Notes on Ball & Dagger reader
John Corvino (1997)
"Homosexuality:  The Nature and Harm Arguments"


John Corvino (1969-)

  John Corvino received his Ph.D. in philosophy from the Univerity of Texas at Austin in 1998.  He is a professor of philosophy at Wayne State University.  He has numerous essays published on the Independent Gay Forum website.


Chronology and context


Corvino's thesis

Despite its title, Corvino's article takes on three major arguments used to condemn homosexuality:  the "nature argument", the "harm argument", and the "slippery slope argument".

Note that Corvino is a philosopher, not a political scientist or political philosopher.  Thus his concern is the more general one of whether homosexuality is wrong, not whether laws should be passed against it.  These are not the same thing.  We might agree that something is wrong — e.g., cursing in front of children — and yet agree that it should not be made illegal.

One argument that Corvino does not take on (in this essay, at least;   he does elsewhere) is the dogmatic argument:  "Homosexuality is wrong (and should therefore be made illegal) because my dogma — e.g., my religious tradition — says it is wrong (and because I have the votes to enforce this)."

Note that throughout this paper Corvino is applying rational argument to what is an emotion-laden issue.  This raises the question of whether philosophical arguments can be strictly "rational".  Some people claim that "rationality" is wrong in its very ignoring of emotion.  Others claim that "rationality" simply disguises hidden emotional value commitments.  From either point of view, the claimed emotional detachment of philosophers is suspect.

On the other hand, even if we admit that morals have some connection with emotions, what is the nature of that connection?  Is reason a slave to emotion?  Should emotion be changed according to reason?  Or, if the relationship between the two is more dialectical, how does this dialectic work?

The nature argument(s)

The main argument here is, "Homosexuality is wrong because it is 'unnatural'."  Corvino starts by pointing out the ambiguity of the term "natural", arguing that we detest many "natural" things (e.g., disease) and like many things that are not "natural" (e.g., clothing).   The key issue here is how to determine what is "natural" in a way that makes clear why "unnaturalness" implies "wrong".  Corvino lists five approaches.

  1. What is unusual or abnormal is unnatural.
  2. What is not practiced by other animals is unnatural.
  3. What does not proceed from innate desires is unnatural.
  4. What violates an organ's principal purpose is unnatural.
  5. What is disgusting or offensive is unnatural.
Not surprisingly, he finds each of these inadequate.  The first argument falls because (i) most things are statistically unusual (e.g., being named "John Corvino" or "Stephen P. Chilton", or reading Sanskrit) but are not thereby wrong and (ii) there is no other neutral definition of "abnormal".   The second argument fails because (i) animals do exhibit homosexual behavior and (ii) humans do many things that animals don't do (e.g., speak) without being thought "unnatural".  The third argument fails because we have innate desires that we do not believe should be catered to (at least indisciminately — e.g., sexual intercourse) and behavior that is self-chosen that we see as uncontroversial (e.g., one's choice of religion). The fourth argument fails because it is unclear what principal purposes organs have;   most organs have (or can be used for) many purposes. The fifth argument Corvino has termed elsewhere the "ick" argument, but he points out that we do lots of icky things (e.g., eat snails) and that many people used to be offended by practices like interracial marriage that were seen later as being unproblematic.

The harm argument(s)

The main argument here is, "Homosexuality is wrong because it harms something or someone, possibly homosexuals themselves, possibly others, possibly society as a whole." 

  1. Homosexuality causes mental illness (depression, suicide).  [Duh.  You try growing up gay.]
  2. Homosexuals are promiscuous.  [Correlation doesn't prove causation.  And in any case, fidelity is hard even for heterosexuals;   you try having relationships under the social opprobrium of being gay.]
  3. Homosexual behavior spreads AIDS, bringing risk to both homosexuals and society as a whole.  [The same could be said for heterosexual sex.]
  4. Homosexuals' practice of anal sex is damaging to themselves.  [So is tobacco use;  so is "rough sex".  But we don't outlaw those.]
  5. Homosexuality threatens children.  [No, pederasty threatens children.]
  6. Allowing homosexuality gives children the message that homosexuality is o.k.  [This is a silly argument, because it is circular:  premised on the assumption that homosexuality is wrong, which is the issue we're trying to settle in the first place.]
  7. Homosexuality threatens society, since homosexuals cannot reproduce.  [First, homosexuals can (and do) reproduce — just not with each other.   Second, people who choose celibacy and people who are sterile cannot reproduce, yet we do not see them as threatening society.]
  8. [There is a further argument he does not mention here (although he does in other work), namely:]  Homosexuality offends most people [especially the person advancing the argument], and majority rules.  [This argument goes back to the "harm principle" and even further back to the roots of classical liberalism, which sees a realm of individual liberty that exists apart from the majoritarian inclinations of popular feelings.]

The slippery slope argument

If we permit homosexuality, are we then bound to permit all kinds of other bizarre, harmful practices:  incest, polygamy, bestiality, public nudity, and so on?  [In another essay, Corvino tells of a protest held by the Young Conservatives of Texas when he spoke at Texas A & M University, where various of them "married" their dog, their cell phone, a picture of Reagan, themselves.]  This is the "slippery slope" argument:  once you're on the slope, you have nowhere to end but at the bottom.  Corvino argues, against this, that each practice has to be treated on its own merits.  If the arguments against these other practices apply to homosexuality, then bring them forward and discuss them in the context of homosexuality, but don't argue against it through the emotions attached to the other practices.  Conversely, if there really are no good reasons to oppose these other practices (other than the fact that we don't like them), then why are they bad in the first place?

To put this in another way, what does gay marriage have to do with bestiality (etc.)?  If the answer is, "catering to unrestrained sexual desire", then one has reduced the relationship between gay partners to purely sex.

Culture wars

The above is true as a matter of abstract logic.  However, there is a political truth that Corvino misses, either deliberately or because his professional concern as a philosopher is restricted to logic.  Let's suppose that there are no logical arguments against these other practices — that they are as acceptable as homosexuality.  What we are then contemplating is a society vastly changed from our own, changed not because people understand and accept the change but rather because some abstract theory says the change is o.k.  In other words, we have to ask ourselves whether we are willing to throw ourselves over the cliff of accepting homosexuality (and all that this implies) just on the basis that Corvino shoots down some of our arguments one by one.

We are now back to Edmund Burke's argument against the French revolution:  that there is more to society than logic alone can reveal.  Thus people oppose homosexuality because to permit it would indeed mean (or feels like it would mean) a great change in the society.  They need time to sort things out.  [The same issues arose thirty years ago in the conflict over the Equal Rights Amendment, which would have eliminated discrimination on the basis of gender.  All kinds of claims were made, not always in good faith, to scare people into opposing the amendment — e.g., that the amendment would require unisex toilets or prevent women from receiving alimony.]

Corvino does acknowledge this, at least implicitly, when he takes care to condemn bestiality and incest on terms that don't apply to homosexuality.

"Heterosexual Coming Out Day"

It is often hard to get UMD students to discuss these issues, because many of them, gay or straight, see nothing very wrong with homosexuality, and those who do oppose homosexuality don't like to say so publicly.  But some of the issues are brought to light more clearly through consideration of "Heterosexual Coming Out Day", an event organized by the College Republicans about ten years ago.  This event raises the question of the nature of oppression (and in particular whether homosexuals were oppressed).  The organizers claimed that they were being oppressed as heterosexuals, since all the attention was given to homosexuals, gay rights, gay pride, etc.  Gay rights groups scoffed at this claim of any special oppression of heterosexuals.   The organizers responded that even if they gave up their claim that they were oppressed, they were still entitled to take pride in their being heterosexual, just like homosexuals were.

So what do you make of these two arguments?  First, are heterosexuals oppressed?  Second, are they entitled to have a heterosexual pride or "coming out" day just like homosexuals are?


QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION


URL: http://www.d.umn.edu/~schilton/1610/Readings/1610.B+DReader.Corvino.HomosexualityNature&Harm.html
Author:  Stephen Chilton [email]  |  Last Modified:  2005-12-11
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