Education and Appointments  
  • 2003 Ph.D. in Philosophy at the University of Illinois at Chicago.
  • 1996 Bachelors of Art at the University of Minnesota at Duluth.

  • Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Perception

  • Metaphysics, Epistemology, Elementary Logic

  • Associate Professor, University of Minnesota Duluth, May 2014-Present
  • Assistant Professor, University of Minnesota Duluth, August 2011 - May 2014
  • Associate Professor, Arkansas State University, May 2010 - July 2011
  • Visiting Scholar, Washington University (in St. Louis), Summer 2006
  • Assistant Professor, Arkansas State University, August 2004 - May 2010
  • Visiting Lecturer, Northwestern University, January 2004 - June 2004
  • "Putting Psychology Before Metaphysics in Moral Responsibility: Reactive Attitudes and a 'Gut Feeling' that Can Trigger and Justify Them", with Jeanine Weekes Schroer, Philosophical Psychology, Vol. 32, No. 3 (2018), pp. 357-387.
  • "Conceivability Arguments, Properties, and Powers: A New Defense of Dispositionalism", Journal of the American Philosophical Association, Vol 4, No. 3 (2018), pp. 352-370.
  • "Hume's Table, Peacocke's Trees, the Titled Penny, and the Reversed Seeing-In Account", Mind & Language Vol 32 No 2 (2017), pp.209-230.
  • “The Goldilocks Problem of the Specificity of Visual Phenomenal Content”, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 44 No. 3/4 (2014), pp. 476-495.
  • “Getting the Story Right: A Reducionist Narrative Account of Personal Identity”, co-authored with Jeanine Weekes Schroer, Philosophical Studies, Vol. 171 No. 3 (2014), pp. 445-469.
  • “Do the primary and secondary intensions of phenomenal concepts coincide in all worlds?”, Dialectica, Vol. 67 No. 4 (2013), pp 561-577.
  • “Two potential problems with philosophical intuitions: muddled intuitions and biased intuitions”, co-authored with Jeanine Weekes Schroer, Philosophia, Vol. 41 No.4 (2013), pp. 1263-1281.
  • “Reductionism in Personal Identity and the Phenomenological Sense of being a Temporally Extended Self”, American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 50 No. 4 (2013), pp. 339-356.
  • “Can a single property be both dispositional and categorical? The ‘Partial Consideration Strategy’, partially considered”, Metaphysica, Vol. 14 No. 1 (2013), pp. 63-77.
  • “Painful Reasons: Representationalism as a Theory of Pain”, co-authored with Brendan O’Sullivan, The Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 63 , No. 249 (October 2012), pp. 737-758.
  • “Representationalism and the Scene-Immediacy of Visual Experience: A Journey to the Fringe and Back”, Philosophical Psychology, Vol. 25, No. 4 (2012), pp. 595 - 615.
  • “Two Challenges that Categorical Properties Pose to Physicalism”, Ratio, Vol 25, Issue 2 (July 2012), pp. 195-206.
  • “Can Determinable Properties Earn Their Keep?’, Synthese, Vol 183, No 2 (November 2011), pp 229-247.
  • “Is There More than One Categorical Property?”, The Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 60, No 241 (October 2010), pp. 831-850.
  • “Where’s the Beef? Phenomenal Concepts as Both Demonstrative and Substantial”, The Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 88, No. 3 (July 2010), pp. 505-522.
  • “How Far Can the Physical Sciences Reach?”, American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 47, No. 3 (July 2010), pp. 253-266.
  • “Does the Phenomenality of Perceptual Experience Present an Obstacle to Phenomenal Externalism?”, Philosophical Papers, Vol. 39, No. 1 (March 2009), pp. 93-110.
  • "Open Your Eyes and Look Harder! (An Investigation into the Idea of a Responsible Search)", The Southern Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 46, No. 3 (Fall 2008), pp. 409-430.
  • "The Woman in the Painting and the Image in the Penny: An Investigation of Phenomenological Doubleness, Seeing-in, and 'Reversed Seeing-in'", Philosophical Studies, Vol. 139, No. 3 (June 2008), pp. 329-341.
  • "Memory Foundationalism and the Problem of Unforgotten Carelessness", Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 89, Issue 1 (March 2008), pp. 74-85.
  • "The Reticence of Visual Phenomenal Character: A Spatial Interpretation of Transparency", The Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 85, Issue 3 (Sept 2007), pp. 393-414.
  • “Environmental Representationalists on Afterimages and Phosphenes: Putting Our Best Foot Forward”, The Southern Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 42, No.4 (Winter 2004), pp. 531-546.
  • “Seeing It All Clearly: The Real Story on Blurry Vision”, American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 39, No. 3 (July 2002), pp. 297-301.
  • “The Intransitivity of Matching Sensible Qualities of Color: A Skeleton in the Closet for Representationalism”, Philosophical Studies, Vol. 107, No. 3(February 2002), pp. 259-273.
  • Participant in the Center for Neuroscience and Society’s “Neuroscience Bootcamp”, Director: Martha Farah, University of Pennsylvania, Summer 2012.
  • Principle Investigator/project director of a Student Undergraduate Research Fellowship, sponsored by the Arkansas Department of Higher Education. Title of project: ”Perceptual Experience: A Contemporary Approach to Solving the Problem of Perception”. Total award: $2299.00 Spring 2011.
  • Participant in "Mind and Metaphysics", NEH summer seminar, Director: John Heil, Washington University, St. Louis, MO., Summer 2006.
Courses Taught 
Philosophy of Mind, Epistemology, Early Modern Philosophy, 20th Century Philosophy, Symbolic Logic, Philosophy of Science, Metaphysics, Introduction to the Cognitive Sciences, Values & Technology, Science and Pseudoscience.