POL 3910:
HONORS SEMINAR: AMERICAN POLITICS:
THE ELITIST-PLURALIST DEBATE
Fall 2003
Reading:
Floyd Hunter (1953). Community Power Structure
Floyd Hunter (1912-1992)
Hunter was a social worker, community activist, professor and author. His most
famous book, Community Power Structure, derived from his doctoral
dissertation and introduced the concept of the power structure. While it
did not overtly identify the business elite of Atlanta, it was based on them.
Hunter wrote other books and articles and taught at several universities.
The collection includes correspondence, writings (both published and unpublished),
notes, source materials, speeches, lectures and working papers. [Biography
from the special collections web site of the Emory University Libraries.]
Orienting Questions to Guide You As You Read
Theory
- How does Hunter conceptualize (define) power? Specifically,
is it a relationship or a quantity? (The title of Chapter 2 implies
it’s a quantity, but see the first ¶ after the list of names
in Ch. 2. Also see pp.6-7.) Must it be visible, or
can it be invisible? Or might it be part of an overall structure
of relationships? (See pp.6-7.) What is its relationship
to the normative issues of power. (Note discussion on p.2.)
- Despite Hunter's many assumptions about power, this is nevertheless an
empirical effort. How does Hunter actually operationalize
(measure) power in Atlanta? Is his operationalization consistent
with his conceptualization?
Results
- How does Hunter know there is a power structure? (See pp.1 &
2.)
- What did Hunter find the structure of power to be in Atlanta?
- What does it mean, exactly, to say that Hunter “found an elite”
in Regional City? What is the nature of this “elite”?
- What are the elite's sources of power?
- In what sense are they an elite? Do its members consult
with each other on all decisions? If not, in what sense
are they an elite, which carries with it the connotation of
a unified group or even cabal?
- Do they make all the decisions? make all the important decisions?
make a disproportionate number of decisions? have a disproportionate
influence over decisions? Do they agree with each other
on every issue? on all the important issues? on most important
issues?
- And anyway, what is really so terrible about a group of knowledgeable,
active people making decisions? — isn't that true
of every group? Some people don’t want to participate,
right? They are glad to leave decisions to others, as long
as the decisions are generally o.k. Why is this situation
so awful? As they say in sports, "no harm, no foul."
For example, does the fact that all of the elite are white
men mean that people simply want white men to lead, or is
there some other force at work? If the latter, what
is its nature?
- To what extent are the elites independent of followers, i.e.,
have power without having any followers or without having
to pay attention to what their followers want?
- Doesn't Hunter’s “reputational method” (a.k.a.
“cobweb sampling method”) guarantee finding an
elite? To put this another way, suppose you had a city that
had no elite; wouldn't you still expect to wind up with
a group of unusually-highly nominated people?
- Hunter distinguishes among several types of elite members. What are
they?
- We have to beware of a general sense of negativity and disempowerment.
First, is power always negative, always hierarchical, always
exploitative? Think of forms of power that are positive, or cooperative,
or beneficial. How can collectively binding decisions get made
without the exercise of some form of power? If we believe that such
decisions are (or can be) useful, then surely the process of reaching
them must be good also? Second, are we inevitably disempowered?
What can be done?
- What implications do these findings have for Atlanta being a democracy?
Is it bad to have an elite? What are its advantages and disadvantages?
Hunter's data show that there are separate "crowds", each
with its own power hierarchy, so we still have to ask whether there
is any identity of interest among the elites of the different "crowds".
If there is not, then we have competing elites and a fair claim to pluralism.
Hunter does show some overlap of the groups in Chapter 4: the
"interlocking directorates of corporations" chart (Fig. 6,
p.77); the "interlocking club memberships" chart (Fig.
7, p.87). On the other hand, he also shows a variety of "crowds"
in Fig. 8, p.91: economic institutions, government institutions,
religious institutions, educational institutions, professional associations,
civic associations, cultural associations. Still, these data do
not show in any definite way a unity of elite interests. The different
elites might conflict. On the other hand, it is possible that
there is a hierarchy of interests. Hunter addresses this to some
extent on p.105, where he notes that the basic interest is in making
money. But so what? Aren't we all interested in making money?
Whose interests, if any, are excluded from consideration by the elite?
What interests are they?
- If there are common interests, how do the elites discern and communicate
them to each other. (See p.105.)
- What does Hunter suggest, either directly or implicitly, that we might
do about elite dominance?
- How does Hunter's work bear on Truman's? I list below aspects of
Truman's argument; for each, say how Hunter's study confirms,
contradicts, or does not bear on this aspect.
- Potential groups: Truman's idea: "People
can come to interact on the basis of a shared characteristic
or interest if their interests are violated enough. This provides
a restraint on the power of other, organized groups."
[Possible reply: "Elites may be fearful, but this
is as likely to result in repression rather than openness."]
- Multiple group memberships: Truman's idea:
"People are members of many actual groups (and many other
potential groups). The interests of these groups can conflict
with one another. This also acts as a restraint on the formally
organized, since the members of a group will be moderate in
their claims on other groups (to which they may also belong)."
[Possible reply: "The power elite has a shared
interest."]
- Access: Truman's idea: "Most of
our political work is group work: groups have access to legislators
and the legislative process; supporting candidates, raising
money, analyzing issues, testifying, writing letters, etc.
Very little is done by individuals." [Possible
reply: "This may be true of the day-to-day process
and administration of government, but it is not true for the
large issues central to the power elite's interests."]
- Rules of the game (or, "the democratic mold"):
Truman's idea: "Access is guaranteed to all groups,
because everyone agrees to fair play, free speech, free assembly,
the right to petition, the right to vote. Some positions (judges,
congressional leaders, the president) even hold themselves
as having a special mandate to uphold the rules. Any group
that consistently violates the rules of the game will find
themselves punished by everyone else." [Possible
reply: "They won't be punished if they have enough
power either to resist punishment or to disguise their actions."]
- Equilibrium: Truman's idea: "A society
has to maintain an equilibrium among competing groups. The
rules of the game, and the formation of new groups, mean that
equilibrium can be preserved through peaceful struggle."
[Possible reply: "Yes, but equilibrium could also
include (or derive from) repression."]
- The public interest: Truman's idea: "Is
the public interest served by this arrangement? According
to Truman (and many liberal philosophers), there is no such
thing, since there is no group known as the public. Or, to
look at this another way, the public interest is simply the
aggregation of people's interests, expressed through groups
which have access to the political process and which are free
to form and interact. [Possible reply: "This
defines away the problem; it doesn't solve it."]
Overall
- Is Hunter's method of study valid? In other words, what criticisms might
you make of it?
Outline of the Book
If you didn't know already, “Regional City” is Atlanta, Georgia.
Hunter did a study of the city during a time (1950-1951) when Atlanta
was just beginning its growth into the regional powerhouse that it is today.
One part of this transformation was a reputation — deserved or
not — for having successfully addressed its racial problems;
this reputation was gained back during those days. (Well, actually
a little later, when Atlanta was one of the first cities in the South to
elect a black mayor.)
Note that we are getting increasingly detailed in our study of power.
The proponents of naive democracy, process theory, and group theory don’t
look farther than what is immediately obvious and theoretically acceptable:
people discussing politics and then voting, Congress making laws, newspapers
publishing, people writing their representatives and newspapers, etc.
There is little systematic, empirical research on the exact dynamics and
importance of these forms of power. Truman’s work is better in
that he directly studies interest groups (or relies on other, accurate accounts),
and this allows him to see more clearly their power. Hunter is now
taking the study of power to a new level: understanding political dynamics
by looking empirically at specific people in a specific community.
The "sociological" vs. "political science" approach to
power:
- "Sociological": The assumption of the need for institutional
maintenance means that power is assumed to be present, to be structured,
to be persistent, and to be role-based. Less direct observation
necessary.
- "Political science": Since institutions can be in flux
and do change from time to time, nothing can be assumed about power
without direct observation of its exercise; power is assumed to
be individual-based.
Hunter's work is at the local level only, but if there isn't democracy at
the face-to-face level, how could there be at the national level?
Pp.2-3 provide a rather vague definition: “Power” ... describe[s]
the acts of men going about the business of moving other men to act in relation
to themselves or in relation to organic or inorganic things.”
The last twelve words seem all-embracing and thus irrelevant.
Three “residual categories” in discussing power:
- historical reference: old theories of power, old examples of power usage
& shifts. Hunter claims these are irrelevant to this study, which
is of today. [Is this accurate / possible?]
- Psychological motivation: Hunter says this may be relevant, but
not used here. [To his peril, really; see his (mis)understanding of
the Black community.]
- Values, morals, ethics: power is divided from ideology. [5/1]
[Is this possible?]
Pp.2 & 263/4: Hunter says it is axiomatic that community life is
organized life. [What about class interests?]Hunter's Method
The "reputational method".
Hunter's "Reputational Method"
- This is a slight misnomer, since many of the informants had direct experience
with the power.
- Hunter identified the powerful by first securing “lists of leaders
occupying positions of prominence in civic organizations, business establishments,
a University bureaucracy, office holders in Village politics, and lists
of persons prominent socially and of wealth status”. He then combined
these into a single List and asked the people on this List to identify
the powerful and/or to nominate other who for inclusion.
- Use interviews and self-selection to narrow down the list and establish
who is really powerful and how their power operates.
The Power Structure Hunter Found
- Of the most powerful 40, most were financial (business, banks) [p.12]
- Of the top 10-15, almost all were in business [p.12]
- Different cliques or crowds, concerned with different issues (but all
were finance-based)
- Common interest in making money and keeping property secure [p.105]
- A distinction between "men of independent decision" /
"top leaders" (who set policy; who are pretty constant across
issues) and the "understructure" of power (who maintain the
system and carry out the upper leaders' decisions; who vary from issue
to issue). [p.91]
- No radical challenge; compliance and complaisance; repression
of deviants, sometimes quite brutally.
Conclusions / Implications
- Elite rule excludes interests (blue collar workers, white collar workers,
professionals, Blacks, women); elites disregard "potential groups"
(and oftentimes, existing, active groups!) Thus:
- against Schumpeter's "process" view of democracy,
Hunter is arguing that local elites are not competitive.
- against Truman's group theory, he is arguing that a plurality
of groups does not mean widely shared power.
- Distinguish maintenance (administration) from change (policy)
- The political system is tied to the economic system; the rich control;
they use various nonpolitical mechanisms to do so, including the withholding
of contributions, withdrawal of credit, and control over jobs; there
are both direct threats and implicit threats; it follows that we have
to distinguish between formal / legal rights and real rights [the USSR
had many protections in their constitution].
- Hunter's answer is to organize more groups. [But we have to ask whether
this will work; or maybe what I mean is that we have to understand more
clearly what gets in the way of them forming in the first place.]
Names
Here's a table to help us keep all the names straight.
| # |
Name |
Business |
|
|
| 1 |
Latham |
|
|
|
| 2 |
Graves |
|
|
|
| 3 |
Dunham |
|
|
|
| 4 |
Mines |
|
|
|
| 5 |
Grover Smith |
merchant |
|
|
| 6 |
Fairly |
|
|
|
| 7 |
Webster |
|
|
|
| 8 |
Worth |
|
|
|
| 9 |
C. Stokes |
|
|
|
| 10 |
Gary Stone |
labor leader |
|
|
| 11 |
Simpson |
|
|
|
| 12 |
Aiken |
|
|
|
| 13 |
Howe |
|
|
|
| 14 |
Delbert |
|
|
|
| 15 |
Farris |
|
|
|
| 16 |
Gloria Stevens |
social leader, niece of Charles Homer |
|
|
| 17 |
Trable |
|
|
|
| 18 |
Herman Schmidt |
banking |
|
|
| 19 |
Moore |
|
|
|
| 20 |
Farmer |
|
|
|
| 21 |
Barner |
|
|
|
| 22 |
Parks |
|
|
|
| 23 |
Gould |
|
|
|
| 24 |
Edward Stokes |
owns Stokes Gear Co. |
|
|
| 25 |
Gordon |
|
|
|
| 26 |
Avery Spear |
CEO of Homer Chemical Co. |
|
|
| 27 |
Hardy |
|
|
|
| 28 |
Mills |
|
|
|
| 29 |
Spade |
|
|
|
| 30 |
Russell Gregory |
labor leader |
|
|
| 31 |
Parker |
|
|
|
| 32 |
Williams |
|
|
|
| 33 |
Black |
|
|
|
| 34 |
Tidwell |
|
|
|
| 35 |
Tarbell |
|
|
|
| 36 |
Moster |
|
|
|
| 37 |
Treat |
|
|
|
| 38 |
Street |
|
|
|
| 39 |
Rake |
|
|
|
| 40 |
Charles Homer [Robert Woodruff, Coca Cola magnate] |
owns Homer Chemical Co. [Coca Cola] |
|
|
Further notes (copied hastily from handwritten notes)
Structure of power:
- Several tiers
- Different functions of the different tiers:
- initiation & veto & consultation
- implementation
- work horses
- Different "crowds", but mutual ties at the top, mutual accommodation
of the top leaders
- Shared background & source of power (mostly commercial & financial;
little governmental)
- Shared interests — making money, in particular
- Shared background & worldview: where they lived, where they
drove, where they worked, limited contact with the rest of the world,
where they grew up, where they went to school
Manifestations of power:
- Control of necessary resources. (Note Clarence Stone's comment
that an "electoral coalition is not a governing coalition".)
- Unity; class consciousness
- Gatekeeping for ideas
- Gatekeeping for individuals to rise
- Punishment for deviance (making someone ineffective; monetary pressure)
Problem for democracy:
- class dominance before public good (as seen most clearly in the area
of race relations & welfare "charity"); all-White;
all-male.
- Conservatism, slowness
Theoretical problems:
- stable over time? new regimes come & go?
- anticipated reaction / "slack power"?
- Is it bad to have a leadership capable of mobilizing resources??
Don't we need one? After all, the Atlanta businessmen get the
job done. On the other hand, this is reminiscent of the (in)famous
comment that "Mussolini may be a scoundrel, but he makes the trains
run on time."
Criticisms of Hunter's Work
- Infinite regress: Hunter argues that the real decisions
are made behind the scenes by a small coterie of leaders that he was
unable to observe directly. How can we/he know that such decision-makers
actually exist (or that the people he names actually operate as he assumes)?
Isn't he just assuming that an elite exists? Doesn't this become sort
of a conspiracy theory? ("We can't see their actions directly because
they operate in secret, and the fact that they operate in secret proves
there's a conspiracy!") Alternatively, perhaps the elite
are themselves controlled by populist forces we know nothing of.
The power elite is always just over the horizon; the method assumes
the existence of power and a power elite, but it doesn't demonstrate
it. Isn't Hunter just assuming his conclusion?
- Reputation vs. reality: How does Hunter know that the
people who are thought to have power (or not) actually have power (or
not)? In other words, is a reputation for power the same thing
as the reality of power? Is status the same as power? How
could we test the equivalence? Having a reputation for power may
not be actual power (though of course it can be a source of it).
Status in a group may not be actual power. How do we know that
the judges / nominators were correct in their understanding either of
what power is and/or who the powerful are? This is not a merely
theoretical question, either. In his 1968 Preface, Hunter says
that he was “naive” about the desirability of integrating
Negroes Afro-Americans African-Americans into the power structure. Why
do you think he said that? Do you agree that his error arose from
simple "naivety", or did it arise from a deeper problem in
his method?
- Elite conflicts: Cliques might come into conflict, i.e.,
power may depend on the issue. Thus while Hunter was essentially arguing
the existence of a class system or class division, others (e.g., pluralists)
argue (as we shall see) that politics is based on temporary and shifting
factions. Hunter argues that there are many leadership cliques.
Did he advance sufficient evidence that these different cliques actually
operated harmoniously? Is it not possible that the different elites
fight with each other, creating a plural system where many interests
were at work? Do the elite have any common interests? If so, how
does Hunter demonstrate it? How do they discern and communicate such
commonality?
- Uncertainties of scale: Even if Hunter has shown that
there are power differences among people in Atlanta, has he shown that
these are significant differences? In other words, is the pyramid
of power steep or shallow? It's no trick to simply pick out the
most powerful people; the question is, do they differ significantly
in their power from the others? Can Hunter's reputational method
answer that question? [Hunter does talk about differences in the
types of power exerted by the different levels he identifies. I don't
know the exact difference between the highest and middle levels, but
it is clear that the highest level can take independent action and set
the agenda, while the lowest level (of the three levels--we aren't counting
the completely passive masses, the fourth level) is a system-maintainer.
So looking at the activities involved, there does seem to be a significant
power differential.]
- Absence of a control group: Isn't Hunter's method guaranteed
to find a power elite in any society? [After all, he asks the question,
"Who are the top ten leaders in the community?"] Let's
think of a theoretically contrasting society. (This is called
doing a Gedanken [thought] experiment.) What would his
method turn up in a society with no elite?
- Lack of generalizability: What are the mechanisms by which
the elite control, according to Hunter? Is there any reason to
suppose that these methods are no longer in use, or are used only in
Atlanta? (See pp.176, 190, 204, 205, 208.)
In your judgment, to what extent do these criticisms negate or otherwise qualify
Hunter's conclusions?
[Ricci argues that while the first two objections above might be theoretically
valid, it's unreasonable to say that people don't understand the power they
are in contact with every day. On the other hand, Ricci is talking
only about manifest power; he doesn't consider that people may be unaware
of who is truly manipulating their consciousness.]
URL: http://www.d.umn.edu/~schilton/3910/Readings/3910.Readings.Hunter.CommunityPowerStructur.html
Author: Stephen
Chilton [email] | Last
Modified: 2003-12-30
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