The University of Minnesota Duluth's position on James Fetzer's conspiracy theories.

James Fetzer is a UMD Philosophy Professor Emeritus and conspiracy theorist. He retired from UMD in 2006. His theories are his own and are not endorsed by the University of Minnesota Duluth or the University of Minnesota System.

As faculty emeriti, Fetzer's work is protected by the University of Minnesota Regents Policy on Academic Freedom, which protects creative expression and the ability to speak or write on matters of public interest without institutional discipline or restraint.

Artificial Intelligence

Curriculum Vitae for Artificial Intelligence

James H. Fetzer

Authored Book:

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: Its Scope and Limits. Dordrecht/Boston/London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1990. (Studies in Cognitive Systems, Vol. 4) xviii + 338 pp.

COMPUTERS AND COGNITION: Why Minds are Not Machines. Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2001. (Studies in Cognitive Systems, Vol. 25) xix + 323 pp.

Edited Book:

ASPECTS OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE. Dordrecht/Boston/Lancaster/Tokyo: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1988. (Studies in Cognitive Systems, Vol. 1) xiii + 385 pp.

Co-Edited Book:

PHILOSOPHY, LANGUAGE, AND ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE. Resources for Processing Natural Language (co-edited with Jack Kulas and Terry L. Rankin). Dordrecht/Boston/London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1988. (Studies in Cognitive Systems, Vol. 2) xii + 421 pp.

Articles and Reviews:

"The Frame Problem: Artificial Intelligence Meets David Hume", Expert Systems (1990), pp. 219-232.

Reprinted in K. Ford and P. Hayes, eds., Reasoning Agents in a Dynamic World: The Frame Problem (Greenwich, CN: JAI Press, 1991), pp. 55-69.

"Artificial Intelligence Meets David Hume: A Response to Patrick Hayes", Expert Systems (1990), pp. 239-247.

Reprinted in K. Ford and P. Hayes, eds., Reasoning Agents in a Dynamic World: The Frame Problem (Greenwich, CN: JAI Press, 1991), pp. 77-85.

"The Workshop on Defeasible Reasoning: Comments", SIGART Bulletin (January 1991), pp. 5-7, pp. 16-17, p. 21, p. 28, pp. 31-33, pp. 36-37.

"Review: Scharples et al., Computers and Thought", Philosophical Psychology 4 (1991), pp. 383-385.

"What Reviewers Should and Should Not Do: On Harold Thimbleby on AI: Its Scope and Limits", SIGART Bulletin (January 1992), pp. 6-7.

"The TTT is Not the Final Word", THINK (June 1993), pp. 34-36.

"Evidential Probabilities are Not Enough", Computational Intelligence (Feruary 1994), pp. 49-52.

"Escaping the Propositional Prison", The Monist (July 1997), pp. 378-381.

"Intelligence vs. Mentality: Important but Independent Concepts", in A. Meystel, ed., Proceedings of the 1997 International Conference on Intelligent Systems and Semiotics (Gaithersburg, MD: National Institute of Standards and Technology, 1997), pp. 493-498.

"The Philosophy of AI and Its Critique", in Luciano Floridi, ed., The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Computing and Information (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 2004), pp. 119-134.

"Information: Does it Have to be True?", Minds and Machines 14/2 (May 2004), pp. 223-229.

"Disinformation: The Use of False Information", Minds and Machines 14/2 (May 2004), pp. 231-240.

"The Frame Problem", The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2nd edition (New York, NY: MacMillan Reference Books, 2006).

Electronic Publications:

"Van Brakel's Position Appears to be Incoherent", PSYCOLOQUY 4 (14), frame-problem.4 (February 1993).

"Philosophy Unframed: A Response to van Brakel, Grush, and Morris", PSYCOLOQUY 4 (33), frame-problem.10 (April 1993).