Compatibilist Conceptions of Freedom and the Analysis of Concepts

"Take these chains from my heart and set me free." Hank Williams

1. From: The Preface to Freedom in the Ancient World by H.J. Muller.

"The subject of this work is freedom in the broadest sense of the word. I am adhering to the relatively neutral and objective definition ... `the condition of being able to choose and to carry out purposes.' This involves the primary dictionary meaning, the absence of external constraint, or the common idea of freedom from coercion. It also includes the idea of practicable purposes, an actual ability with available means, or effective freedom to do what one wishes."

2. From: Social Philosophy by Joel Feinberg

"...the word `free,' without further specification, is often incompletely informative...To make such sentences more informative, we may have to add specifications of what someone is free from, or is free to do, or more precisely who it is whose freedom is at issue. The full version of conceptually elliptical statements about freedom will normally take the form indicated in the following schema:

_______________is free from_______________ to DO (or omit doing)___________"

3. Evans' version: A free act is one which is: 1) not compelled, not coerced, not restrained, not forced, and 2) a free act done on the basis of one's own (rational and conscious?) wants, desires or purposes. Also, one has some ability to change or modify one's own desires and wants.

CASE I (A AND B)

J: I once went without food for a week.

S: Did you do it of your own free will?

J: No, I did it because I was lost in a desert and could find no food.

Ghandi: I once fasted for a week.

S: Did you do that of your own free will?

Ghandi: Yes, I did it because I wanted to make the British give India its independence.

CASE II (A AND B)

Judge: Did you steal the bread your own free will?

Evans: Yes, I stole it because I was hungry.

Judge: Did you steal the bracelet of your own free will?

Evans: No, my gang threatened to kill me if I didn't steal it.

Judge: Did you join the gang of your own free will? (Trying to establish foreknowledge of consequences.)

Evans: Not exactly, it was just the thing to do.

CASE III

Judge: Did you sign the confession of your own free will?

Evans: No, I signed it because the police beat me.

Foreman of Jury: My client says he signed the confession because the police beat him and not of his own free will.

Hard Determinist Juror: That is quite irrelevant; there is no such thing as free will.

Foreman in astonishment: You mean to say that it makes no difference whether he signed because his conscience made him want to tell the truth or because he was beaten?

Hard Det: None at all. Whether he was caused by his own desire to tell the truth or whether he signed because of the beating, it was casually determined and therefore in neither case did he act of his own free will.