WPC 23 BD ZTE#|d Panasonic KX-P2123PAKXP212.PRSd\  @B$wX@07-04-93 09:43a  +2ReZRoman 12cpiRoman 10cpiSuper LQ 12cpi ItalicRoman 20cpi Half-HeightRoman 15cpi#d\  @ &X@#X01Í Í01 Í Í X1Í.1 Í Í. Ҋ I. A. 1. a.(1)(a) i) a) 1. a. i.(1)(a)(i) 1) a)X` hp x (#%'0*,.8135@8:> distinguishing between failure arising from the hegemonic power we face and failure arising from the absence of a good idea. In other words, are our failures those of our theories or of our weakness? >> distinguishing between success arising from our superior power and success arising from the force of a good idea. In other words, are our successes those of our theories or of our hegemonic power? >> distinguishing between failure arising from the inadequacies of the practitioners and failure arising from the absence of a good idea. In other words, are our failures those of our theories or of ourselves? The article concludes by assessing the field and advancing three ways in which political development theorists should refocus their attention: on political instead of technological development; on ways of relating (political culture) instead of institutions; and on the force of normative concerns ("good reasons") in development. But before beginning this presentation, several preliminary clarifications and limitations are required. First, although two previous works (Chilton 1988b, 1991) have presented my own conceptualization of political development and have at least sketched a general framework for studying it, the present work is neither a presentation nor a defense of this conceptualization and framework, nor does most of it presume broad agreement with them. The major presumption, discussed and justified in Section1 below, is that political development (and development generally) is differentiated from other change by the normative valence of the change.h)0*0*0*ԌSecond, this programmatic statement appears in the form of demands that development scholars "should" do this or that. "Should" here does not mean "morally enjoined" but rather "required by the considerations advanced herein, against which the reader is at liberty to advance countervailing considerations". Thus it connotes an assertion supported by reason, not a  7 moral diktat. Third, even though this programmatic statement cites no empirical data, I nevertheless claim for it at least two useful purposes. (1)Theoretical considerations can set limits on the forms of concepts. Although empirical researchers may claim the right to define concepts in any way they find useful, a little theoretical consideration will prevent them from adopting a concept because of, say, its operational ease, and thereafter wasting much time because of some inherent flaw. Presumably the subsequent failure of the concept to produce meaningful results would doom it, but perhaps only after years of effort that ten minutes' worth of theoretical attention could have saved. Good theoretical considerations distill the experience of many prior researchers regarding the features that seem to make theories useful or not. (2)Theoretical considerations can point out unconsidered, fruitful possibilities. For example, Einstein developed his theory of relativity after a philosophical scrutiny of the theoretical underpinnings of classical (Newtonian) physics. Discovering that classical physics was predicated on the untestable premise of absolute time and space, Einstein considered the alternative premise-that time and space could only be defined relative to the observer-, and the rest is history. 0*0*0*Ԍ1. We Should Conceptualize "Political Development" As a Concept Distinct from "All Social Change" Researchers commonly treat "political development" as meaning "whatever  7X happens politically" (political development s , plural).s@X 7 ԍFor example, in presenting his "political development model" of how states enter the international system, Maoz (1989:209, n.11) makes the following startling admission: "I am ignoring the nature of regime change. A regime transformation takes place whether a state changes from a democracy to an autocracy or from an autocracy to a democracy." I will pass over the empirical question of whether the direction of change alters a new state's reception within the international community; my point is the blithe indifference of Maoz's "political development model" to the nature of change.s More than two decades ago this apparent inability to give "development" any distinctive content prompted Samuel Huntington (1971) to recommend that we abandon "development" and study "change" instead. This suggestion is still seductive, having two appeals: it corresponds to the actual practice of development researchers, and it promises to eliminate our problems with normative issues. Unfortunately, one cannot study social change without coming to grips with the normative issues implicit in the term, "political development". This assertion is not the commonplace confession that researchers' normative positions affect their selection of research topics and their interpretation of their findings. It is, rather, an assertion of the necessity for social  7 science to take into account the power of normative beliefs that arises from  7 good reasons for holding these beliefs (as opposed to, for example, the power of such beliefs that arises from the psychological needs they serve). Social scientists need to take these moral considerations into account, because people operate on the basis of them-potentially at any time, and certainly some of the time. A comprehensive socialscientific theory of change should account for such behavior, meaning that it should include an account of moral reasoning. Furthermore, this account should itself be normatively grounded (i.e., it cannot be a solely empirical account of moral choices; it should have normative validity, not just empirical accuracy), because any solely empirical account can be undercut by its subjects asking the "open question",  7 "But should we behave in this way?" Unless the account is itself normatively  7V grounded, its subjects will slide out from under its empirical predictions.V 7 ԍThis argument appears more fully in Chilton (1988a), reprinted and clarified in Chilton(1991:2739). I believe that an implicit recognition of these points has caused development theorists so far to reject Huntington's suggestion, even if our conceptualization of political development remains unfocused and our search  7v for normative grounding remains contentious. Political development has dynamics that include human devotion; other change does not. A merely linguistic shift to "change" will not alter that difference in dynamics between development and other change. Despite our reluctance to plunge into the thickets of normative discourse, social scientists' implicit recognition( 0*0*0* of this has resulted in our finding ourselves unwilling to walk away from the  7 idea of "development".z 7  ԍA partial exception to this is the "basic needs" approach to political development (e.g., Spalding 1990 among many others), which takes the satisfaction of basic needs as its criterion of development. However, this approach is incomplete: it lacks a systematic normative defense of this  7@ criterionfor example, is satisfaction of basic needs really the only criterion of development?--, and it lacks a translation of this criterion into development practice.,!H  7b ԍI wish to address some hortatory remarks to my colleagues in political science. Normative issues may be a source of difficulty and embarrassment, but our entanglement in them is also the source of political science's distinctive strength among the social sciences. Other social sciences may have a normative foundation (and even then, many ignore it); only political science attends to both normative theory and empirical observation; only political science has retained an active subfield of inquiry into normative issues. And because normative understandings do affect how people behave toward each other, and because normative discourse is to some degree independent of the material conditions of society, we should cherish and fight to preserve this dual nature of our discipline. Within political science, the subfield of political development best represents this duality, so political development specialists have a special duty to preserve and cultivate it. Unfortunately, political science has not yet connected normative theory and empirical observation in any systematic way. Because normative arguments affect social dynamics, we cannot understand the latter apart from the former, and yet the myth and practice of the factvalue separation remains.! 2. Our Conceptualizations of Political Development Should Satisfy Five "Fundamental Theoretical Requirements"  7 Chapter2 of Defining Political Development (Chilton1988b; henceforth DPD) argues that conceptualizations of political development should satisfy five "fundamental theoretical requirements" (FTRs). These FTRs are justified at  7B length in Chapter3 of Grounding Political Development (Chilton 1991;  7  henceforth GPD); other, proposed FTRs are considered in Chapter4. Briefly, the five FTRs are as follows: * Exact specification: Conceptualizations should distinguish development itself from its causes, consequences, and correlates; this is a basic requirement of any scientific theory. Further, to reply to Marsh (199192), any attempt to define development as the unarticulated aggregation of constituent parts (e.g., Pye's "development syndrome") assumes that there is no overall structure integrating these parts; the theorist needs to defend this assumption to defend against the criticism that h/her definition ignores the interrelationships of these parts. (See Miller1987.) Theorists may0*0*0* certainly contend that development is no more than the sum of its parts, but  7 that claim requires a direct argument; it can't be assumed apriori. 7  ԍThere is also the issue of how, without a prior, overall definition, we can know that the list of constituent parts is complete. * The locus of development: Conceptualizations of development should specify what it is, exactly, that develops in development, i.e., the unit of analysis. Without further specification, units of analysis like "society" or "politics" are too amorphous, so that development becomes merely a change in ... in ... well, in something. * The micromacro connection: Development cannot be conceptualized as a  7B change in either individuals or institutions alone. B  7 ԍDPD:2934 and GPD:2627 present an argument for this assertion. Briefly, this argument shows that a definition of development in terms of either individual characteristics alone or macro characteristics alone is unsatisfactory. Conceptualizations consequently should specify how the changes at both levels are related to each other, either by defining conceptualization as a change in some third level-the approach taken in DPD-or by building the relationship between the two  7b levels into the conceptualization.fb  7 ԍMy formulation here has benefitted from comments by Michael Foley.f * Recognition of development: Conceptualizations of development should allow us to recognize development when it occurs, either directly, by specifying the stages of development, or indirectly, by stating criteria for recognizing one social configuration as more developed than its predecessor. Without the ability to recognize the occurrence of development, we cannot test any related theory of development. * Normative grounding: Conceptualizations should explain why each developmental level is normatively superior to that preceding it and should  7j present and defend the moral philosophy employed. Pace Huntington (1971), and as I argued above, political development is a distinct, distinctive subset of all social change, namely, those changes that yield a normatively superior  7 situation.< 7 ԍSee also Chilton (1994).< The necessity of normative grounding does not mean it will be easy to achieve, of course. T( 0*0*0*Ԍ3. Our Conceptualizations Should Apply Not Just to the Third World But Also to PostIndustrial Societies Although political development theories usually focus on challenges facing the Third World, a complete theory of political development should speak to development beyond whatever current societies are taken as the peak of development. There are three theoretical reasons for this. First, despite the current free market/ democracy triumphalism and its "end of history"  7x claims, we cannot simply assume that postindustrial society is the most developed possible. We certainly have the right to attempt to justify this claim, but we should not disguise it through the limited scope of our theories. Second, any theory benefits from application to as broad a scope of cases as possible; political development theory is no exception. To be sure, a researcher studying (say) the Ugandan military's role in politics might see no immediate need for a general conceptualization of political development, with particular reference to future development of postindustrial nations. Still, even such specific studies will ultimately benefit from being situated within a coherent conceptualization of development, and that conceptualization will be most coherent when it deliberately considers and encompasses the broadest  7 range of societies.F `  72 ԍAnalogously, we could study water tension empirically without benefit of any general theory, but our insights into water tension and many other physical systems will be much more profound when they are grounded in a comprehensive molecular theory. With Faust, we seek "what holds the world together at its inmost point." In testing itself against the broadest range of societies, political development theory should also consider and encompass small, isolated, and/or primitive societies, e.g., the Tasaday. The study of such societies is often relegated to political anthropologists, conveying the implicit message that studies of these societies could not bear on "real" development theory. But it seems to me that the more unusual the society, the more valuable for testing our theories.F Third, a detached analysis of our own development intuitions may protect us from social science's previous, lamentable ethnocentric selfsatisfaction. While we inheritors of Western civilization have much to be proud of in our cultural heritage, with its subtle solutions to fundamental problems of social conflict, and while we can certainly offer these solutions to societies encountering similar problems, we will do so with clearer eyes if we don't  7R imagine we are perfect. R  7 ԍI am attempting here to thread a path between "postmodern" theorists, on the one hand, and the modernday inheritors of the "White Man's Burden", on the other. Postmodern theorists damn every social construct as inherently corrupted with domination, but they are unable or unwilling to distinguish the better from the worse and are thus unable to chart a path away from what they condemn. I accept their contention of inherent corruption, but without positive normative grounding, their argument undercuts itself and ultimately silences them. On the other hand, we should be long past any selfsatisfied assumption of our own total superiority. It is this dilemma that forces us into the creation of a critical theory, a theory that simultaneously seeks to invent both better ways of relating and( 0*0*0* the normative grounds therefor and yet retains a continued critical examination of how these are corrupted by the current configuration of hegemonic power. In order to get anywhere right, we have to give up our fear of being wrong and, while retaining our critical abilities, uncompromisingly resist any trashing of ourselves or others for our inevitable failures.Rx 0*0*0*Ԍ4. Our Conceptualizations Should Distinguish Political Development from Technological Development and from Certain Aspects of Economic and Social Development It may seem obvious that political development researchers should study political development. Unfortunately, most do not, even if we construe "the  7 political" broadly as "the ways people relate to one another". x 7 ԍThis is the definition of "the political" employed in DPD and GPD. The statement is even more true if we narrowly construe "the political" as the institutions of the State and individual behavior with reference to them. Marsh (199192) criticizes DPD for subsuming "the economic" and "the social" under "the political". But I do not claim that we can never distinguish a specifically political domain from other social domains; I claim merely that our conceptual distinctions among different domains have to flow from the nature of society itself ("from true differences in their object of study" [DPD:5]) rather than from a priori assertions. Analogously, work in moral development has to distinguish among different domains of moral issues on the basis of whether people's actual reasoning employs those distinctions. In addition, any simple division between "the political" as commonly understood and other aspects of society is called into question by several streams of thought. Marxists and critical theorists argue that the division between the economic and political domains is really only an ideological disguise of a power relationship supported by the State. Feminists argue that the division between the social and the political is only an ideological disguise of the domination of women. ("The personal is political.") I find these criticisms persuasive; in any case, it is only common sense to avoid rushing into apriori distinctions that lead one into such philosophical problems as these. Finally, as the rest of this section implies, socalled "political  7  development projects" suffer not from a confusion between the political, the economic, and the social but instead from a confusion between the political broadly construed-i.e., any of these-and the nonpolitical. Marsh takes DPD to task for failing to make fine distinctions when the field as a whole often fails to make even this gross distinction. Far from focussing on political development, we have become preoccupied with "development" projects that are either not development or not political (again, even construing "the political" broadly). First, some theories and projects concern not how people relate to each other but instead how they relate to the physical world. The socalled "Green Revolution"-the change of agricultural methods to the use of new seeds, etc.-is such a project, as are many health projects, e.g., water purificationXZ 0*0*0*  7 projects. Such projects may be desirable,q  7X ԍBut not automatically desirable. Lappe & Collins (1986) criticize the Green Revolution both for its environmental damage and for its exacerbation of world hunger. We are also recognizing that the provision of wells for livestock creates its own problems as hitherto nomadic herds come to overgraze the area around the water points.q but they are more properly called technological than political development. In Marxian language, we have concentrated on the forces of production instead of the relations of  7X production. Even if these changes affect how people relate to each other, they are not undertaken with much consciousness of their political effects. If we are to study political development, and especially if we are to foster  7 it, we need to study and conduct political development projects. Second, some projects affect not how people relate to each other but rather their individual characteristics. Examples include literacy projects generally and the efforts of McClelland and Winter (1969) to raise business owners' "need for Achievement". Projects oriented toward changing individuals may be desirable and may also change how these individuals relate to one another, but they are more properly termed individual than political development. For example, people experiencing a high "need for Achievement" (McClelland 1976) may cooperate and compete in new ways, but McClelland's focus is the individual. Literacy projects make possible whole other forms of connection, e.g., newspapers and letterwriting, but the primary focus is the individual's skill. However, literacy projects in Friere's (1970) tradition are concerned with community building and political action. (Foley 1992 presents an example.) Third, some projects are designed not for development but rather to fit a society into the international capitalist system without regard for whether the change is development or not. Such projects may base their activities on an implicit claim that (say) the integration of a given country into the international market economy is development, but this claim remains implicit and/or unexamined. Klitgaard's work in Equatorial Guinea (Klitgaard 1990), despite its other virtues, is predicated on this claim. 5. Our Theories of Political Development Should Study the Dynamics of Development, Not Just the Static Circumstances of Its Occurrence Many studies of political development remain content with looking at the current circumstances of developing societies. This is fine as far as it goes; our theories of development can only benefit from a detailed knowledge of the circumstances in which development occurs. However, such empirical study cannot in the final analysis help us understand the dynamics of development. 6. Our Theories of the Dynamics of Political Development Should Be Clear and Specific Enough to Be Testable Testability is a standard criterion of science. I could let it go at that, but I do want to note that my own examination of recent works on politicalD x 0*0*0*  7 development finds virtually no testable research of the trajectory of  7 development.  7" ԍThere are, of course, numerous testable studies of various aspects of developing countries. To take an example at random, many studies examine the nature and incidence of informal transactions in developing countries. Such  7z studies may bear on development, so that development researchers may ultimately find them useful, but they are not studies of development itself. Some studies explore broad classes of forces affecting  7 development, z 7 ԍForces held to affect development include Kondratieff long waves, the state of the world capitalist system, the military and its internal ideology, bargaining advantages of labor unions visavis owners, etc. etc.-the list is endless. but these explorations, however insightful and thoughtprovoking, do not support clear, falsifiable hypotheses about political  7$ development.4@$b  7 ԍOf course no theory really generates such clear hypotheses that one unexpected result will falsify it. In Lakatos's (1970) language, every theory's "hard core" is protected by a "protective belt". (At a minimum, every empirical "falsification" must overcome the objection that the data were not gathered properly.) Still, there are degrees of protection. Some "theories" are so insulated from the real world as to be in practice unfalsifiable; some theories do ultimately permit correction by exposure to empirical results.4 Their formulations usually assert only inexplicit hypotheses of the form, "Factor XX is involved in development." Even if true, such hypotheses don't tell us much about the specific mechanisms and trajectory of development as a whole. 7. Our Theories Should Specify-Even If Only Implicitly-Means of Stimulating Political Development through Conscious Action [Praxis]  7  Singlespace the epigramThe philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point  7f is to change it (Marx 1985:123). Any theory of political development that is based on an adequate conceptualization of political development should have, at least latently, a praxis component. Such a theory (and its conceptual foundations) should show how people can act for development in a given situation. This requirement of a praxis component arises from the requirement that a conceptualization of development be normatively grounded-recall the last FTR above-and the understanding of "normative" that underlies this. Development means the movement of a culture to a normatively superior state. The following argument asserts that the nature of normative grounding-the means by which we establish that one way of relating is better than another-has a praxis component. We first examine the nature of normative grounding. How are we able to tell in general that one way of relating is normatively superior to another? For j0*0*0*  7 the present, I will assume that a sufficient answer 7X ԍIn fact, this answer is insufficient, but a full discussion would interrupt the narrative flow too much. AppendixII presents a fuller description of normative grounding. However, this fuller description does not invalidate the argument given here. A more direct answer is provided by Habermas's "discourse ethics", which demands normative grounding of moral principles on the basis of practical discourse among all persons affected by the principle under discussion (Habermas 1990b). But even though I am personally persuaded by Habermas's position, he has not yet provided a complete argument. is provided by the neoKantian (formalist) criteria of moral judgments: universalizability,  7 reversibility, prescriptivity, primacy, consistency, and impersonality.T 7 ԍSee Hare (1952, 1963) for this "formalist" approach to moral reasoning. Here are brief definitions of these criteria: ,,>> Universalizability: The principle for resolving a moral dispute can be applied to all situations; one could will that all people use it. (This is one formulation of Kant's categorical imperative.)(# ,,>> Reversibility: One could will that the principle be applied if the situation were reversed, that is, if one occupied another position.(# ,,>> Prescriptivity: The principle of judgment says what one ought to do.(# ,,>> Primacy: Moral judgments take precedence over other modes of judgment (e.g., judgments of aesthetic beauty, psychological comfort, individual interest, prudence, technical accuracy). Thus the moral principle barring murder preempts any aesthetic judgment of the blood's beauty against the white tile floor.(# ,,>> Consistency: The principles of judgment must not conflict with one another, or secondorder principles must exist to resolve such conflicts.(# ,,>> Impersonality: The principles of judgment should be capable of statement without reference to particular individuals.T A moral philosophy or set of moral principles is philosophically adequate to the extent it satisfies these criteria. We now have to delve a little deeper into the nature of development, bringing some new concepts to bear. A culture is any group of people sharing a publicly common way of relating, that is, a way of relating that people in the culture all know ("commonness") and, in the absence of specific renegotiation,  7 actually employ as the basis of interaction ("publicness").p 7 ԍThis conceptualization of political culture is presented in Chapter2 of DPD and justified at length in Chapter6 of GPD. "Publicness" does not here carry the connotation that people have to speak openly about this. In some cases (e.g., where bribery is widespread), the actual way of relating may be perfectly understood but never spoken of. "Commonness" here means frequent or shared, with no connotation of plebeian or low. A way of relating constitutes a moral position, since it states how conflicts-moral dilemmas-are to be resolved. A member of a culture is not required to support its way of relating, only to acquiesce in it, that is, follow its dictates regardless of h/her personal opinions. If s/he does not acquiesce, then s/he is not a member of the culture, and interactions with h/her have to be resolved through either negotiation or "strategic" action. So when we say that a culture's way of relating represents a moral position, we do not mean 0*0*0* that any specific member of the culture necessarily believes in that position-just that s/he acts on it. This does not dismiss people's private beliefs; it just says that in order to identify political development, we should recognize how cultures embody moral judgments. Moral dilemmas occur for the culture when the culture's solution to a conflict is not universalizable and reversible, that is, when different members of the culture use similar reasoning but arrive at different resolutions. This rather abstract statement can be made concrete by the example of the English Civil War-the 17th century struggle between Parliament and the Monarch. Although both sides used adventitious arguments, at root they both saw the need for regulating their society by common reference to an overarching moral system. (Let's say they did, anyway.) As Hobbes saw, however, the problem was that they could not agree on which authority to refer to. Political development occurs when a culture (the "locus" of development) resolves a moral dilemma by adopting a new way of relating. To return to the English Civil War example, Hobbes offered one unsatisfactory resolution: whoever could enforce h/her dictates had the right to rule. (This vaguely circular argument was not welcomed by its beneficiary, Charles II, who held that his right to rule came from God, not from his strong right arm.) The conflict was really resolved only with the Glorious Revolution, whose principles were crystallized by John Locke. The resolution, to us familiar and obvious, was to remove the conflict to a Parliament representative of the conflicting interests while preserving rights that were outside the legitimate scope of government. Since then, political theorists have deepened our understanding of the range of interests, the nature of fair representation, and the determination of what rights lie outside government's legitimate interests, but these great basic principles were first established then. This resolution makes the Glorious Revolution an example of political development: it was the change of a culture from a way of relating unable to settle a moral conflict (universalizably and reversibly, at any rate) to a way of relating that did. It is important to note that the conflict was resolved, not just ended. The resolution did not settle the conflict by a Hobbesian  7 suppression of one party by the other; instead, the resolution integrated the conflicting perspectives under a formally fair system of rule and  7 simultaneously differentiated the legitimate interests of each side from its illegitimate (because nonreversible) claims to universal dominance. This integration and differentiation of perspectives is characteristic of political development at all levels. For development to occur, therefore, the culture must face some problem that the existing way of relating cannot resolve. Development depends on the breakdown of the existing way of relating due to conflicts arising from its structural inadequacy. If no such conflicts arise, there is no necessity for a cognitive shift and thus no grounds for saying that people should become (e.g.) liberal democrats. Kohlberg found that smallscale, nonliterate societies tend to reason at levels no higher than Stage3, presumably because moral dilemmas requiring higherstage reasoning-that is, not solvable by facetoface interactions in the context of ongoing personal relationships-do not arise. We cannot conceptualize development in a vacuum. It is characteristic of the theorypraxis dialectic that in the absence of any structural conflict, political development could neither be created nor defined. If people experience no difficulty in relating to one another, what possible meaning could "political development" have for them? What "injustice", defined only hypothetically, would lead them to adopt some new,( 0*0*0* more complex way of relating? And if means could be found to make them resolve this hypothetical problem, would not those means themselves be illegitimate, just as surgery in the absence of disease is only mutilation?X It may be worth noting that this conflictcentered perspective reflects Jean Piaget's interactionist position regarding knowledge. Even though Piaget (and such Piagetians as Lawrence Kohlberg) found that people acquire the cognitive structures in an invariant sequence, he rejected the idea that such a sequence was either wiredin or manifest in external reality. Instead, he claimed that development occurred as the organism and the environment interacted, with the organism's structures adapting in the face of conflict to create an increasing equilibration with the environment.X The conceptualization of political development presented in DPD is consistent with this position (i.e., that development has no meaning in the absence of conflict), but I did not really appreciate its importance until GPD. I am not claiming that development is an inevitable result of conflict.  7x Development resolves moral dilemmas, but of course there are a variety of  7B other ways to solve them: through "strategic" instead of "communicative action", as Habermas would phrase it. Killing one's opponents, exiling them, buying them off, hindering their communications and organization, fooling them into some sort of false consciousness, adopting a merely symbolic solution-these "solve" conflicts. However, these solutions are not development, since they are not universalizable or reversible; one would not advocate having them practiced by one's opponents on oneself. But even if development is not the inevitable result of conflict, the structural ambiguities of the existing culture are very likely to emerge repeatedly until a developmental shift ends them. To continue with the example of the English Civil War, the conflict between Protestant and Catholic power centers flared up after every temporary solution: HenryVIII and ElizabethI oppressed the Catholics; JamesI attempted to restore the Catholics' dominance; the Roundheads rebelled, defeating the Cavaliers and beheading CharlesI; and the Roundheads lost favor after Cromwell's death and gave way to the Catholic kings CharlesII and JamesII. The structural problem, of how people with different religions and different interests were to get along together, remained until its resolution in the Glorious Revolution. A theory of political development, therefore, anticipates the following situation: a culture is experiencing a widespread conflict for which its way of relating provides no universalizable or reversible solution; political development will occur if the conflicting perspectives can both be subsumed under a new way of relating. This is where the possibility for praxis enters. Anyone can act for development who can do two things: (1)clearly identify any widespread conflicting perspectives and (2)offer a new way of relating that resolves them (without creating other, worse problems). Note that this is a genuine strategy with some political strength. It addresses a real conflict with a real solution, and it derives strength from people's desire for universalistic, reversible solutions. A "resolution" in this context need not mean a compromise; a resolution simply means a framework or perspective within which the legitimate claims of both parties are acknowledged. A simple example of the distinction between resolution and compromise: if one child demands to divide the last cupcake evenly while his younger brother demands the whole cupcake, neither having any special claim to it, the resolution of splitting the cupcake will not be a compromise, but it will be fair. This example also shows that resolutions can be fair even if one party does not understand why. This leads us into the thickets of paternalism, of course, and so requires caution and continued dialogue, but the basic principle still holds. The possibility of paternalism does not relieve us from the necessity of making moral judgments. Simply having this program does not guarantee success, of course. There are many difficulties with establishing a developmental solution. These difficulties fall into two categories: difficulties of cognitive development,( 0*0*0* and difficulties of establishing a new way of relating as publicly common (DPD, Chapter5). Some programs will address these difficulties with greater creativity than others. However, the issue here is not automatic success but simply the basic reasonability of the two core elements given above. The claim made at the beginning of this section was simply that a developmental theory should have a practical component, even if only implicitly. The argument is that since-if it is to be normatively grounded-a conceptualization of development should take into account the way people prefer one way of relating to another, the twopart, practical program outlined above will always exist. 8. Our Exploratory Studies of Political Development Should Be Followed by Confirmatory Testing of the Theories They Generate To the extent that we have theories of development, they tend to be retrospectivehistorical in nature, created in response to some society's experience. We find some society that seems to have developed or to be developing, look closely at its experience, and construct an abstract representation of the twists and turns of this experiencethat is, a development theory. Whatever the value of this procedure for generating theories of development, we cannot consider a theory tested until it is applied to cases beyond those that generated it. Such testing is seen in the work of David McClelland (1976), who tests his previously created theories of the "need for Achievement" by examining many different societies. Everett Hagen (1962) similarly studies many cultures to establish the role of "withdrawal of status respect" in economic development. Joel Aronoff tests Maslow's theories of the hierarchy of needs by examining two cultures on St.Kitts (1967) and follows up this study by examining the cultural consequences of later psychological changes (1970). Unfortunately, such careful theorization and conscientious confirmatory testing remain rare. 9. Our Theories Should Be Tested in Practice If political development involves a cultural solution to real conflicts faced by real people, then political development theory is in the business of resolving-or at least finding ways to resolve-these conflicts. It follows  7X that to test our theories we need to demonstrate in practice that our proposed resolutions indeed resolve the conflicts. Let us suppose, for example, that our theory states that the development of a society will move it from its current undemocratic state to a democratic one. This movement should then be attractive to the members of a culture as a way of solving the conflicts they are experiencing. Their acceptance or rejection of this option will therefore bear on the validity or invalidity of our theory.  0*0*0*Ԍ 10. Tests of Development Theories Need to Overcome Several Logical Difficulties in Interpreting the Success or Failure of Their Praxis As footnote 15 indicated earlier, tests of theories are rarely clearcut, and for theories of political development, Lakatos's "protective belt" is especially thick. The interpretation of any development program's results is confounded by the enormous social and intellectual complexity of political development. This section highlights three of the many logical difficulties that need to be overcome before the empirical outcome of a political development program can be brought to bear on the validity of its underlying  7 theory.X 7` ԍNote that the "logical difficulties" described below are of both positive and negative results. This is in keeping with the position that no single test can either immediately falsify or confirm a theory.  a. Do Our Failures Stem from the Weakness of Our Theories or the Strength of Opposing Forces? Political development is difficult to achieve, for several reasons (DPD:Chapter5). First, individuals' development of moral reasoning is difficult in the best of circumstances. Second, beyond the difficulties of individual development, the problem is compounded for cultures by the  7H necessity of having such development widely disseminated.XH  7 ԍOne need not accept the connection between political development and moral reasoning in order to recognize the difficulty of implementing change on a culturewide scale. Third, even if such development were widely disseminated, there remains the problem of establishing it as the mutually acknowledged focus of orientation. Finally, there may be forces at work actively opposing any change in the culture. After all, as noted in an earlier section, cultural conflicts can be settled in ways other than a cognitive differentiation and restructuring that reconciles the conflicting perspectives-i.e., in ways other than development Failure of a development program can then be explained in two separate ways: as a failure of the underlying theory, certainly, but also as a simple failure to overcome the many obstacles holding the existing culture in place. As long as we cannot discount the second explanation, we are not forced to accept the  7 first-that our theory has failed. 7x ԍThis relies on an understanding of normative force as only one of several forces at work. In an idealist's world, simply advancing a better moral position would create development, and so any refusal to adopt a development program would mean that its moral position was flawed. Where other forces are at work, however, this automatic connection is broken. Consider, for example, what meaning we can draw from the "failure of communism" in the former Soviet bloc countries. The overwhelming, ongoing rejection of these countries' political systems by their citizens is being taken as falsifying the Marxian vision of political development. However, there are several alternative explanations of this rejection. The Marxian vision may be more than one cognitivedevelopmental stage above that of most members of those cultures; since people cannot comprehend reasoning more thanX 0*0*0*  7 one stage above their own, 7X ԍFor a discussion of this phenomenon and references to the supporting research, see Chapter5 of DPD. the straightforward attempt to impose this  7 vision could not succeed, regardless of its ultimate virtue.  7x ԍIndeed, the attempt to impose a way of relating constituted its own way of relating, so that the Bolshevik vision was undercut by the very glorification of it. The vision became an excuse for any measures being used to impose it. The United States pursued a similar course in South Vietnam, where the vision of "democracy" became an excuse for supporting dictators to impose it. My belief is that the great mass of people in the former U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe had a Stage3 political culture, one based on local, personal ties, with the elite subculture being no higher than Stage4 authoritarian (what Almond & Verba would call the subject orientation), while I take the Marxian vision as based on Stage6 reasoning. (See Chapters3 & 4 of DPD for a discussion of the various stages of moral reasoning and their associated cultures.) If the above assessment of the political culture of the former U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe is accurate, their current ethnic conflicts can be seen as the straightforward consequence of Stage3's structural inability to find a rational basis for dealing with people outside one's immediate community. Another explanation attributes its failure to the opposition of the capitalist powers, through invasion and the threat of invasion, embargoes and other economic warfare, and a wellfinanced campaign of anticommunist propaganda. Until these alternative explanations are assessed and rejected, we cannot conclude that communism has failed. A better article would here specify how to assess such alternative explanations, but I must leave this question unsolved. It is, in fact, a deep question, which generations of political scientists have been unable to settle in, for example, their disputes over whether the United States is dominated by  7 a ruling elite (or some other hegemonic formation).Xj 7 ԍSee Gaventa (1982) for an excellent treatment of this issue. Ricci (1971) provides an excellent, but now dated, overview of the elitistpluralist debate. Among many philosophical problems, such disputes raise the especially difficult issue of false consciousness: can it be meaningfully defined at all, and even if it exists conceptually, can it be studied without hurling us into the thickets of normative debate? My answers-yes and no, respectively-must await another work. My point here is simply that the whole area is not easily settled.  b. Do Our Successes Stem from the Strength of Our Theory or of Our Hegemonic Power? Development practice-at least the practice usually studied by "political development specialists"-is conducted almost exclusively in societies weaker than our own: weaker in economic strength, in military might, in international political influence, in cultural prestige, and in cultural "reach". Practical attempts to foster political development are inevitably undertaken in the context of these power differentials. As a result, the practical success of a political development theory is confounded with extradevelopmental forces. We don't know whether the target of our development0*0*0* suggestions adopts them because the suggestions are useful or because s/he is afraid of our military power, wants our economic aid, or thinks that Western ways must be good. The example I will point to here is the reverse of that above: the "success" of the free market/ capitalist/ democratic way of relating. It is unclear whether the widespread movement toward this way of relating arises from its inherent virtue or from the capitalist world's vigorously pushing it at a time  7x of economic difficulty and political upheaval in the former Soviet bloc.x 7 ԍThe standard mechanism of this "pushing" is making aid and trade dependent on political concessions. The International Monetary Fund and the World Bank make their assistance conditional on economic "reform", meaning compliance with capitalist/ free market practice. Countries requiring such assistance complain that this practice violates their sovereignty, but of course such complaints receive short shrift. Who pays the piper calls the tune. This issue is the reverse of the previous one. Above, I argued that the failure of our programs does not necessarily falsify our theory, because this failure may not arise from the imperfections of our theory but instead from the strength of some opposition. Here I argue that the success of our programs does not necessarily support our theory, because this success may not arise from the virtues of our theory but instead from our ability to impose ways of relating.  c. Are Our Failures Those of Our Theories or of Ourselves? To live abroad was to create a mythology about yourself, more than a new personality-a liberating fantasy you could believe in, a new world (Theroux 1976:237). Development practice can attract people who, consciously or unconsciously, look to another society to provide rewards denied them in their own society. I would point to the recurring Western fantasy of the white explorer greeted as a god or king by the darkskinned tribe he encounters. We see him later, lying on his hammock, drinking ginandtonics served by obedient youths, and  7 being fanned by dusky maidens. X@ 7X ԍAs the old joke has it, for example: "Why was Robinson Crusoe an excellent worker? Because he had everything done by Friday." Mannoni (1990) discusses at length the effect of colonialism on the colonizer as well as the colonized.  Such images are certainly not held by all development agents, but to the extent that they are held, they get in the way of development. In order to understand the real conflicts in the culture that  7 are the essential basis for development, a development agent has to make human connections with a people and their culture; megalomaniacal and erotic  7r fantasies are a poor foundation for such connections." r`  7b" ԍBy contrast, and despite its offensive title, Tropical Gangsters (Klitgaard 1990) portrays development work grounded both in the author's close attention to the real problems of Equatorial Guinea and in his human connection with the Equatoguineans." In order to assess any empirical test of their development theory, researchers have to:H 0*0*0* distinguish the failure of the theory from the psychological difficulties of  7 its agents.x 7  ԍThe problem is not simply megalomania and eros, however. There is also the tendency to overcome one's difficulties by the use of force, where here "force" denotes any means beyond sweet reason. Since development agents' personal and professional rewards are tied to the success of their programs, a development agent facing the failure of h/her program generally has an incentive to give it an extra push, using whichever of the abovelisted resources s/he can command. We can address this problem by doing development work in our own culture. (Here I am speaking to my U.S. and, more generally, Western colleagues.) Doing work in our own culture addresses the concern that development agents' motivations are not strictly those of development. Of course, development  7 programs in our society can fall prey to an attitude of noblesse oblige-a sense that we are bringing culture to the unwashed masses--, but development agents have a greater chance of making human contact with people in their own society than with people in some completely foreign culture. The difference is a matter of degree, not of kind, but it is still there. Such a focus also addresses the concern that our theories be relevant to our own culture. Doing development work in our own culture is the only way to assure that our theorizing is not simply an irrelevant intellectual exercise about foreign lands poorly understood. Finally, doing work in our own culture addresses the concern that our tests' success arise from theoretical virtue, not hegemonic power. Our culture certainly has power differentials that development programs can bring to bear, thus confounding our assessment of a program's success. Still, these differentials are less than those between, say, the United States and Equatorial Guinea.  d. Does the Difficulty of Measurement and Interpretation Invalidate a Conceptualization? The above remarks are surely discouraging, and they may lead analysts to shun conceptualizations of the type discussed here, that is, normatively grounded conceptualizations. If any such conceptualization is so hard to measure, and if the results obtained from it are so difficult to interpret, can the measure itself be valid? Let us examine carefully the relationship between validity and difficulty. Note first that political development is a concept unmeasurable in principle, which would automatically prohibit its use; unmeasurable concepts have no place in science. Whether a society has changed to a normatively superior state is certainly difficult to measure, and the conceptualization of "normatively superior" is fraught with difficulties, but these do not mean that it is unmeasurable in principle. Some analysts hold that normative discourse is in principle unresolvable, pointing to the multiplicity of  7 normative positions in the world.X 7% ԍSome argue that political development is one of Gallie's (1956) "essentially contested concepts", ignoring the restrictive conditions on which Gallie's argument depends. Unfortunately, this position rests on the metaethical assumption that there can be no universal principles underlying normative discourse, a claim that is at the very leastz( 0*0*0* unsubstantiated, even if one refuses to accept the implication of Kohlberg's  7 crosscultural researches that there are universal underlying principles of moral judgment. To move from the empirical observation that people hold different normative stances to the metaethical claim that such stances are of equal normative value or are incapable of discursive resolution-this movement is the "naturalistic fallacy" of deriving ethical claims from empirical  7 facts. 7  ԍThis argument, so central to the claims made in this paper, appears in Kohlberg (1981:Chapter4). So unless better arguments can be lodged against normatively grounded conceptualizations, we are not talking of them being unmeasurable in principle but only of them being difficult to measure. Other things being equal, we naturally prefer conceptualizations that are easy to measure. However, other things are rarely equal, and the presence of human devotion in social dynamics throws us willynilly into the thickets of normative arguments. Of course we could choose to ignore the role of normative commitments, but a social science would be strange indeed that could not distinguish, say, the behavior of the citizenry under a legitimate  7 government from that under an illegitimate government.(  7j ԍIn a similar vein, Piaget was wont to comment that one would teach "1+1=2" in a different way as one would teach "1+1=3". Surely a pedagogy that could see no difference between the two statements would be a strange one. A more political example is given by Friedman (1994:55), who comments that the Gandhian tactics of "This Is Our Land", an organization of Israeli West Bank settlers devoted to resisting the IsraeliPalestinian peace process and retaining the West Bank lands for Israel, are "not popular among the settlers, and the movement has not caught on." A social science that could not understand the difference between Gandhian tactics devoted to, say, ending segregation and those devoted to expelling an indigenous people and that could not understand the relationship of those differences to the ethical bases of the respective movements-such a social science would surely miss something central to social dynamics. The above argument seems sufficient logically, but the reader may still feel depressed at the effort demanded. I advance, therefore, an analogy to give a sense of the future rewards that will follow our present challenges. We are in the situation of the medieval alchemists, who must have been similarly discouraged by the protochemists' demands for exact measurement, purity of materials, reproducibility, and so on; these demands must have appeared to  72 the alchemists as nitpicking and burdensome.S 2 7 ԍThis analogy also appears in Chilton (1991:12).S Nor were the alchemists without their own successes, and the rewards of "chemistry" must have seemed both marginal and uncertain; they had no way of foreseeing the enormous power that the science of chemistry would bring to humanity. And against the alchemists, the protochemists had little: with atomic theory still in the future, with their methods and standards still being worked out, they had logic but not results on their side. We are in the position of the alchemists: lacking a paradigm, having our own successes, comfortable in the rewards our existing knowledge and successes bring us, reluctant to face the terrible difficulties entailed by normative grounding, and unaware of the benefits to be reaped therefrom. So my appeal, as opposed to my argument, is 0*0*0* for us to heed these logical considerations and let them point us to a true social science. A second objection to normatively grounded conceptualizations is that a concept is useless if we cannot interpret the results arising from it. The reply is straightforward and uncompromising: the difficulties of interpretation arise from the difficulties of normative grounding. If, as claimed, we need to solve the problems of normative grounding, the  7x difficulties of interpretation are simply part of the problems. Difficulty of  7B interpretation is not the same as impossibility of interpretation.  11. Assessment and Recommendations Political development is not yet a field of scientific inquiry. None of the requirements for a scientific theory of political development have been fully  7, met, and most have not been met at all.!,  7 ԍThis ignores my claims for my own work. But even my work claims no more than to have solved the problems raised above in Sections 14. Start with the issues surrounding  7 conceptualization: Almost all writers use "political development" in a manner indistinguishable from "any and all political changes". Even if the changes discussed are indeed development, such writers provide no systematic grounds for identifying them as such. No conceptualization of political development meets all five FTRs; most conceptualizations meet almost none of them. Most conceptualizations have no vision of any development beyond Western, postindustrial society; most political development theorists pay no attention  7n even to the possibility of such development.G"n  7 ԍPark (1984) is a partial exception.G And most conceptualizations of political development fail to focus on ways of relating instead of technological/ economic advancement.  7 Our theorization is in no better shape: To the degree that political development has come to mean "whatever happens", our theories are so diverse as to be noncumulative and so vague in their predictions as to be untestable. Even those theories describing specific influences on the trajectory of social change ignore the distinctive dynamics arising from development's normative ground. And since we have almost no theory of how development occurs, even less have we a development praxis. Given the absence of any clear theory or praxis based on a clear  7 conceptualization, it is no surprise that testing is almost nonexistent. Our observations of development-often very acute-are generally not followed by confirmatory studies, whether replications of the same study or applications to new cases. The lack of praxisoriented theories naturally results in the  7* absence of any practical tests.#* 7j" ԍUsing a program of inspirational readings and workshops, David McClelland and David Winter attempted to stimulate the need for Achievement among business owners and managers in India. In the preface to their description of their efforts (McClelland & Winter 1969), they allude to the problems they experienced due to U.S. funding agencies' discomfort with the project's "moral rearmament" approach to fostering development. It is significant that a government so brazenly interventionist in world affairs suddenly becomes so coy at the explicit mention of normative issues; the reticence attests to the importance to oppressive systems of justifications remaining unexamined. And finally, given these lacunae, we can* #0*0*0* have only hypothetical interest in how our nonexistent tests bear on their nonexistent underlying theories and conceptualizations. The following directions will help us overcome our theoretical difficulties, and here I am speaking primarily to my Western, white, and/or male colleagues: First, we need to focus less on technological/ economic development and more on political development. Our civilization has looked to technology to solve our problems, and this orientation carries over to the field of development. We look at the effects of (e.g.) new water supplies and new cropping methods, but we need to look instead at the mutual understandings and assumptions through which people deal with each other. We are good at technology, but we are relatively inexperienced at thinking about the social context into which these things must fit. Some examples of the conflict between technological solutions and ways of relating: 1) A development agent in Thailand is trying to figure out how to introduce a new gardening system into a culture that assigns women social status according to how their gardens look-judged against traditional standards, naturally. 2)A former student of mine, doing development work in Guinea, tried to collect money in his neighborhood to pay for repairs to the local well pump. Despite their having to walk a long distance for water, the local residents would not make even the nominal contribution asked of them. Their reason?-none was willing to contribute to a cause that would also benefit noncontributors. Banfield (1958) tells a similar story about a local priest's difficulty in getting his Southern Italian parishioners to cooperate to build a local, badlyneeded health clinic. In these studies, the technological advances-new gardening methods, a pump, a better system of health care-foundered on the reefs of culture. We need to foster social development more than technological inventions. The focus on appropriate technology attempts this by looking seriously at how technological solutions fit into an existing culture, but this focus still treats the  7 culture as static. As students of political development we need to go farther; we need to see how people change the way they relate to each other and how to stimulate such change. These theoretical considerations are reinforced by some immediate, practical concerns. Both environmental and economic pressures mean that we are becoming less and less able to solve our social problems by the production of more goods. "Throwing money at the problem" has always been suspect as a solution to conflicts between people; when there is no money to throw, we may at last be forced to turn our attention to the real source of a problem in the culture's failure to develop and maintain legitimate relationships. As Habermas (1979:198199) expresses it, "[If the form of life reflected in such systemconforming rewards as money, free time, and security can no longer be convincingly legitimated,] the 'pursuit of happiness' might one day mean something different-for example, not accumulating material objects of which one disposes privately, but bringing about social relations in which mutuality predominates and satisfaction does not mean the triumph of one over the repressed need of the other." Second, to the extent that we do try to look at changes in political culture, we need to untangle institutional from politicalcultural change. In the United States, at least, the Federalist tradition has been preoccupied with institutional solutions to our problems. We take pride in such inventions as separation of powers, checks and balances, credit unions, the recall petition, and so on. We forget, however, that these institutions are founded on assumptions-not so false assumptions in our culture, either-that citizens(#0*0*0* will recognize their mutual interest in obeying the laws and participating with mutual respect in their making. But this way of relating is not  7 universally honored.$ 7 ԍAnd I will defer until later the important question of whether they should be. Our ways of relating have great merit, and our appreciation of them cannot be dismissed out of hand as ethnocentrism. But it is true that their applicability to other situations needs to be argued case by case. To ignore the host culture's unique traditions and the particularity of its problems- 7 that is ethnocentrism. As a result, our institutional solutions fail when applied elsewhere. These failures are often concealed by a "Potemkin village" facade, to the confusion of all-aid officials, academics, and the hapless  7 objects of our good will.G%B 7 ԍThus our wellintentioned programs to democratize South Vietnam resulted in little more than the South Vietnamese government's development of a public relations industry devoted to convincing its U.S. patrons that the country was indeed democratizing, concealing the reality of widespread corruption, electoral fraud, and many other undemocratic practices. And of course the pressure to accept this pretense also came to subvert U.S. policymakers and -executors, e.g., the U.S. military and State Department personnel. Michael Foley (1992) discusses at some length how the democratic rhetoric of Mexican politics has been contradicted by the actual practice. However, as Foley also shows, this facade of democracy has been used to facilitate the democratic organization of peasant movements.G We need to look at the moral basis of each culture in order to understand what institutions it will support. Third, we need to confront the difficult but crucial problem of normative grounding. Our failure to do so arises from two concerns. (1)We don't want to see moral arguments misused. As Fred Riggs (1981) points out, "development" is a power word, and development theorists are rightly concerned that it can be used-indeed, has long been used!-as an ideological disguise for and justification of Western culture's hegemonic ambitions. Nevertheless, this concern is not solved by a refusal to discuss normative issues. Development is a project worthy of our efforts; our criticism needs to be directed not at political development's normative dimensions but instead at their abuse. Hegemonic control proceeds all the better, the less it is exposed to the critical scrutiny of normative discourse. As Paulo Friere expresses it (quoted in the August 1992 Catholic Worker), "Washing one's hands of the conflict between the powerful and the powerless means to side with the powerful, not to be neutral." (2)Development theorists take seriously the criticisms that have been directed at us for our past mistakes. We take these criticisms so seriously, in fact, that we are reluctant to employ (or even reveal) our normative commitments. This accords well with the postmodern stance of a universal skepticism unable to distinguish the better from the worse. Nevertheless, whatever our past sins, however painful our guilt, and despite our certainty of future failures, both moral and intellectual reasons require that we take up the challenge of normative grounding. These several directions can probably be taken up in many different ways, but  7 one good way is to do practical, political development work in our own  7r cultures. This strategy will not cure all our theoretical problems, but as noted earlier, it does have several virtues. It ensures that our theories are as broadly based as possible, applying not just to the benighted heathen but%0*0*0* also to us, so that our theories gain theoretical strength and we gain a healthy humility. It alleviates our confusion between development and hegemonic control, since our better understanding of our own culture means that we are less likely to be deceived by institutional facades. This  7  strategy also causes us to focus on the real problems in our society-and the difficulty of identifying them. Doing practical work in our own culture may be a chastening experience for us, but it has the virtue of giving us clear answers. APPENDIX I: THE SPECIAL LOGICAL CHARACTER OF SOCIAL SCIENCE For the purposes of this work we need not settle the ongoing dispute over whether social science has the same logical character as natural science. This work only insists that we have logical, defensible standards of conceptualization, theorization, and testing, leaving open the question of whether those standards will be those of the natural sciences. I am convinced, however, that these two sets of standards are different. The testing of natural science theories can occur within what Habermas (1979) calls the "objectivating attitude", where the observer's will is unrelated to the observed's behavior, while the testing of social science theories requires at least some admixture of what he calls the "performative attitude", where the observer's choices and ethical stance are part of what is to be explained. The necessity of development's normative grounding arises from this reflexive character of social science, as I argue above and in GPD. The relationship between the two domains (normativephilosophical inquiry into the nature of morality and empirical study into the facts of development) are dialectically related in the form Habermas (1990a) terms a "reconstructive science". APPENDIX II: ASSESSING THE RELATIVE NORMATIVE SUPERIORITY OF ALTERNATIVE WAYS OF RELATING How are we able to tell in general that one way of relating is normatively superior to another? I listed above several neoKantian criteria that, I asserted, suffice to decide between competing perspectives. However, there is  7" some doubt whether these criteria are indeed sufficient;{&" 7z ԍDick Hudelson (personal communication) asserts that Hegel demonstrated that the criteria of universalizability and reversibility are inadequate, and that this inadequacy has not been overcome by the other criteria I listed. Habermas (1990c) argues that discourse ethics-the direction taken below-is capable of overcoming Hegel's objections.{ in any case, whatever the current strength of any given set of criteria, they may encounter competing perspectives they cannot resolve. So to fully answer the question of normative justification, I turn away from justifying any fixed set of criteria and turn instead to a general process by which we create and refine criteria as we encounter other ways of relating. Basically, what I look to is a interaction among several sources of information: Ego's best thinking about how we recognize normative superiority, this thinking being represented by a set of formal criteria; Ego's intuitions about normative superiority, which appear in contemplation of*#x&0*0*0* specific conflicts; and Alters' similar best thinking (criteria) and intuitions. This approach goes by various names, including dialectics (in the Hegelian and Marxian traditions) and "reflective equilibrium" (Rawls). Lawrence Kohlberg's work on the cognitive development of moral reasoning also employed this approach, playing off empirical studies (i.e., how people's moral reason factually develops) against philosophical formulations of the domain of study (i.e., what exactly the moral domain is that is  7x developing).G'jx 7 ԍLet me put this in concrete terms. Kohlberg studied the moral reasoning of people in several cultures, identified six moral reasoning structures  7` (stages), and found that all (sic) people acquired and employed these various structures in the same sequence. He also showed that these structures differ, each from the previous, by the increasing degree to which they satisfy the criteria listed earlier, with particular reference to the criteria of universalizability and reversibility. So factually, at least, these are the criteria that people seem to use in judging their own reasoning. Does this argument fall to the "naturalistic fallacy", that is, the argument that one cannot derive normative imperatives from facts? A specific objection along these lines, made by Carol Gilligan, was that Kohlberg's (implicit) philosophical definition of "the moral" excluded certain perspectives ("voices")-women's in particular. In a series of works (Kohlberg 1981:Chapter4, Habermas 1983, and Kohlberg 1984:Chapters3 and 4), Kohlberg and Habermas considered the problem of the relationship between empirical studies of moral development and philosophical questions of normative adequacy. They concluded that there was a dialectical interaction between the definition of morality on which Kohlberg's work depended and the results of the empirical work itself. Kohlberg himself revised his conceptualization of the moral domain, eventually asserting that his work involved specifically "justice reasoning", not the whole domain of morality.G While the set of neoKantian criteria listed earlier is useful, neither it nor any revised set need be the ultimate means of judgment. As long as our principles differ with our intuitions, and as long as our principles and intuitions differ from those of others, we will be adding new criteria, refining the old, and coming to new moral intuitions. To ensure that our quest for a complete set of criteria is not doomed from the start, we make the metaethical assumption that all perspectives are ultimately  7 reconcilable.(@  7z ԍRawls (1985) only hopes for criteria that will bring people's moral judgments close enough so that their basic respect for each other will enable them to make any remaining compromises required for them to get along. While such compromise is necessary to achieve Rawls's immediate, practical goal of gaining agreement on principles of justice that can in turn support politicalmoral institutions, it neglects the issue of how we are to overcome our longterm discomfort with compromising our principles. My position is that the search for revised criteria and moral understandings is a profitable one. This assumption may appear to be a large and debatable one, but in fact it is simply the grounds for our willingness to engage in discourse with one another. The alternative assumption, that our perspectives are not reconcilable, makes all communication "strategic" in nature. Neither assumption is really provable, but the one made here has at least the virtue(0*0*0* of leading to more interesting consequences than the alternative, which simply  7 abandons the field of moral discourse.) 7  ԍHabermas (1990b) argues that we cannot live and remain human in a world in which "communicative action oriented toward understanding", i.e., moral discourse, is replaced by "strategic action". This work also follows K.O. Apel's suggestion in arguing that regardless of how we justify a preference for communicative over strategic action, use of the former is an inescapable pragmatic presupposition of argumentation (Habermas 1990b:7). 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Boston: Houghton Mifflin. xx (19xx). xx book. xx: xx. xx (19xx). xx article. xx xx:xxxx. xx (19xx). xx paper. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the xx, xx.()0*0*0*Ԍxx (19xx). xx book chapter. Pp. xx xx of xx, ed. xx. xx: xx. bottom.html APPENDIX: Various stuff, notes, etc. * Call Deborah Paulson, U of Wyoming Geography & Recreation Department, who did a study of sustainable agriculture in Minnesota, re. people who go to other societies to overcome problems they experience in their own. * Look at Bernstein's work on "Praxis, Hermaneutics, and xx" * Bruce Wilshire The Moral Collapse of the Universe Steve Ropp's comments: 194590: American hegemony. If this is normal science, I have to explain why my language is corrrect. "Why are we in times where a normative approach is necessary?"-I must explain this. Try a broadly philosophical journal. Use a "postCold War" orientation; we are changing from normal to abnormal times. Cromwell, etc., indicates nonnormal times; Bosnia etc. could be use to indicate this also. Deductive style of thinking aloows me to play God; nothing wrong with it, but people are working inductively in comparative politics, not deductively. I want to concentrate on the following points: * The distinction between political development and other forms of development. Political development is about how we get along with each other: the "forms of production" instead of the "means of production". * Political development as grounded in moral development, but with the moral problems arising from the real problems of real people. * The consequent need for testing in practice.  12. So, Is "Political Development" Currently Being Used Scientifically? It has long been my sense that the concept of political development currently has no scientific strength, judging "scientific" against the criteria laid out above.[>This is not a novel observation, of course. Riggs (1981) lays bare the origins of the term and claims it has no meaning whatsoever. Huntington (1971) argues that the term is so diffuse that we should abandon it and study "change" instead. While I have argued that these conclusions are premature (Chilton 1988b:Chapter1), the current research in the field continues to justify Riggs's and Huntington's discouragement.<] Even my own work goes no farther than the concerns about conceptualization and theorization. I therefore wanted to assess the current state of the field of political development, to see whether my own intuitive assessment was justified. I accordingly examined xx works in the area against the criteria above; the results are presented in Table1.(#)0*0*0* A sample of studies was obtained through a computer search of the "Wilson database" for the terms "political development" and "political modernization". (The Wilson database combines six indexes: Applied Science and Technology Index, Biological and Agricultural Index, Business Periodicals Index, Humanities Index, Reader's Guide Abstracts, and Social Science Index.) I took only studies having "political development" [or "political modernization"] in their title, descriptors, or abstract, either as one united phrase (e.g., "The Gold Allegations Movement and Political Development in Uganda" [Mujaju 1987]) or otherwise meant as a united phrase (e.g., "Political Culture and Development in a Rentier State: The Case of Kuwait" [Farah 1989]). I also searched the most recent available volume of the following six journals for articles in the general area of political development: Comparative Political Studies, Comparative Politics, Economic Development and Cultural Change, Journal of Developing Areas, Studies in Comparative International Development, and World Politics. The cases are restricted to those I could find in the University of Illinois library in the short time available. Altogether, xx articles were studied. (A future, revised version of this paper will present data for all the works I identified.) The constraints on identifying and obtaining the studies make this sample nonrandom. Any statistical analysis of the results presented in the table would therefore be inappropriate. However, the sample clearly does cover mainstream political development research. TABLE 1: CURRENT USE OF "POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT" ddx !ddx``````x0 :p@  p@  :"CASE (footnotes Rexplain the theory)z"=DOES THE CONCEPTUALIZATION:"3THEORIZATION "RAIF TESTABLE, WHAT TESTING IS DONE?:p@  @  : " SATISFY THE FIVE FUNDAMENTAL THEORETICAL REQUIREMENTS (FTRs) *xPOSTULATED IN CHILTON (1988B, 1991)?"a &APPLY TO c&POST`%INDUSTRIAL `%SOCIETIES?0"o*+DISTINGUISH p+POLITICAL o\+FROM OTHER o*+DEVELOPMENTt-?s"}0ANY THEORY 2OF }0DEVELOPMENT }0PRESENTED? s"V6IF THEORY IS 6PRESENTED: "=ANY <TESTS <MADE? "DIF TESTS ARE MADE, ARE THEY:>@  ,@   >"x"<"e'H"tP-"2 "7IS THE 7THEORY 6TESTABLE?   "L@CONFIRMAATORY @TESTS FA(AS ~@OPPOSED xATO L@EXPLORATFAORY L@RESEARCHxA)? <"REMADE IN DPRACTICE? <"JIF TESTS ARE MADE IN JPRACTICE, DO THEY FALL fJVICTIM TO THE FOLLOWING .KLOGICAL CHALLENGES:8,@   ,@  8 ."0 Locus of  developmen tL",Exact )specificati-onL"7JRecognition ; of 7JdevelopmentL"DMicromacro DconnectionL"Sn Normative Sn groundingL"e'L"tP-L"2 L"8 L  L"A h"F h"JJCONFUSION JOF SUCCESS DKWITH JJHEGEMONY?h"OCONFUSION OOF FAILURE PWITH OWEAKNESS?0,@     <0 Maoz  7 (1989)E"iPolitical development is never defined directly. Reference is made to a "political development model". I infer that Maoz means political development to refer to "the process by which new states are formed" [203]; for older states, "major transformations of their domestic political systems" [203]; "processes of state formation" [203]; "processes of political transformation" [203]. Distinguishes "evolutionary" and "revolutionary" processes of new state formation, but both are part of the political development model. (That is, they may have different consequences, but they are both political development.) Maoz's bibliography provides no citation to any work on political development except insofar as he uses Gurr's (1978:135) distinction "between evolutionary and revolutionary state formation processes" [209]. Maoz explicitly rejects any consideration of normative grounding: "I am ignoring the nature of regime change. A regime transformation takes place whether a state changes from a democracy to an autocracy or from an autocracy to a democracy" [209, n.11].E! N! N! I! N! X! Yes, in that all can changeH" YesH" No H"  H" No theory given to test #  #  # # *    h* Chilton (1988b,  7H% 1991)afThese works conceptualize political development as a change in the culture's "ways of relating" that resolves moral problems arising from structural ambiguities in the existing way of relating. This definition is given content by use of Kohlberg's work on the development of moral reasoning (Kohlberg 1981, 1984; Colby and Kohlberg, 1987).a& E& E& E& E& E& Yes, in that a criterion is presented for recognizing further development) Yes: a specific focus on the development of ways of relating) Yes: Chilton (1988b: Chapter5) ) Yes ) Some earlier work using a similar perspective ) Yes ) No ) ) #)0*0*0*" p #"  7 xx>hxx3p p p p p p p p  p  p  p  p  p p "p   "  7 xxhxx4                     p CODES: N = Addresses this point neither explicitly nor implicitly; I = Addresses this point at best only implicitly; E = Addresses this point explicitly and with no obvious fallacies; X = To the extent that this point is addressed, it is done so incorrectly. FOOTNOTES