NOTES ON
Manfred B. Steger (2005) Globalism (2nd ed.): Market Ideology Meets Terrorism
I. 7-8 days on this topic; probably more than we need. Don't have to rush.
II. This is where the action is; this is where you can make a difference. Maybe not be "successful", but make a real difference. [Legitimation crisis sequence.]
III. Globalization vs. globalism.
A. Globalization is multidimensional:
1. Technological; ecological; political; economic; cultural
2. "Fragmented, incomplete, uneven, contradictory"B. Globalism is an ideology: says what's happening, explains what's happening, says how to evaluate it, and gives one an identity in relation to it.
IV. This book has a unique approach – not just rewarmed LCRE; not just Marxist critique of neoliberalism / neoconservatism.
A. Two Marxist critiques:
1. The materialist critique: economic, materialist, inequality, exploitation.
2. The Humanistic Marxism critique: human alienation
a. from work
b. from the product
c. from one another3. Hence we get the standard Marxist critique of the globalist vision as just capitalism writ internationally.
B. Postmodernism
1. uncover the play of power in "reality". Foucault and The Birth of the Clinic. Doctors, hospitals, not midwives or Chinese medicine. Reality as formed by symbols and interpretations/meanings: social relations are carried by talk (& writing). They carry ideas, ideologies, power.
2. Steger book: "critical discourse analysis"
a. Critical theory – Frankfurt School / Institute for Social Research – Theodore Adorno, Eric Fromm, Max Horkheimer: "immanent critique": uncover assumptions, show inconsistency/contradictions
b. Discourse: as negotiation & persuasion3. So critical discourse analysis uses what people say to reveal the hidden assumptions & contradictions.
C. Note, therefore, that the book's analysis sees more going on than purely economic forces and their superstructural derivatives. Ideology has its own, autonomous force.
V. Control by inevitability:
A. Control is most efficient and effective when people are convinced that they have no alternative. "Reality". "Internalized oppression". Hegel's subject vs. object of history; liberation ideologies as trying to create subjects.
B. Choosing the form of life.
1. Nozick's Wilt Chamberlain example. But do we want the form of life?
2. Note also the Genghis Khan example.C. Decentering needed. "Contingency; contingent".
D. So let's look skeptically at the claim that globalization is a process inevitably (and desirably) structured along globalist lines.
VI. Social control via narrative:
A. Narrative: a story that people are familiar with. No effort in following the structure, remembering the elements.
1. For example, listen for the shock that comes from the violation of our narrative expectations in the following story: Dick Whittington – discouraged – turns around – then hears bells of London – "Turn back, turn back, Dick Whittington, Lord Mayor of London" – perseveres – encounters a rich person who gives him a one pound note – is promptly robbed and killed. The concept of "implicature".
B. Name some narratives:
1. Here's one example: Boy meets girl, boy loses girl, boy gets girl back. Meet cute; misunderstandings; reconciliation. Working Girl (w/ Melanie Griffith). Pretty Woman (w/ Julia Roberts).
2. Others:
a. Sports movies (underdog comes through at the end)
b. Powerful guy abjures violence, bully attacks people close to him, guy gets angry and exacts revenge.
(1) Commando (Arnold Schwartzenegger)
(2) Every Steven Segal movie. In fact, ...
(3) Every kung fu movie ever made.c. Horatio Alger & "Raggedy Dick"
d. Corporate greed –> evil individual
(1) Silkwood (w/ Meryl Streep)
(2) Erin Brockovich (w/ Julia Roberts)e. Campbell's hero myth / "monomyth"
f. Corruption ("...gate") scandals
g. Parents' view of how their children's lives should run (e.g., high school, college, good job, marriage, grandchildren)
C. Narrative "framing" a debate. Lessons of the Past.
1. Is Iraq Vietnam or Czechoslovakia / Munich/ Chamberlain / "Peace in our time".
2. The Marshall Plan
In order to understand Steger's book, you must be aware of the debate among Marxists about the role of ideology. Some Marxists believe that the economic system of a society is the "base" and that the political and ideological-philosophical systems are only a "superstructure" erected on that base, i.e., domains that are simply reflections of the power structure ordained by the base. Even if they appear to have some autonomy, they are said to be subordinate to the base "in the final instance" — i.e., when push comes to shove. To these Marxists, ideology and politics have autonomy only until the economic system's iron fist comes out of the velvet glove of its supposed permissiveness.
Other Marxists dispute this, saying that while the economic system may in fact be the most important domain to consider in understanding a society, the domains of ideology and politics do have some independent effect, so that we need to understand society as a dialectic between these various domains. Sometimes ideology (or politics) is decisive. As I've said in class, this is my position, and Steger argues for it, esp. in Chapters One and Two.
However, this debate is one that Steger doesn't have to settle. The only thing he needs to establish is that ideologies are worth studying. If they have autonomous effect, then they are important for that reason. But even if they are merely and completely superstructural, examining them will reveal things about the base. They offer a good observatory, so to speak, and may reveal things that a direct examination of the economic base might miss.
A. The "End of Ideology" debate
The end of ideology was predicted, but ideological battles are still very much present. [And, I would add, the "end of ideology" thesis was itself ideological.]
B. Ideology: Elements & Functions
Distortion, legitimation, integration.
Hegemony; false consciousness
[One may say that ideology is always false, but this is not a claim that what one believes is therefore right.]
C. Globalism & Neoliberalism
To a large extent, globalism is classical liberalism writ internationally. Globalism as an ideology arose from globalization processes being interpreted in the context of the rising neoliberal (a.k.a. modern conservative) ideology.
D. Globalism & American Empire
Neoliberalism gave way to neoconservatism after 9/11. Both have a fundamental commitment to private property and the unrestricted operation of the free market, but they differ in their support of the intrusion of government. Where neoliberals rely primarily on economic forces, keeping government small, neoconservatives rely on the deployment of both economic and governmental force in the service of U.S. / Western interests, justifying the latter by purportedly universal values. "Soft power" vs. "hard power".
E. Conceptual Framework of the Book
Ideology has an effect. [See my note just prior to this chapter's notes.]
Steger says his purpose is the directly normative one of "show[ing] that these ideas [i.e., globalist ideology] can be changed to bring about a more egalitarian and cosmopolitan order" (20). Much of the book is devoted to showing that globalist ideology distorts the reality of globalization and does so in a way that is harmful to people. Such forthright normative statements are unusual in social science work. It is up to you to decide whether this taints his work from the start. Still, we need to consider whether it is possible to discuss the power of ideologies without making normative judgments, since their power comes from their normativity. As Piaget might say, that would be as unreasonable as educational psychologists studying how to teach that 2+2 = 5 without recognizing that the truth of that equation might affect their conclusions.
[Questions to ask yourself before reading this chapter: Does globalization exist? Assuming that you believe it does, what does the term mean to you? For the term to be meaningful in social science, it must help us understand things, even if only by simplifying the discussion of what we knew before, so what does the term help us better understand?]
A. The Blind Scholars and the Elephant
Different scholars can see a phenomenon in different ways, each guided by h/her own perspective. The diversity of perspectives (and their incommensurability) may lead still others to believe the phenomenon / concept doesn't exist or isn't useful. ["Incommensurability" means that no perspective can be accurately measured within the terms of any of the others; they are speaking different languages, seeing the world in apparently irreconcilable ways.]
B. Globalization Is "Globaloney"
Steger deals first with scholars who dismiss the concept for various reasons and to different degrees.
1. Rejectionists
Scholars in this camp see globalization as a "power word", like "development" or "nationalism". It explains everything and nothing; it's a label slapped on everything, not a tool of analysis.
Advocates of the concept can adopt / have adopted one of two possible responses to this position, according to Steger. First, they can try to demonstrate its utility through empirical studies. Second — and this is Steger's own response — they can study the ideologies attached to the term "globalization". In other words, the very existence of the term creates its own reality, and this reality can be studied regardless of whether the concept itself is meaningful.
2. Skeptics
Skeptics point out that even if the concept is meaningful, it is not particularly important. For example, most trade remains national in scope.
Advocates of the concept have an easy response to this, namely, that there could be an important structure of power relations attached to international trade, so that even if the trade itself was not voluminous, it could still have far-reaching effects. For example, most trade in the United States might be intra-state [or so I'm guessing], but the national government and the national structuring of inter-state trade are enormously important.
3. Modifiers
Modifiers look at "globalization" as merely one of many similar phases in history. Thus "globalization" should be regarded not as a unique event but just one moment in a more general theory of world history.
Advocates of the concept of "globalization" can respond to this criticism by claiming that our current situation is unique in history, and that this uniqueness is much more important than this period's commonalities with other periods and/or placement within an overall historical theory. (See 27/1.) (Analogously, one of the strengths of Marx's analysis was to situate capitalism within a history of exploitative regimes [e.g., slave societies; feudal societies]. He analyzed capitalism in particular depth, of course, but he was guided in picking out its most important features — what I'd call its "deep currents" — by seeing its similarity to these earlier regimes.) [Personally, I disagree with this. At least in the case of globalization, I think the "deep currents" issue must be taken into account, even if, like Marx with capitalism, globalization scholars pay primary attention to the period of globalization itself.]
C. Globalization Is an Economic Process
Most obvious. Trade; financial flows; foreign direct investment. Drives globalization and the institutions regulating these economic aspects.
D. Globalization Is a Political Process
One cannot do without politics, because there eventually needs to be some management of trade flows; otherwise, they wind up sloshing wildly.
E. Globalization Is a Cultural Process
xx
F. Globalization and Ideology: Toward a Critical Examination of Globalism
Other possible approaches/perspectives/concomitants to/on/of globalization:
In sum, globalization is complex.
This is a key chapter, with key claims.
Preparatory questions:
Basic questions you need to ask yourself as you read the chapter:
Another way of listing what Steger is trying to prove:
Note what I said a while ago when asked whether Chinese women are oppressed. I based my answer on a particular type of democracy ("deliberative democracy") as being my criterion. The issue is whether the women (or any group in any society) participate equally and fully, not what decisions are made. We're always in pursuit of this public, full, equal participation, but it seems plain to me that these women did not participate thus. (And if they did, I would withdraw my objection.)
A. Selling Globalization
Active persuasion; not inevitable process, nor does it sell itself. People's personal experiences (esp. fears) contrast with their ideological approval of globalization in the abstract. [SPC: Is ideology the only explanation for that support? Could it be the NIMBY effect, for example?]
Market ideology serves certain class interests. [SPC: MS doesn't use the term "class", however (48/3).]
Note that globalism is a complete ideology, not just a specific social-science explanation of events.
Also since 9/11 the United States is selling itself overseas. A "battle of civilizations" (Huntington's phrase). A "war of ideas".
B. [The six claims:]
No collective decision-making: either market [= owning class] or U.S. government [= owning class too].
1. Globalization Is about the Liberalization and Global Integration of Markets
Separation of government & economy; minimal government. Negative liberty. Social integration. Wealth & innovation.
This is the central claim. Liberalization / global integration is our primary concern, the primary engine of globalization, our primary desire.
2. Globalization Is Inevitable and Irreversible
This, along with the next claim, is a key element of disempowerment. Globalization is "naturalized", so people believe they can no more oppose it than they can oppose the law of gravity.
3. Nobody Is in Charge of Globalization
If no one is in charge, then there is no one to blame or, more to the point, no place on which to bring power to bear.
4. Globalization Benefits Everyone
Pretty standard classical liberal argument. However, evidence suggests is not the case.
[SPC: And even if the argument were true, it is ideological in that there is no public, free, equal discourse about it.]
5. Globalization Furthers the Spread of Democracy in the World
Note that "democracy" means the globalists' model of democracy, which MS terms "thin democracy", a democracy concentrated on mass participation primarily through voting, not through the actual participation characteristic of "thick democracy". [SPC: This is why my political orientation is not especially focused on political parties.] Voting provides only legitimation, not real participation. Globalism doesn't foster the latter.
Classical liberalism is obviously better than feudalism and traditionalism. [This is what MS says, but once again, even if the claim were true, it remains ideological in the lack of public, free, equal discourse about it.] The fall of the Soviet bloc has discredited socialism. [SPC: In one sense yes, but I believe that socialism is better off for not having to defend the Soviet system.]
6. Globalization Requires a War on Terror [and on anti-globalist dissenters (65/2) — "If you aren't with us, you're with the terrorists"]
Democracy via force: military force and economic power.
Who threatens globalization? — terrorists? Multiple approaches possible: force is one approach; providing better conditions and greater respect for people is another.
C. Conclusion
These six claims are, collectively, an ideology. [SPC: I believe MS has proved that they are interrelated, even if, as he says, they are not all claimed by every globalist.]
[SPC: MS says it is "remarkable" that globalists defined globalism,
shifting from neoliberalism to neoconservatism in the process. But
I don't see this as particularly remarkable; classical liberalism
has always been backed up by military and economic coercion.]
Despite globalism's ideological power, it is not without its challengers. In discussing them, Steger is of course concerned with showing the overall configuration of the debate over how we should regard and guide globalization. Beyond that, he is also implicitly asking what possibilities there are for political resistance. It is to his credit, I believe, that he considers a wide variety of challenges, not just the one(s) that may particularly appeal to him.
A. The Left-Right Distinction
This distinction is problematic. Two distinct ways in which it can be measured: a concern for equality and a concern for stability. These are usually seen as opposing dimensions, with the "left" concerned more with equality than with stability and the "right" oppositely concerned. However, there is some overlap between the two measures.
[SPC: I find this chapter's analysis a bit incoherent, and the problem seems to arise from the difficulty of distinguishing "left" and "right" these days. In our current circumstances we seem to be simultaneously facing both inequality and instability. Or perhaps the distinction is this: "instability" is not the same for the wealthy and for the poor. For the wealthy, "instability" means a threat to the existing class structure whereby they maintain their control (and wealth, though wealth is as much a means to an end as it is an end in itself). As long as that class structure remains, they can take care of themselves: in gated communities, in exclusive suburbs, in other countries if necessary. Their security is tied to their "community", as is the case for poor people, but their community is an international one. For poor people, however, "instability" means a loss of the various local systems that keep them afloat: a particular job, a network of friends to call on for support. Not having much money in reserve, the poor are more affected by disruptions in their world, and their relative poverty means they are less able to protect themselves against such disruptions. (For example, when was the last time that a highway was constructed through the high-rent district of town?) Thus globalism (and the operation of national free markets) means different things to the rich and the poor. To the rich, it means stability in its preservation of the class system. To the poor, it means instability in the constant vagaries of the market. For the rich, the instability of the market is an advantage in that an insecure workforce is a compliant and cheap workforce. For the poor, therefore, the instability is a disadvantage. It is true that free markets do result in some industries and/or wealthy being unseated from their positions of power, but such losses are minor in comparison with the overwhelming advantage of being part of the dominant class in a class-structured society. These observations motivate the analysis of party alignment given at the very end of these notes.]
B. The Particularist-Protectionist [and populist] Right
"National integrity" under threat from globalism & internationalism. Anti-NAFTA and similar globalizing arrangements. Anti-immigrant; anti-welfare; anti-Ivory Tower elites.
1. The Economic Nationalism of Pat Buchanan and Lou Dobbs
2. Gerhard Frey's German Right-Wing Extremism
Economic nationalism. Anti-"New World Order", e.g., the Council on Foreign Relations. Anti-immigration. Within the United States, the "English-only" movement. Anti-Semitic, sometimes phrased in the code phrase, anti-"international bankers". Within Germany, the movement to a "Fortress Europe", meaning cooperation among the European nations to resist the globalism of the Washington Consensus.
3. Hugo Chávez's Bolivarian National Populism
Here too, the idea of regional unity (Latin America and the Caribbean) to resist globalism. MS claims that Chávez's centralization of authority can be seen as "populist" [which I believe is a code word for "fascist"].
4. Al Qaeda's Antiglobalist Islamism
[SPC: I think it is important in understanding Islamic fundamentalism generally to distinguish between the use of terrorism as a tactic, which is used only by some Islamic fundamentalist groups (al Qaeda among them, of course), and the Islamic fundamentalist impulse. The discussion below refers only to the latter.]
Globalism identified with secularism, materialism, anti-Islam.
[SPC: MS tries to make Osama bin Laden look self-contradictory, but I believe his argument is unfair. It reminds me of a silly debate I heard recently on the radio where a caller accused Paul Wellstone of having been duplicitous because Wellstone opposed corporate funding of campaigns but accepted campaign contributions from corporations. The fact that Wellstone would have instantly lost if he had not accepted contributions did not seem important to the caller.]
C. The Internationalist-Egalitarian Left
Basically, equality is under threat from globalism.
1. The Left Populism of Ralph Nader and Dennis Kucinich
2. The Internationalization of Antiglobalist People's Movements
There is a need for international equality.
D. Conclusion
Despite globalism's enormous political, economic, military, and ideological power, there remain serious and persistent forces in opposition to it. The diversity of views and concerns between left and right weaken this opposition, however.
[SPC: One of the things I noticed in reading this chapter is the confusion
caused by the attempt to keep classical liberalism's free market economy
at the national level while rejecting it at the international level. It
seems to me that the problems with capitalism that are present at the international
level
are also present at the national level. Capitalism creates inequality
and social disruption, no matter at what level it exists.]
Chapter Four ends with acknowledging the existence of a variety of anti-globalist positions and forces. This chapter shows how the globalist - anti-globalist conflict has played out in practice.
Ultimately, MS wants to use these examples to see what direction the anti-globalist movement should take (or at any rate what outcome is likely), but this conclusion appears in the next chapter, Chapter Six.
A. The "Battle of Seattle"
B. The Specter of Seattle Stalks the World: Antiglobalist Protests from Davos to Geneva
C. Resisting Imperial Globalism after 9/11: From Doha to Cancún
The first three sections of this chapter are about the various anti-globalism demonstrations. As he points out, they actually start prior to the "Battle of Seattle" in December 1999, but that was when the anti-globalist opposition first came to public attention. Seattle was the site of a meeting of the WTO (World Trade Organization), which was supposed to relax trade barriers worldwide. Demonstrators against this agenda were, as MS says, an "eclectic alliance [of leftist groups] includ[ing] consumer activists, labor [& anti-sweatshop] activists..., environmentalists, animal-rights activists, advocates of Third World debt relief, feminists, and human-rights proponents" [128-129]. There were other supporters from the nationalist (even fascist and neo-Nazi) right. What surprised the world (and unnerved the WTO) beyond the simple number of demonstrators was the variety of these groups and their hitherto-unseen coordinating of their actions.
The tactics used were for the most part nonviolent direct action aimed at shutting down the WTO conference. Other activities were educational (and media-oriented) in nature, e.g., street theatre, puppets, etc. The so-called "Black Bloc" of anarchists did conduct violent direct action (i.e., destroying property), and their relatively small numbers were avidly covered by the media, tarnishing the overall nonviolence of the other protesters and discrediting their movement.
Tactics adopted by the police included the use of riot gear, rubber bullets, tear gas, batons, and pepper spray. A curfew was imposed. A no-protest zone was established around the WTO site. (MS wonders if this didn't violate the 1996 Collins v. Jordan decision, which said that police had to allow protesters close enough to meeting sites so that their protests could be seen & heard by their intended targets. I wonder whether this decision applies to situations in which the avowed purpose of many of the demonstrators is to prevent the meeting from occurring altogether. On the other hand, what does one do when one is excluded from the table?) The police also arrested and beat protesters and (according to one report) threatened that rubber bullets would be replaced with live ammunition if the demonstrators persisted.
Partly as a result of the demonstrations, a split developed within the WTO, where a bloc of Third World countries objected to the meeting's agenda, which had been set earlier in closed-door sessions by First World countries.
MS also notes that Seattle allowed anti-globalist forces to discover and test new types of organization and demonstrations, e.g., use of the WWW and cell phones. [SPC: Let me note here what looks to me like a double standard in Steger's analysis. In this chapter he discusses approvingly the use of new technology and world-wide communications by the anti-globalist demonstrators, while in Chapter Four he criticizes Osama bin Laden as inconsistent for doing the same thing.]
The demonstrations in Seattle were followed by a series of similar protests: at the February 2000 WEF (World Economic Forum) meeting in Davos; at the April 2000 IMF/World Bank meeting in Washington, D.C.; at the October 2000 IMF/World Bank meeting in Prague; at the December 2000 EU Summit meeting in Nice; at the January 2001 WEF meeting in Davos; etc. (And many others; these were the major demonstrations.) Meetings of the (anti-globalist, anti-WEF) World Policy Forum were held in 2001 and 2003 in Porto Alegre, Brazil and in 2004 in Mumbai, India. [SPC: On p.146 the text calls this latter meeting the "WEF" meeting, but I believe this is a typo. There is a similar typo at the end of the paragraph.]
[SPC: Examples like this raise the general and difficult question of what protest tactics and governmental responses are legitimate in such situations.]
D. Globalist Responses
1. Violence: During this series of demonstrations, government repression became greater & greater, with particular attempts being made to exclude protesters from the vicinity of the meetings.
However, violence is not a preferred response to demonstrations. The use of force has many drawbacks: [SPC: Input from my Fall 2005 class enabled me to extend and elaborate on the original list.]
As the text lists them, the two preferred responses are:
2. Public relations campaigns: homogenized news coverage, starting from similar assumptions, aided by media concentration on "infotainment" instead of coverage of real issues. This also includes government-funded advertising, both covert and overt.
3. Reform: Vague assurances of forthcoming "reform"
E. Conclusion
Steger says that the events of 9/11 have presented the anti-globalist movement with both problems and opportunities. The major problem is, of course, that protesters can be tarred with the same brush as terrorists; many people are in no mood to permit challenges to the government's legitimacy. The "War on Terror" has provided governments with an excuse for repressing their own citizens. On the other hand, the war in Iraq has provided a linkage between peace activists and anti-globalism activists — a linkage that, even if valid, was not particularly prominent prior to the invasion. The war and occupation have made clearer the connection between globalism and the use of imperial power.
Steger wisely makes no predictions, only pointing to the appearance of the
World Policy Forum as a possible organizing body for what he, following
the New Left Review, calls a potential "movement of
movements".
xx
Here's the way the political spectrum is usually conceptualized:
| Stage 5 theories | ||||
| Classical liberalism | Burke | |||
| Progressive / socialist left (e.g., the Green Party) | Modern reform liberalism | Modern conservatism / neoliberalism / neoconservatism (e.g., the Bush Administration)* | Burkean conservatism | Religious Right / cultural conservatism (Lou Dobbs; Pat Robertson) |
| Republicans | ||||
| Democrats | ||||
| Equality | <----------------------> | Stability & tradition | ||
[* George W. Bush is situated in both this camp and in the Religious Right / cultural conservative camp. However, I believe that when push comes to shove, his basic commitment is to the neoconservative camp. Certainly his advisors come largely from that camp. My sense is that he plays to the R.R./c.c. camp when it is politically advantageous to do so, but in a conflict between this and the neoconservative camp, the latter wins.]
I believe that the picture might more properly be shown as follows:
| "Left" | "Right" | |
| Upper / owning class | Modern reform liberalism | Neoliberalism / neoconservatism |
| Lower / working class | Progressive / socialist left | Religious Right; cultural conservatism |
Currently, the major division is between the two columns, although the upper row is much more unified and the lower row is much more divided. Note that it serves both sides of liberalism (i.e., the upper row) to emphasize this latter split, because it leaves socialists with no allies except for modern reform liberals and it leaves cultural conservatives with no allies except for neoliberals / neoconservatives.
I believe, however, that the primary cleavage is between the two rows, and that this cleavage becomes ever more severe. If it were to unify, the bottom row is quite capable of taking power. Furthermore, it seems to me that they have some important unities: both sides oppose rampant globalism and the unchecked operation of the free market; both sides value social stability insofar as it means protecting those unwillingly dispossessed of their livelihoods and/or their cultural connections.
There are many problems that would need to be overcome for this realignment to occur:
Here are the directions or initiatives I see as necessary for addressing these problems:
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