Curriculum Vitae for Cognitive Science

James H. Fetzer

Authored Books:

PHILOSOPHY AND COGNITIVE SCIENCE. New York, NY: Paragon House Publishers, 1991. (Paragon Issues in Philosophy) xvii + 170 pp. 2nd edition (revised and expanded), 1996. xx + 191 pp.

Published in Portuguese translation under the title, FILOSOFIA E CIENCIA COGNITIVA. Bauru, SP, Brazil: EDUSC, 2000. 194 pp.

COMPUTERS AND COGNITION: Why Minds are Not Machines. Dordrecht/Boston/London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2001. (Studies in Cognitive Systems, Vol. 25) xix + 323 pp.

Co-Authored Book:

GLOSSARY OF COGNITIVE SCIENCE (co-authored with Charles E. M. Dunlop). New York, NY: Paragon House Publishers, 1993. (Paragon Glossaries for Research, Reading, and Writing) xii +146 pp.

Edited Book:

EPISTEMOLOGY AND COGNITION. Dordrecht/Boston/London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1991. (Studies in Cognitive Systems, Vol. 6) xiii + 301 pp.

Co-Edited Book:

PHILOSOPHY, MIND, AND COGNITIVE INQUIRY. Resources for Understanding Mental Processes (co-edited with David Cole and Terry L. Rankin). Dordrecht/Boston/London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1990. (Studies in Cognitive Systems, Vol. 3) xi -+ 449 pp.

Guest Edited Journal Issues:

Rationality and Objectivity: Philosophical and Psychological Conceptions, Part I, Synthese, Vol. 57, No. 2 (November 1983), pp. 127-266.

Rationality and Objectivity: Philosophical and Psychological Conceptions, Part II, Synthese, Vol. 57, No. 3 (December 1983), pp. 267-442.

Epistemology and Cognition, Part I, Synthese, Vol. 82, No. 2 (February 1990), pp. 175-306.

Epistemology and Cognition, Part II, Synthese, Vol. 82, No. 3 (March 1990), pp. 307-439.

Epistemology and Cognition, Part III, Synthese, Vol. 83, No. 1 (April 1990), pp. 1-177.

Articles and Reviews:

"Signs and Minds: An Introduction to the Theory of Semiotic Systems", in J. Fetzer, ed., Aspects of Artificial Intelligence (Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1988), pp. 133-161.

Reprinted in J. Fetzer, Computers and Cognition: Why Minds are Not Machines (Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2001), pp. 43-71.

"Language and Mentality: Computational, Representational, and Dispositional Conceptions", Behaviorism (Spring 1989), pp. 21-39.

Reprinted in D. Cole, J. Fetzer, and T. Rankin, eds., Philosophy, Mind, and Cognitive Inquiry (Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1990), pp. 377-402.

Reprinted in J. Fetzer, Computers and Cognition: Why Minds are Not Machines (Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2001), pp. 73-98.

"Primitive Concepts: Habits, Conventions, and Laws", in J. Fetzer, D. Shatz, and G. Schlesinger, eds., Definitions and Definability: Philosophical Perspectives (Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1991), pp. 51-68.

Reprinted in J. Fetzer, Computers and Cognition: Why Minds are Not Machines (Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2001), pp. 25-42.

"Connectionism and Cognition: Why Fodor and Pylyshyn are Wrong", in A. Clark and R. Lutz, eds., Connectionism in Context (Heidelberg, FRG: Springer-Verlag, 1992), pp. 37-56.

Reprinted (in Finnish) in E. Marjomaa and T. Vaden, eds., Ihmisen Tiedonkasittely, Symbolien Manipulointi ja Konnektionismi (Tampereen Yliopiston Jaljennepalvelu, 1991), pp. 1-31.

"Goldman has Not Defeated Folk Functionalism", Behavioral and Brain Sciences (March 1993), pp. 42-43.

"The Argument for Mental Models is Unsound", Behavioral and Brain Sciences (June 1993), pp. 347-348.

"Mental Algorithms: Are Minds Computational Systems?", Pragmatics and Cognition 2 (1994), pp. 1-29.

Reprinted in J. Fetzer, Computers and Cognition: Why Minds are Not Machines (Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2001), pp. 101-129.

"Creative Thinking Presupposes the Capacity for Thought", Behavioral and Brain Sciences (September 1994), pp. 539-540.

"What Makes Connectionism Different? Discussion Review: W. Ramsey, S. Stich, and D. Rumelhart, eds., Philosophy and Connectionist Theory", Pragmatics and Cognition 2 (1994), pp. 327-348.

Reprinted in J. Fetzer, Computers and Cognition: Why Minds are Not Machines (Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2001), pp. 131-152.

"Minds and Machines: Behaviorism, Dualism, and Beyond", Stanford Humanities Review 4 (1995), pp. 251-265.

Reprinted in J. Fetzer, Computers and Cognition: Why Minds are Not Machines (Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2001), pp. 3-21.

"Thinking and Computing: Computers as Special Kinds of Signs", Minds and Machines 7 (August 1997), pp. 345-364.

"People are Not Computers: (Most) Thought Processes are Not Computational Procedures", Journal of Experimental and Theoretical Artificial Intelligence 10 (1998), pp. 371-391.

Reprinted in J. Fetzer, Computers and Cognition: Why Minds are Not Machines (Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2001), pp. 153-180.

"Deduction and Mental Models: A Discussion Review of P. N. Johnson-Laird and R. M. J. Byrne, Deduction", Minds and Machines (February 1999), pp. 105-110.

"Mental Models: Reasoning without Rules", Minds and Machines (February 1999), pp. 119-125. Errata, Minds and Machines (August 1999), p. 457.

"Computing is at Best a Special Kind of Thinking", in B. Elevitch, ed., Philosophy of Mind and Philosophy of Psychology, Proceedings of the 20th World Congress of Philosophy, Vol. 6 (2000), pp. 103-113.

"Consciousness and Cognition: Semiotic Conceptions of Bodies and Minds", in Q. Smith and A. Jokic, eds., Aspects of Consciousness (Oxford, UK: The Clarendon Press, 2003), pp. 295-322.