" (2000: p.19). The Council goes on to argue that most probation agencies have taken a myopic view of their responsibility for public safety by focusing exclusively on *offenders* and ignoring the underlying community context of crime and victimization. The Council argues that "probation agencies must start thinking outside the box for public safety, and design supervision strategies and programs that provide for crime prevention and community betterment" (2000:p.19). While a case can certainly be made for expanding the role of probation agencies to encompass certain crime prevention (e.g., mentoring) and advocacy (e.g., community service), programs it appears to us that the underlying purpose of this role expansion is not public safety - it is to acquire more funding. The Council correctly observes that community-policing initiatives resulted in significant funding increases for many local police departments and that "probation must do likewise" (2000: p.19). In our quest for new avenues of funding and support however, we need to ask ourselves how probation can contribute to public safety, not how probation can convince the public to increase their level of funding.

Before jumping on the community policing bandwagon as a short-term resource "fix," probation administrators would be wise to consider whether this model is consistent with their view of the purpose of probation. For many, probation is primarily an *offender-based* supervision activity that takes place in a community setting. Probation departments contribute to overall community safety by controlling (and hopefully changing) the behavior of the offenders

under their control; this is their contribution to the safety in the community. They can not--and should not--be held accountable for *overall* community safety. This is a multiple agency and system responsibility and requires specialized skills, including community organization skills.

The "Reinventing Probation" Council does not share this view of probation's role in the community. The Council's view of probation is that it should be doing more to change *both* offenders and the communities in which they reside, and this requires a much broader array of duties and responsibilities for line probation officers. We disagree with this view of the probation's role. Rather than *expand* the duties and responsibilities of probation officers, *we* believe that probation officers should be asked to do *less* (e.g., smaller caseloads, less administrative support work, less fine collection), in order to achieve improved public safety by focusing on the core activity of probation-offender supervision. Obviously, the probation agency must collaborate with other community groups and agencies, but agents should devote themselves primarily to the supervision of offenders, while designated resource people should devote themselves to working with community organizations on such issues as employment, education, and treatment availability/quality. In both instances, however, we believe that the focus should be on the individual offender—rather than community change.

From a public safety perspective, we would be wise to use prison and jail less often and to place an even greater proportion of prison-bound offenders (such as drug offenders) on probation with specific treatment conditions (that span the time frame of supervision). Concomitantly, we need to develop sanctioning strategies that do *not* result in a significant number of offenders being sent to prison/jail for technical violations, because this would only increase the threat to public safety posed by these offenders. Studies have shown that what we gain in the short-term (by using incarceration) is lost further down the road due to the negative

effect of imprisonment on offenders (e.g., Clear & Rose, 1999; Petersilia &Turner, 1985). Our review of the research on the effectiveness of probation (e.g., Byrne & Pattavina, 1992) reveals that it is offender improvement in the areas of employment, substance abuse, personal, and family problems that is directly related to recidivism reduction. At its core, offender change in these areas is precisely what probation officers should focus on during supervision.

The "what works" literature consistently repeats the theme that offender change (i.e., recidivism reduction) is due to improved treatment outcomes (see Taxman, 1999).   To be effective, treatment must be both available and suitable to meet the needs of the population. To the extent that treatment quality and/or availability is a problem in a particular area, probation leaders should be advocates for more (plus better) treatment resources. Why? Because this aspect of community change can be *directly* related to probation's role in promoting overall public safety - providing individual offender supervision.

Strategy 2: Supervise Probationers In The Neighborhood, Not The Office

While "location, location, location" is a very sound credo for the real estate investor looking to make a profit, it has limitations to any discussion of (mainstream) probation supervision. According to the Council, "For probation supervision to be effective, it must take place where the offender lives, works, and engages in recreational and other activities (2000: p.20). It is our view that this is an overstated, unsubstantiated claim. Why would a face-to-face contact in the field improve public safety while the same meeting *in an office setting* would be a threat to public safety? In terms of public safety, the location of the meeting is not important; it is the *content* of the actual meeting between the probation officer and the offender that is critical. As Braswell (1989) and others (e.g., Byrne, 1990; Taxman & Piquero, 1998) have noted, informal social controls (e.g., family, peers, social interaction, etc.) offer much more in terms of

public safety than formal social controls. Perhaps the most effective informal social control mechanism available to line PO's is the relationship developed between the PO and the offender. With this in mind, we need to spend less time thinking about *where* these meetings occur and more on the number and actual *content* of the probation officer-offender contacts meeting itself (i.e., a focus on personal, family, school and work problems).

We do not mean to imply that field visits should not be used, because they certainly represent an important supervision "tool," particularly as an adjunct to an office visit, to complete a collateral contact, and/or as part of the initial offender assessment process. However, the Council's discussion of "community-centered" supervision emphasizes the *surveillance* role of probation officers in community settings, which may leave little time for *treatment*-related interventions. According to the Council, "Community-centered supervision activities call for the development of supervision strategies that carefully monitor in concert with others the whereabouts and behavior of offenders"(2000:p.21). The danger inherent in this strategy is that monitoring and control becomes the focal point of supervision, rather than engaging the offender in behavior change activities in specific problem areas (e.g. drug use, employment, etc.).

There is another element to the Council's proposed plan to have probation officers "reach outward beyond their individual caseloads to the community" (2000:p.20-21).
How will we monitor the behavior of probation officers in community settings? In many states, the primary reason probation officers conduct their work *in the office* is operational control: managers at least know where line staff are and what they are doing. In Massachusetts, for example, probation officers in the late 60's and early 70's routinely spent a large portion of their time in the field.   In a *Boston Globe* series of articles about agents having "part-time" coaching jobs during their state ordered time, probation officers were ordered to quit their secondary jobs.

Our point is simple: any wide-scale movement out of the office and into the community must be managed carefully, perhaps using new technologies such as electronic monitoring and/or global positioning systems and cell phones for line staff "in the field." Without such controls in place, this strategy could result in less, not more, community supervision of offenders. Of course, the cost of these new technologies may actually outweigh the public safety benefits of community-centered supervision and improved offender outcomes. This is another caveat to consider before implementing a broken windows strategy.

Beside the management control issue, the Council did not identify several other important issues that probation managers must address when "field contacts" are discussed. First, the simplest way to give probation departments the "look" at community policing is to open neighborhood "field" offices in storefronts, at community policing sites, and in local schools. These operations require additional positions and require attention to a series of administrative control issues (e.g., line staff supervision, staffing, operational control, case review, and confidentiality of records). A second, related concern for probation managers will be the extent (if any) of union/staff resistance to changes in job location, hours at work, supervision, and overtime. Third, probation managers in many jurisdictions will have to revisit a contentious issue - gun carrying by line probation officers. Of course, any discussion of gun carrying is inevitably followed by the call for revised training procedures, due to the potential for "failure to train" lawsuits, and the concomitant need to revise current salary, leave and retirement policies to more closely mirror the policies of local and state police departments. Finally, coordinating the use of physical locations with other agencies (e.g., police departments, schools) will require coordination on a number of fronts, such as cost-sharing, privacy issues and administrative procedures. While each of these management issues can certainly be addressed, it seems clear

that location in the community, by itself, is not the answer. In short, there is a lot more to the development of a community-oriented probation system than telling line staff to "hit the streets," particularly if offender treatment rather than surveillance/control is your goal. As we noted earlier, our view is that the question of *where* the probation officer meets with the offender is less important than the content of the meeting itself. Although the distinction between the Council's view of community supervision and our own could be described as a choice between "Big Brother (or Sister) watching you" and "Big Brother (or sister) helping you." We recognize that probation officers can and should be address issues related to offender surveillance and offender rehabilitation.

Strategy 3: Rationally Allocate Resources

When discussing resource allocation decisions, it is necessary to make a distinction between a "satisficing" strategy and an "optimizing" strategy. The Council's decision to focus their recommendation on how best to (rationally) allocate *existing* probation resources is a satificing strategy that ignores the larger issue of the disparity between prison and probation resources. According to the Council, community corrections is sliced an inordinately small piece of the corrections resource pie (i.e., two-thirds of the offenders but only one-third of the money). The Council decided to remain silent on how to address this issue. Instead they focused on two pragmatic resource-related recommendations: (1) improve assessment and placement practices within the constraints of existing resources; and (2) shift (back) to geographic or "place-based" supervision. In terms of the Council's first recommendation, there is no discussion provided on either the cost of new assessment protocol (e.g., design, implementation, validation, assessment), or the obvious need to address the problems related to treatment availability, cost, and quality.

Even if one assumes—for the sake of argument only—a "satificing" mode, it is difficult to see whether this strategy will result in "rational" resource allocation.

Similarly, the Council's discussion of *place-based* supervision begs the question of the specialist vs. generalist role of line staff. In a geographic based model, all line staff will likely be generalists with mixed caseloads (e.g., drug users, alcoholics, sex offenders, and, mentally ill offenders) could all be placed on the same caseload with--it is assumed--the necessary *brokerage* skills to link offenders with available programs/services in their community. Is this movement away from specialized caseloads based on sound empirical evidence or is it another attempt to mirror community policing? The Council is strangely silent on this important issue. The Council also fails to discuss the dynamics of the *advocacy* role imbedded in this model, as PO's attempt to improve public safety *within* these geographic areas. As critics used to say about electronic monitoring, place-based supervision is currently a technique in search of a program. But is it a *sound* strategy? Absent a review of the empirical evidence, the immediate answer is no.

Strategy 4: Provide For Strong Enforcement Of Probation Conditions And A Quick Response To Violations

The past decade has been marked not only by changes in sentencing strategies that have exposed more and more citizens to the prison experience, but also by an increase in the number and type of probation conditions established for offenders (see, e.g., Lanagan & Cunniff, 1992; Taxman & Byrne, 1994). Not surprisingly, when you increase the number of conditions set you increase the number of violations noted, even if surveillance strategies remain constant. According to the Council, this leads to a problem. Probationers often realize they may "expect

two or more 'free ones' when it comes to dirty urine samples, electronic monitoring violations, or failure to comply with their supervision conditions" (2000:p.24). They state that, "for probation to be meaningful, this permissiveness and laxity in enforcement practice must be reversed" (2000:p.24). But how? In *our* assessment of this problem, there are two possible solutions that should be considered: (1) don't establish multiple conditions unless the condition is directly related to public safety; and, (2) develop and implement a system of structured, graduated sanctions for addressing the problem of noncompliance with risk-related" conditions of probation. Unfortunately, the Council does not discuss the first option. They do discuss the need for *non*-incarceration sanctions, but only as a bridge to their major point: a tough incarceration-based response to some offenders will be a general deterrent to many others. The evidence they cite to support their belief in a general deterrent effect is non-experimental and anecdotal (e.g., Corbett, et al., 1996). Given the importance of their propose revocation strategy to the effectiveness of the broken windows model, it would certainly make sense to ground this recommendation in firm empirical research.

The Council also recommends the development of *probation-based*, specialized absconder location and apprehension strategies. While the development of specialized units can certainly be justified, two questions about this recommended change come quickly to mind. First, where will the money come from to fund these new units? Second, what will we do with the absconders we catch? If absconder units will be funded using *existing* probation resources, then there will be even less money available to support treatment-based probation initiatives, which would be a bad idea if public safety is our primary goal. Moreover, if catching absconders becomes a priority for probation then invariably there will be a higher return to prison rate for these probation systems, even it the judiciary remains constant in their response to absconders at

revocation (see Taxman and Byrne, 1994 evaluation of the Maricopa County, Arizona Absconder unit). Due to the *negative* effect of the prison/jail experience on these offenders, they will likely pose a greater risk to public safety upon their release. Absent any empirical support for either a specific or general deterrent effect, it is difficult to understand the Council's position on absconders and the general issue of the integrity of court orders.

Our point is not that we should ignore absconders, but that we should first examine *why* probationers abscond (e.g., inability to pay fines) and then consider the various system changes that could address this problem without new program development initiatives, especially when these new initiatives may have a negative impact on public safety. This is also regarding a better understanding of the issues related to technical violations, attendance at treatment, and other typical areas of non-compliance. Very little is known about the nature and extend of the issue. Without more research into understanding the issues, our solutions may not be appropriate. This is the essence of a "problem-oriented" probation strategy—understand the issues and then develop appropriate responses..

Strategy 5: Develop Partners in the Community

We agree with the Council that the development of "partnerships" is, in the abstract at least, a critical step in the ongoing process of reintegrating the concept of "community" into community-based corrections. What is worrisome to us is the use of Boston, Massachusetts' Operation Night Light as the exemplar for this type of effort. Throughout their report, the Council has hammered home the theme that for probation to be successful, it must be more like policing; specifically, community policing. By "successful," of course, they mean successful at gaining public support for more resources. According to the Council, "Probation department managers must realize… that adequate resources will not come until the public is persuaded that

probation is more than a "slap on the wrist," a hollow experience that trivializes the offense, demeans and enrages the victim and emboldens the offender" (2000:p.13). When viewed in this context, police-probation partnerships like Operation Night Light offer local probation systems the opportunity to appear more law enforcement oriented and therefore more fundable. There will inevitably be pressure to demonstrate that these partnerships represent a "tougher" response and not a perpetuation of probation's "slap on the wrist". How will this be accomplished? The obvious answer is higher technical violation rates for curfew violators in order to send a message to the entire offender population. History suggests that this type of "get tough" strategy will likely only exacerbate the problem, by placing a greater proportion of offender population "at risk" for incarceration. What would make more sense would be the development of police-probation partnership that begins with a very *different* underlying assumption. Consider the following: for police departments to be successful in the area of improved public safety, they adopted roles traditionally assigned to traditional probation (e.g., advocacy, brokerage, community- the ABC's of probation); for probation to be successful it must do the same thing-return to its roots. Police-probation partnerships based on this set of operating assumptions would focus not on posturing (i.e., as get tough strategies) but on problem solving at the individual and the neighborhood level (e.g. helping offenders get jobs, so that they can pay fines). .

Finally, we caution program developers against providing yet *another* example of "Dumja Vu," i.e. making the same mistake over and over again. The Council actually makes the outrageous claim (2000:p.28) that programs such as Boston's Operation Night light can reduce a city's homicide rate significantly, citing the type of supporting evidence (i.e., non-experimental research) that would be laughed out of any undergraduate research methods class. You would

think that the Council would be careful not to repeat the same mistakes program developers made with Scared Straight, Outward Bound, Mandatory Minimums for gun possession, and most recently, mandatory arrests for domestic abuse. In *each* instance, exaggerated claims were presented for public consumption that could not be supported by sound, empirical research. In each instance, the reason these unsubstantiated claims were offered was easy to articulate: The ends (more funding for new initiatives) justified the means (the use of non-experimental research and anecdotal evidence to buttress a claim of effectiveness).

Partnerships between probation departments and the local community are an essential ingredient of a successful probation system. However, it is our view that such partnerships should focus primarily on improving public safety, not garnering public support. Toward this end, probation managers will need to work closely with local police departments, school superintendents, business Councils, (other) social welfare agencies, and area treatment providers in activities directly related to the supervision of offenders. Since the problems (e.g., unemployment, inadequate schools, income inequality, racism) that generate and exacerbate an area's crime problem cut across (and more beyond) any one agency, only a comprehensive system-wide response to the problem will likely succeed. Of course, it is up to probation managers to clearly define their role in this system-wide effort.

Strategies 6 & 7: Establish Performance-Based Initiatives And Cultivate Strong Leadership

The Reinventing Probation Council offered two recommendations that do not involve specific programs, including: (1) the need to establish performance-based initiatives; and, (2) the need for probation leaders to be risk-takers.

We agree with the Council that performance-based initiatives, as well as improved leadership are critical to the success of probation, but there are certainly a few caveats to consider. First, before we design a rigorous evaluation protocol for the Council's "Reinventing Probation" Model, it would be a good idea to integrate what we already know about "best practices" in the area of probation from *previous* evaluation research. Based on our review of the Council report and recommendations, what we have here is a prime example of an "expert system" model based on the past experience of those on the Council. We find no evidence in the report that the members of this Council have even a rudimentary knowledge of the results of the available evaluation research on probation. When viewed in this context, the call for sound evaluation research is at best, specious. More emphasis should be on developing performance-based initiatives that ingratiate the empirical literature.

This brings us to our second caveat: it is one thing for a probation leader to be a risk taker when the risk-taking is the result of a careful review of the evidence supporting various policy options; it is quite another to engage in a major change effort without first reviewing the available empirical evidence. The former strategy entails risk-taking leadership, while the latter strategy simply puts the public's safety at risk, merely for the pursuit of new resources

Concluding Comments on Fixing Broken Windows

Despite it's limitations, probation is currently the most commonly used and effective sanction in this country. As the Reinventing Probation Council correctly observed, almost 60% of the 5.7 million offenders under some form of correctional control in 1997 were placed on probation. Critics of our country's probation system often lament the subgroup of offenders who commit new crimes while under probation supervision, conveniently ignoring the fact that over

70% of the offenders placed on probation will actually complete their term of probation supervision without committing a new crime. Using rearrest while under supervision as our outcome measure, probation is our most effective sanction, with much lower recidivism rates than prison, jail, and intermediate sanctions.

Can probation be improved? Obviously, the answer is yes. But as they consider alternative strategies for the organization and administration of probation services, probation leaders in general (and the Reinventing Probation Council in particular) would do the public a service by looking *within* rather than outside the probation system for answers. The core technology of probation is <u>supervision</u> and the primary purpose of supervision is individual offender change—in work habits/patterns, in personal and family relationships, in risk behaviors, (e.g., gangs, substance abuse) and in mental health. It is our view that efforts to "reinvent" probation will fail unless we recognize this basic tenet. How can we "fix" the broken window model? We offer our assessment in this final section.

Fixing Broken Windows: A Preliminary Plan Of Action

The good thing about the "Broken Windows" probation model is that it provides a solid foundation for discussing the "future" of community supervision practices in this country. This said, we have serious problems with the Council's overall conceptual framework as well as the specific strategies included in their blueprint for reform. In Table 1, we have summarized the key features of the broken windows model and then offered our own treatment-based strategy for refocusing probation, which for the sake of continuity, we have called "proactive community supervision" probation. We hope that this point by point comparison of the broken windows and "proactive supervision" approaches to probation reform will continue a debate over the future of probation that we seem to have at the beginning of each new decade.

Our rejection of the "broken windows" probation model is based on a belief that despite its "social ecological" rhetoric, this proposal is a throwback to the "get tough" surveillance-oriented community sanctions championed during the late eighties and early 90's (see, e.g., Byrne, 1989 for an overview). The fact that the Council has attempted to "reinvent" probation by turning it into community policing suggests to us that there may actually be a link between financial (need) and intellectual bankruptcy. Probation certainly needs additional resources, particularly if we expect probation officers to provide adequate supervision and treatment (resources) to offenders. But a "broken windows" probation strategy is not the *only* option available to administrators attempting to increase public support (and resources) for their agencies. One only has to look at recent reform efforts in California and Arizona for evidence that the public currently supports *treatment* and is willing to pay for it. Legislation was passed in 1996 in Arizona that has diverted thousands of drug offenders from prison and jail to community-based treatment programs. Similar legislation recently passed in California

(proposition 36) that "will provide $120 million a year, for the next 5 1/2 years, for community-based substance abuse treatment programs" (Mann, 2000:p.13). As the results of recent meta-analyses of "what works" with offenders in various correctional settings (see Table 2 and Taxman, 1999) become available and publicized, we expect increased public support for *probation*-based community treatment initiatives. In this model the emphasis is on a problem-solving approach where the agent works the offender on behavioral objectives. The tools of corrections (e.g. treatment interventions, sanctions, rewards, etc.) become the strategies employed to improve offender outcomes. Grounded in the empirical literature on effective interventions, the emphasis of the proactive supervision model is on offender change, not merely surveillance and control. It is for this reason that we view the "broken windows" model as a step in the wrong direction for all the wrong reasons.

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Table 1: Fixing Broken Windows Probation: A Comparison of Two Strategies

	The Broken Windows Model	The Proactive Supervision Model
Definition of the Public Safety Problem	Probation should be held responsible for the level of public safety in each community, including crime rates, fear of crime, school safety, and quality of life.	Probation should be held responsible for the supervision and control of all offenders under their direct supervision.
The Duties of Probation Officers	Probation officers should be involved not only on offender surveillance and control, but also in crime prevention efforts and various forms of advocacy and community change.	Probation officers should focus their efforts on the direct supervision of offenders while the responsibility for resource development and coordination should be completed by creating a new "resource specialist" position within probation.
The Location of Probation Officers	Probation officer should supervise offenders exclusively in the community rather than in the office. Supervision should be *place*-based rather than *offender*-based.	Probation officer should utilize a combination of office and field visits, but the purpose of the contact is always the supervision of the offender, not the place.
The Role of the P.O	The probation officer should be a "generalist" with the ability to supervise a wide range of offenders (e.g. drug offenders, alcohol offenders, nonviolent offenders, sex offenders, mentally ill offenders), utilizing a classic brokerage model.	Probation officers should be hired and trained with the skills to handle a specialized caseload (e.g. drug offenders, alcohol offenders, non-violent offenders, sex offenders, mentally ill offenders) including assessment procedures, counseling techniques, and a comprehensive knowledge of the treatment network (in-patient and out-patient).

The Acquisition and Allocation of Probation Resources	Probation departments need to develop improved strategies for the rational allocation of *existing* resources, focusing on two primary agency needs: (1) better assessment of offender "risk" to public safety (e.g. sex offenders, gang members, drug dealers); (2) the assignment of field staff to areas with greatest public safety needs.	Probation departments need to "make the case" for increased resources for offender treatment and supervision, by proposing legislation that mandates minimum levels of probation (e.g. case load size) services and allows agents to use sanctions as a tool to improve public safety.
Enforcement of Probation Conditions	Probation officers utilize a range of field surveillance techniques to identify offender noncompliance and quickly respond to violations. A structured hierarchy of sanctions will be used for initial violations with revocation and (return to) prison/jail repeat "offenders".	Probation Departments develop strategies (in conjunction with local judiciary) to reduce the number of conditions established and to enforce the conditions set, using a structured hierarchy of non-incarcerative sanctions.
Location of Absconders	Probation Departments establish separate probation absconder location and apprehension units to better protect the community.	Probation departments develop a task force to better understand the nature (and impact) of the absconder problem. Utilizing a problem-oriented probation strategy, Probation officers will be directly to focus on addressing the cause(s) of the problem, rather than the consequences.
Partnerships in the Community	A wide range of probation-community partnerships will be developed, including both crime prevention and community betterment activities.	Probation departments will focus on improving the treatment networks in their community and on those related activities that will enhance the supervision function.

Table 2: Meta-Analysis Findings on Effectiveness for Correctional Programs

Program	Prior to 1997[a]	Recent Meta-Analysis[b]
Vocational Training Program	Mixed	Don't Know
Work Ethic	-	Don't Know
Anger/Stress Mgt.	-	Don't Know
Victim Awareness	-	Don't Know
Life Skills	Successful	Don't Know
Boot Camp/Confrontation Programs	Unsuccessful	Doesn't Work
Physical Challenges/Juvenile Wilderness/Outward Bound	Unsuccessful	Doesn't Work
Intensive Supervision Programs	Unsuccessful	Doesn't Work
Home Confinement	Unsuccessful	Doesn't Work
Community Residential	Unsuccessful	Doesn't Work
Urine Testing with no treatment/sanctions	Unsuccessful	Doesn't Work
Case Management Programs	Unsuccessful	Doesn't work
In-Prison Therapeutic Communities with Aftercare	-	Works
Incarceration	-	Works for select offenders
Correctional Industry Programs	-	Works
Vocational Education	Successful	Works
Day Fines	-	Promising
Juvenile Aftercare	-	Promising
Drug Treatment combined with urine testing	Successful	Promising
Moral Reconation Therapy (MRT) &Reasoning		Promising
Adult Basic Education	Successful	Promising
Drug Courts	-	Promising

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